IDA

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

Why Nations Differ in Military Skill (And How That Should Affect U.S. Defense Planning)

Wade P. Hinkle
Michael P. Fischerkeller
Matthew N. Diascro
Rafael Bonoan

October 1999

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

IDA Document D-2372

Log: H 99-002256

19991109 115

This work was conducted under IDA's independent research program. The publication of this IDA document does not indicate endorsement by the Department of Defense, nor should the contents be construed as reflecting the official position of that Agency.

© 1999 Institute for Defense Analyses, 1801 N. Beauregard Street, Alexandria, Virginia 22311-1772 • (703) 845-2000.

This material may be reproduced by or for the U.S. Government.

INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES

IDA Document D-2372

Why Nations Differ in Military Skill (And How That Should Affect U.S. Defense Planning)

Wade P. Hinkle
Michael P. Fischerkeller
Matthew N. Diascro
Rafael Bonoan

PREFACE

This research was conducted under the Independent Research Program of the Institute for Defense Analyses.

The authors owe thanks to several people who generously assisted our efforts. Prof. Herbert K. Tilemma of the University of Missouri made available his dataset on foreign military interventions. Prof. Patrick J. McGowan of Arizona State University made available his data on coups. Ms. Mary D. Hinkle, a government specialist on China, made many helpful suggestions in our research on the scholarship on Chinese civil-military relations. Prof. Stephen D. Biddle of the University of North Carolina, adjunct member of the IDA staff, and our co-investigator in much of the work that this paper uses as its point of departure, reviewed our research design and suggested many improvements. Mr. Michael Leonard at IDA reviewed the draft paper and also made suggestions for improvements. Thanks are also due to Ms. Shelly D. Smith and Ms. Burnette A. Aylor of the IDA staff for their assistance in the editing and production of the paper.

The authors alone are responsible for any errors that remain.

CONTENTS

Preface	iii
Executive Summary	ES-1
1. Introduction	I-1
Questionable Assumptions	I-3
The Importance of Skill	
National Differences in Skill	
Organization of the Paper	
2. Factors Affecting Development of Skill	2-1
Economic and Human Resources	2-1
Proliferation of Arms and Technology	2-6
The Skill Factor	2-8
Civil-Military Relations	2-9
Duplicate Chains of Command and Missions	
Lack of Integration, Tendency toward Hyper Centralization	2-12
Little Overseas Training or Contact with Outsiders	
De Minimis Exception	
Organizational Culture	2-16
Measuring Organizational Culture	
"Culture Lag"	
Non-Western Recipients	2-21
Large Or Small Effects?	
3. Testing the Alternative Hypotheses	3-1
Operationalizing the Variables	3-1
The Effect of Civil-Military Relations	3-5
The Effect of Culture Lag	3-8
Summary of Results	3-10

	4. Conclusion and Implications	4-1
	Planning Uncertainty and Size of the Threat	4-1
	Policies on Arms Transfer and Control	4-4
	Net Assessment Techniques and Intelligence Requirements	4-4
	Bibliography	.Bib-1
	Appendix: Dataset Construction	A-1
	\cdot	
	FIGURES	
	·	
2-1	Economic Performance of Selected Countries	2 - 3
2-2	Average Annual Arms Transfers to Developing Nations	2-4
2-3	High-School-Aged Females in Secondary School	2-6
2-4	Hypothesized Determinants of Skill Attainment	2-9
2-5	Hypothesized Effects of Poor Civil-Military Relations	2-15
2-6	Categorizing Organizational Behavior	2-18
3-1	Organizational Culture z-scores	3-8
	TABLES	
2-1	Variations in Economic Performance	2-2
2-2	Variations in Human Development	2-5
3-1	Mean Intervenor Fatalities per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Civil-Military Relations for All Types of Military Operations	
3-2	Mean Intervenor Fatalities per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Civil-Military Relations for Conventional Military Operations Only	
3-3	Mean Intervenor Fatalities per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Civil-Military Relations for All Types of Military Operations Except Conventional	3-7
3-4	Mean Intervenor Fatalities per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Culture for All Types of Military Operations	3-9

TABLES (Cont'd)

3-5	Mean Intervenor Fatalities per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target	
	Culture for All Types of Military Operations	3-10
4-1	Characteristics of Potential Planning Cases	4-3

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

A consistent recent theme sounded by defense policymakers and commentators is the difficulty of planning under conditions of strategic uncertainty. The uncertainty confronting defense planners is said to stem in substantial part from two causes, often thought to interact. The first is the possibility that sustained economic growth in developing countries may permit significant increases in defense spending and human development over the next 15 to 25 years. For example, substantial growth in incomes and literacy occurred in parts of East Asia over the past three decades. This has led many analysts to speculate that similar gains may occur or continue in countries such as China. Such sustained growth invested in military budgets could, the argument goes, result in the emergence of one or more regional powers or even "near-peer" competitors to the United States in the second decade of the 21st Century. How might these new powers arise? Through the proliferation of advanced technology and weapons systems, goes the argument. Thus the second uncertainty, the degree to which such proliferation will occur, is related to and interacts with the first.

Some of the concerns about the spread of advanced technologies center on the acquisition by potential adversaries of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and/or the use of such weapons or other exotic technologies for terrorist attacks or asymmetric counter-value strategies to deter the United States from acting in regional conflicts. But the primary concern regarding arms transfers centers on their potential for dramatically improving the conventional military capability of potentially aggressive or destabilizing regional actors. The Secretary of Defense has stated that the ability to defend key allies and regions against this threat is and will remain one of the highest American defense imperatives over the next 15 to 25 years. So if it is true that access to better weapons automatically translates into improvements in military capabilities, our security strategy may be at risk over the mid- to long-term future.

Taken together, the two sources of uncertainty seem to pose a double dilemma for defense planners. Economic performance in the developing world (and concomitant improvement in human development) has been highly variable over the past 30 years, but was quite high over that period in a number of countries. In addition, the number of sources of modern weapons and military technology is increasing. The confluence of these trends has led many to conclude that (1) it is impossible to characterize meaningfully the future capabilities of potential adversaries, but (2) the potential for *at least some* of them to make dramatic improvements in conventional military capabilities (because they will be able to afford them) cannot be ruled out, and therefore (3) the U.S should pursue prophylactic policies, especially in the form of robust modernization, aggressive pursuit of advanced technologies, and controls on technology and arms transfers.

The syllogism in the preceding paragraph may, however, rest upon two questionable assumptions. The first is that possession of advanced weapons leads automatically to improved military capability. Ongoing research at the Institute for Defense Analyses suggests a different relationship: that user skill and operational doctrine interact strongly with weapons technology, and that skill levels therefore profoundly affect combat outcomes. If true, then to increase one's capability, it is not enough simply to be able to acquire advanced weapons—militaries must also be able to develop and maintain high skill levels. In addition, the demonstrated robustness of the skill-technology relationship leads us in turn to question the second basic assumption posited above, i.e. that increased capital and human resources equals increased capability. If military skill is indeed largely a matter of resources invested over some time period, then given a decision to do so and sufficient resources, any government can make substantial improvements in its military's skill, especially over the mid to long term. But based on the preliminary research presented here, we believe there may be important systemic impediments in many nations that will retard or frustrate their attempts to translate resources into improved military skill. Moreover, because these impediments are a function of the fundamental nature of systems of governance and cultural norms, they are extremely difficult to change by policy and tend to be stable over even long periods of time. These traits are present in many of our potential adversaries. If our hypothesis is

true, it may be the case that future threat levels can in many cases be meaningfully predicted more accurately and may be less severe than currently believed.

We hypothesize that two factors in particular affect a country's ability to attain and sustain military skill and that these factors operate largely independent of resources and deliberate policy. The factors are civil-military relations and a phenomenon called "cultural lag."

Regarding the first, *poor* civil-military relations limit the types and intensity of military training that the government is willing to permit. To sustain their hold on power, threatened regimes also often feel compelled to intervene detrimentally in military promotions and operational planning. As a result, militaries that are distrusted by their regimes often manifest duplicate chains of command, lack horizontal and inter-service communication, practice little or no joint training, and exhibit hyper-centralized decision-making. Each of these retards realistic training at high tempos, and acts as brakes on operational synchronization.

The second factor, "cultural lag," finds its genesis in the differences in culturally based norms of interpersonal behavior in organizations between the designers of modern advanced weapons systems and their users. Most advanced weapons systems (and here the word "systems" should be emphasized) are designed in "Western" countries. Their designs include the designers' culturally based expectations about the behavioral norms that will predominate in the organizations in which these assets will operate. When these weapon systems are exported to and operated by countries that do not share the same culture-based organizational behavior norms, a mismatch occurs. This mismatch has a tangible and substantial detrimental effect on operators' ability to train and utilize the system (especially on their ability to train intensely or actually employ the system on a sustained basis). This detrimental effect will be increasingly intensified as technology links individual weapons systems together into systems-of-systems, thereby intensifying system interdependence and training and operational complexity.

We tested for this detrimental effect in an examination of 457 military operations that have occurred since 1945. We controlled for disparity in economic resources and human capital between combatants, and found that there were differences in performance

(defined as fatalities suffered per day) between militaries in countries with good vs. bad civil-military relations and with Western vs. non-Western organizational cultures.

Why should poor civil-military relations and cultural lag matter to defense planners? Because both are enduring national attributes that change only slowly and are not susceptible to direction by policy, i.e. a government cannot legislate trust between military and civilian officials. Also, many developing nations (including many of our potential adversaries) have one or the other characteristic, so even if they grow steadily richer and can find willing weapons suppliers, their military capabilities will probably remain low. So if our hypothesis is true, it has several interesting implications for defense planning and policy.

PLANNING UNCERTAINTY AND SIZE OF THE THREAT

The conventional wisdom is that the size of tomorrow's defense challenges is extremely uncertain. That may be incorrect. The size of tomorrow's threats may be easier to forecast—and smaller—than generally supposed.

Most of the nations commonly mentioned as potential security concerns for the future have either bad civil-military relations or very non-Western norms of organizational culture or both. If our hypotheses are correct, these characteristics may act as significant brakes on their ability to improve military skills and thus generate combat power. This does not gainsay the possibility that some of these nations may have quite large military establishments. Economic growth may even permit them to have sizable quantities of advanced equipment. And the human raw material available for military service may be better educated. But their ability to integrate those assets into sustained, large-scale military operations may be quite limited. Nations limited in this way will be at a significant military disadvantage vis-a-vis skilled opponents, even skilled opponents equipped with somewhat less modern systems.

POLICIES ON ARMS TRANSFER AND CONTROL

If our hypotheses are correct, arms transfers to developing nations are probably much less likely to cause significant shifts in regional conventional arms balances than commonly supposed. (Again, as stated previously, we are not asserting that this is true

about transfers of nuclear, biological, or chemical arms or technologies.) Many recipients will simply lack the ability to fully utilize the modern weapon system capabilities. So to the extent that regional powers make realistic assessments of their neighbors' military capability, arms races will not automatically be kindled by the introduction of even advanced systems into a region. Nor would the transfer of such weapons to a potentially hostile power necessarily increase the risk to our allies in the region or to our forces should we need to operate there.

NET ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES AND INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Most net assessment techniques are of the "bean-counting" variety, focusing on the numbers and technical characteristics of the two sides' weapons. That's also true of intelligence reporting. If our theories are correct, this approach may result in serious overestimations of the military effectiveness of potential enemies. As we have argued, the possession of the material products of technology should in no way imply that these products could be used effectively. From our perspective, this approach to net assessment focuses on the wrong level of analysis and, in so doing, confuses latent weapons capability with military effectiveness. This is especially true of assessments at the theater, force-on-force levels that drive much defense programming (and hence defense budgets). The longer, more wide-ranging and more intense a conflict is, the more the effects discussed in this paper will become apparent.

In our ongoing work on skill, technology, and combat outcomes, we have suggested it is imperative that the new generation of combat assessment models now under development include a proper comprehension of how skill and technology interact to produce real combat outcomes. If the hypotheses we explore here are correct, it may be equally important that tools used to forecast future capabilities of foreign forces incorporate civil-military relations and culture lag as factors. And it will be important for the Intelligence Community to have the capability to collect and analyze indicators related to those factors. Failing to do so may result in gross overestimates of the capabilities of potential opponents.

1. INTRODUCTION

A consistent recent theme sounded by defense policymakers and commentators is the difficulty of planning under conditions of strategic uncertainty. As Secretary of Defense Cohen wrote in the introduction to the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR): "[W]hile the prospect of a horrific, global war has receded, new threats and dangers—harder to define and more difficult to track—have gathered on the horizon."

The uncertainty confronting defense planners is said to stem substantially from two causes, often thought to interact. The first is the possibility that sustained economic growth in developing countries may permit significant increases in defense spending and human development over the next 15 to 25 years. Observing the substantial growth in incomes and literacy that occurred in parts of East Asia over the past three decades, many analysts speculate that similar gains could occur in countries such as China. Such sustained growth invested in military budgets could, the argument goes, result in the emergence of one or more regional powers or even "near-peer" competitors to the United States in the second decade of the 21st century.

The second cause of uncertainty is the proliferation and sale of militarily useful technology and advanced weapons systems. The fear, again as summarized in the QDR, is that such transfers could shift the military balance in key regions or raise the cost of future U.S. military operations, especially

...in the Middle East, where the proliferation of advanced technologies provides rogue states such as Iran with increasingly sophisticated means to threaten regional security, and in East Asia, where such proliferation threatens to upset delicate military balances in a region rife with long-festering territorial disputes. The civilian marketplace is developing technology that has dual civilian and military applications, and this makes it difficult to slow the diffusion of technology to potentially hostile state and non-state actors. Nations such as the United States that

William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, *Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review* (Washington: Department of Defense, May 1997), Introduction (from online version at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/). Hereinafter cited as QDR Report.

embed such technology in their military forces could be particularly vulnerable to countermeasures if this challenge is not fully considered in system designs.²

Some of the concerns about the spread of advanced technologies center on the acquisition by potential adversaries of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, and/or the use of such weapons or other exotic technologies for terrorist attacks or asymmetric counter-value strategies to deter the United States from acting in regional conflicts by threatening large-scale loss of American lives. Those are troubling possibilities and are already properly the subject of study and analysis.³ But the primary concern regarding arms transfers centers on their potential for dramatically improving the *conventional* military capability of potentially aggressive or destabilizing regional actors. The Secretary of Defense has stated that the ability to defend key allies and regions against this threat is and will remain one of the highest American defense imperatives over the next 15 to 25 years.⁴

[W]e will continue to confront a variety of regional dangers. Foremost among these is the threat of coercion and large-scale, cross-border aggression against U.S. allies and friends in key regions by hostile states with significant military power.

So if it is true that access to better weapons automatically translates into improvements in military capabilities, our security strategy may be at risk over the midto long term.

Taken together, the two sources of uncertainty seem to pose a double dilemma for defense planners. As will be seen later in this paper, economic performance in the developing world (and concomitant improvement in human development) has been highly variable over the past 30 years, but has been quite high over that period in a number of countries. In addition, the number of sources of modern weapons and military technology is increasing. The confluence of these trends has led many to conclude that (1) it is impossible to characterize meaningfully the future capabilities of potential adversaries, but (2) the potential for *at least some* of them to make dramatic

² Ibid., Section 2.

Nevertheless, for reasons discussed in Chapter 2, weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and asymmetric comparative threats fall outside the scope of the argument we present in this paper.

⁴ Ibid.

improvements in conventional military capabilities (because they will be able to afford them) cannot be ruled out, and therefore (3) the U.S should pursue prophylactic policies, especially in the form of robust modernization, aggressive pursuit of advanced technologies, and controls on technology and arms transfers.

QUESTIONABLE ASSUMPTIONS

The syllogism in the preceding paragraph may, however, rest upon two questionable assumptions. The first is that possession of advanced weapons leads automatically to improved military capability. Ongoing research at the Institute for Defense Analyses suggests a different relationship: that user skill and operational doctrine interact strongly with weapons technology, and that skill levels therefore profoundly affect combat outcomes. If true, then to increase one's capability, it is not enough simply to be able to acquire advanced weapons—militaries must also be able to develop and maintain high skill levels. (Indeed, in many cases, skill development should come first, for it will provide substantial improvements in capability even with existing weapons.) In addition, the demonstrated robustness of the skill-technology relationship leads us in turn to question the second assumption posited above, i.e., that increased capital and human resources automatically equals increased capability. If military skill is indeed largely a matter of resources invested over some time period, then given a decision to do so and sufficient resources, any government can make substantial improvements in its military's skill, especially over the mid to long term.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the validity of this second assumption. Based on the preliminary research presented here, we believe there may be important systemic impediments in many nations that will retard or frustrate their attempts to translate resources into improved military skill. Moreover, because these impediments are a function of the fundamental nature of systems of governance and cultural norms, they are extremely difficult to change by policy and tend to be stable over even long periods of time. These traits are present in many of our potential adversaries. If our hypothesis is true, it may be the case that future threat levels can in many cases be meaningfully predicted with greater accuracy and may be less severe than currently believed.

But before beginning the analyses of how and why nations may differ in their ability to develop military skill, we need to summarize briefly our ongoing work (undertaken with our colleague Stephen Biddle) on how skill affects combat outcomes.⁵

THE IMPORTANCE OF SKILL

Evidence is mounting that the *interaction* between technology and its users' *skills* profoundly influences real combat outcomes. Technology (or applied technology in the form of weapons effectiveness) does not in and of itself determine combat results. This is because technology's effects differ radically depending on the countermeasures adopted by its targets—especially how well they use tactical counters. (For ground combat, for example, these include cover, concealment, dispersion, suppressive fire, combined arms, and independent maneuver by small units.)

Survival on the modern battlefield requires the ability to reduce exposure to hostile firepower. Properly implemented, tactical countermeasures are extremely effective at this. Correctly dug defilade vehicle fighting positions, for example, can negate an opponent's advanced sights and long-range gunnery by keeping friendly tanks below grade until the opponent is close. Suppressive fire can reduce hostile firing rates by a factor of 10 or more even if it kills no targets directly. Attackers able to use cover and concealment effectively often can advance to within a few hundred meters of a typical defensive position without extended exposure to defensive fires.⁶

But while such countermeasures are potentially very effective, they are often very difficult to implement properly and are getting more so all the time. To make the most of cover and concealment, for example, each small-unit commander must fashion unique

Readers who wish to know more about the ongoing work on skill-technology interaction and combat outcomes should consult Stephen Biddle, Wade Hinkle, and Michael Fischerkeller, "Skill and Technology in Modern Warfare," forthcoming in *Joint Force Quarterly* (Summer 1999). The results of the ongoing IDA research will be published shortly by the same authors in *Beyond Firepower: Including Skill and Operational Sophistication in Combat Modeling*, IDA Paper P-3477, (Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses forthcoming). Results to date were reported in "Modeling Skill-Technology Synergy in Combat Assessments," a paper presented at the 67th Symposium of the Military Operations Research Society, West Point, NY, June 23, 1999. The initial basis for this ongoing research can be found in Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood: What the Persian Gulf Conflict Tells Us About the Future of Conflict," *International Security*, 21, 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179.

⁶ Stephen Biddle, "The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare," Security Studies, 8, 1 (Fall 1998); idem., "Victory Misunderstood," op. cit., at pp. 166-9.

plans for movement and disposition based on the vagaries of local conditions. Troops cannot simply be laid out in standard, textbook formations and marched toward the objective or be deployed in formulaic cookie-cutter defensive layouts. Proper use of suppressive fire requires very tight coordination between widely separated, moving units and multiple commanding officers. Since the pace of an assault varies unpredictably with terrain and enemy action, maintaining continuous suppression requires a complex combination of planning, adaptation, and communications between harried commanders at many different echelons. Dispersion and independent small-unit maneuver increase the number of independent decision-makers in any given organization. They also demand greater initiative and tactical judgment from junior leaders and make it harder for those leaders to see and communicate with their troops.

As the range and lethality of weapons has increased, so has the depth over which such techniques must be exercised. The advent of long-range weapons and airpower has extended the zone of maximum complexity from front-line units and their immediate supporting elements to, in some cases, entire theaters. But while this is an important change, it is one of degree, not kind. Traditional operational countermeasures employing cover, concealment, dispersion, suppressive fire, combined arms, and independent small unit maneuver still work by exploiting weaknesses of advanced technology. In particular, our ability to engage dispersed targets under cover is still dramatically lower than our ability to destroy massed armor in the open, and will be for some time to come. What is changing is the difficulty of making the countermeasures work over the required span of space and time.

Militaries that can cope with such growing complexity are likely to see their vulnerability change little even as the nominal lethality and reach of modern weapons continue to grow. Militaries that *cannot* cope with such complexity are likely to see their vulnerability grow dramatically. Changing technology thus acts as a wedge by

⁷ For recent examples from Operation ALLIED FORCE, see Michael R. Gordon with Eric Schmitt, "War Games in Kosovo: Allies Seek, Serbs Hide," New York Times, April 7, 1999, p. 1, and Joseph Fitchett, "Escalation of Air War Underscores Its Flaws: Low-Tech Serb Tactics Stymie NATO Plan," International Herald Tribune, April 14, 1999, p. 1.

magnifying the consequences of skill differentials over time. Absent a favorable skill overmatch, technology per se cannot be relied upon to produce Gulf War-like results in the future.

If the skill-technology hypothesis is true, it has two profoundly important implications for regional balance assessment and defense planning:

- 1. Knowing a military's skill level is critical to predicting its current capability (in many cases more important than knowing about quantity and types of weapons).
- 2. Understanding how skill is developed is key to predicting future capability.

NATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN SKILL

We hypothesize that two factors in particular affect a country's ability to attain and sustain military skill and that these factors operate largely independent of resources and deliberate policy. The factors are civil-military relations and a phenomenon called "cultural lag."

Regarding the first, *poor* civil-military relations limit the types and intensity of military training that the government is willing to permit. To sustain their hold on power, threatened regimes also often feel compelled to intervene detrimentally in military promotions and operational planning. As a result, militaries that are distrusted by their regimes often manifest duplicate chains of command, lack horizontal and inter-service communication, practice little or no joint training, and exhibit hyper-centralized decision-making. Each of these retards realistic training at high tempos, and acts as a brake on operational synchronization.

The second factor, "cultural lag," finds its genesis in the differences in culturally based norms of interpersonal behavior in organizations between the designers of modern advanced weapons systems and their users. Most advanced weapons systems (and here the word "systems" should be emphasized), are designed in "Western" countries. Their designs include the designers' culturally-based expectations about the behavioral norms that will predominate in the organizations in which these assets will operate. When these weapon systems are exported to and operated by countries that do not share the same

The term is defined and the rationale for it discussed below.

culture-based organizational behavior norms, a mismatch occurs. This mismatch has a tangible and substantial detrimental effect on operators' ability to train and utilize the *system* (especially on their ability to train intensely or actually employ the system on a sustained basis). This detrimental effect will be increasingly intensified as technology links individual weapons systems together into *systems-of-systems*, thereby intensifying system interdependence and training and operational complexity.

Why should poor civil-military relations and cultural lag matter to defense planners? Because both are enduring national attributes that change only slowly and are not susceptible to direction by policy, i.e., a government cannot legislate trust between military and civilian officials. Also, many developing nations (including many of our potential adversaries) have one or the other characteristic, so even if they grow steadily richer and can find willing weapons suppliers, their military capabilities will probably remain low. Indeed, while it seems somewhat counterintuitive, the acquisition of ever more advanced weapons technologies by many developing nations may actually *decrease* their relative threat to regional stability and U.S. national security.

ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER

We have divided the discussion and testing of our hypotheses into three chapters. Chapter 2 briefly reviews the arguments by others regarding how economic growth and weapons proliferation may place US security at risk either directly or indirectly by promoting regional instability. It then more fully explicates the cause-and-effect mechanisms through which we hypothesize that poor civil-military relations and cultural lag lead to diminished military skill and hence capability. Chapter 3 presents our research design and some results from a large-*n* test of our hypotheses. Chapter 4 concludes with a discussion of the implications for both defense policy and planning.

2. FACTORS AFFECTING DEVELOPMENT OF SKILL

Measurements of the quantity and quality of weapons available to each side drive most orthodox combat capability assessment techniques. Orthodox assessment techniques intended to portray current regional balances do the same. Forecasts of future capabilities are also heavily influenced by assumptions about the availability of quantities of modern weapons (about which, more in a moment), but they also focus on the role played by economic and human development.

ECONOMIC AND HUMAN RESOURCES

Since the advent of the modern state system, economic strength has been held to be an important indicator of potential to develop military capability. Indeed, many consider that, since the beginning of industrialization, economic power has been the single most important leading indicator of future military power (and a decline in economic performance has been seen as a harbinger of a loss of military power). Accordingly, since the end of the Cold War many have regarded the strong economic performance of same developing countries as harbingers of their future military capabilities.

For an early example of the argument, see Patrick Colquhoun, A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire (London: Joseph Mawman, 1815). For a treatment on the relationship between economics and military power in pre-industrial Europe, see John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (London: Routledge, 1994).

See, for example, Edward D. Mansfield, Power, Trade, and War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994); Kenneth A. Schultz, The Democratic Advantage: The Institutional Sources of State Power in International Competition (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1996); Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Random House, 1987); and John Zysman, Power, Wealth, and Technology: Industrial Decline and American national Security (Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, University of California, 1990).

Table 2-1. Variations in Economic Performance

Category of country	GNP per capita, 1965-1990 Average annual rate of change	
	Worst average rate	Best average rate
ow-income economies	-2.4%	5.8%
ower-middle income	-3-3%	8.4%
pper-middle income	-3.0%	7.1%
gh-income economies	-4.0%	6.2%

As Table 2-1 shows, economic performance among developing countries has been highly variable over mid- to long-term periods. Compounded over time, these rate differentials can produce astonishing differences in wealth between countries. For all lower-middle income economies, for example, the worst sustained performer (Nicaragua) had per capita real gross domestic product in 1990 that was only 40 percent of its real per capita product in 1965. The best sustained performer (Botswana) had per capita income in 1990 more than 8 times as large as in 1965.

This wide variance in mid- to long-term economic performance for individual countries is one reason that many feel the future military planning environment is so uncertain. Others, however, point to the fact that there have been at least some remarkable instances of sustained growth in past periods. They therefore posit that it is reasonable to assume that at least *some* developing countries (and by extension, countries that may figure in security calculations as friends or adversaries) will have high sustained growth over the next 15 to 25 years. For example, as shown in Figure 2-1, Israel's gross domestic product per capita more than doubled in real terms over a 27-year period beginning in 1965. Egypt's nearly tripled, while South Korea's increased by almost a factor of 7.




Figure 2-1. Economic Performance of Selected Countries

The planning concern regarding potentially strong economic growth in the developing world is that such growth will be translated into military spending in ways that permit single countries or groups of countries to field hardware inventories that rival our own. As Figure 2-2 shows, arms transfers to developing countries averaged \$23 billion annually in constant 1998 dollars from 1991 through 1998. That amount is a little more than 40 percent of the average spent annually by the Defense Department on all procurement during the same period (which was \$53 billion in constant 1998 dollars).³ And the relative parity between the aggregate developing world and American weapons procurement is even greater than that since the arms transfer totals in Figure 2-2 do not include indigenous production, while DoD's totals include many non-weapons items. If any given developing country devoted just a pro rata share of increased GDP per capita to defense spending and if that country enjoyed just a 4 percent real rate of growth over the next 25 years, that country's defense spending could rise a total of 225 percent. If every

Figures for 1991-1997 are from William M. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the President and the Congress (Washington, Department of Defense, 1997). Figures on 1998 are from the DoD Comptroller's office, http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/FY2000budget/FY00P1U.pdf, p. 4.

developing country did it, the aggregate spending in defense procurement would far outstrip DoD's planned procurement spending.




Figure 2-2. Average Annual Arms Transfers to Developing Nations

Of course, it has been argued that the ability to translate economic resources into a capability to utilize advanced weapons is heavily dependent upon human capital. On the importance of human capital, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, for example, wrote in *Joint Vision 2010*:

Attracting people with the intellectual tools, physical skills, and motivation to serve ... was among the foremost requirements in building a professional, robust and ready force. In the late 1970s, over 15 percent of our enlistees scored in the lowest category for military qualifications examinations. Today, less than 1 percent are in that category and over 90 percent of enlistees have graduated from high school.⁴

In theory (precisely the theory we intend to question in the next chapter), even militaries in poor countries could devote substantial financial resources to training and education of recruits and therefore overcome whatever disadvantage in human

John M. Shalikashvili, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Vision 2010* (Washington: Department of Defense, 1996).

development their underlying civilian economy and society have relative to developed nations. As Table 2-2 shows, much of the developing world has faced such a relative deficit in human resources in the past.

Table 2-2. Variations in Human Development

Category of country	Percentage of eligible school-age population enrolled in 1989	
	Secondary school	Tertiary education
Low-income economies	38%	2%
Lower-middle income	55%	17%
Upper-middle income	56%	17%
High-income economies	95%	42%
Source: World Development Report	1992, op. cit., Table 29	

But as was the case with national income, some developing countries *have* made substantial improvements in their level of human development over the past 25 years. As Figure 2-3 shows, both South Korea and Egypt improved the rate of female enrollment in secondary school from levels near that of low-income economies in 1970 to levels close to those in high-income economies by 1993.⁵ In the dataset presented in Table A-1 we report a number of human development and economic resource indicators for use in testing of our hypotheses. Perhaps unsurprisingly, these human resource factors tend to be highly correlated with economic development. For example, the correlation between illiteracy and per capita income in our sample is r = -645 (p < .001, n = 601). The ability of at least some states to couple strong economic performance to human capital improvement buttresses the arguments presented by many that the next 20 to 30 years could well see the emergence of many new regional powers, if not in fact near-peer

⁵ For countries in the developing world, rates of female educational enrollment substantially lag those of males, so raising female enrollment to high-income levels is an even more impressive achievement than simply raising the overall national average.

competitors to the United States. China and other nations in East Asia are often cited as candidates in this regard, as is India.⁶ Essentially, many commentators feel that the amount of disposable income that developing countries can devote to weapons purchases is going to grow over time, as will their ability to use them.




Figure 2-3. High-School-Aged Females in Secondary School

Proliferation of Arms and Technology

There is a widespread belief that proliferation of advanced military technologies and weapons runs the risk of facilitating the rise of a near-peer competitor and promoting regional instability. It has been proposed that the rapid proliferation of highly sophisticated weapons to the Third World may foster militaristic tendencies and encourage national leaders to think of military, rather than political, means for resolving their disputes.⁷ Seth Carus, for instance, argues that modern weapons are so highly

See for example, Suisheng Zhao, Dynamics of Power Competition in East Asia: from the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity (London: Macmillan, 1998); and Robert A. Forczyk, "Emergent India and the Assessment of Third World Regional Powers in the Post-Cold War," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland at College Park, 1993.

See, for example, Charles Krauthammer, "Why We Must Contain China." Time, July 31, 1995, p. 72; National Panel on Conventional Arms Control, Controlling the Conventional Arms Race (New York:

capable that they will be inherently destabilizing because of their ability to decisively determine military outcomes.⁸ In particular, Carus feels proliferation of command and control systems and other enabling technologies will intensify shifts in regional military power.⁹ Steven Rosen agrees that such improved military capabilities could cause shifts in power balances, encouraging opportunistic regimes to capitalize on this advantage by settling an old score or seeking personal or national aggrandizement.¹⁰

Some analysts have argued that proliferation of advanced weapons systems will not necessarily lead to improved capabilities (and hence increased political instability) unless certain problems attendant to absorption of new technologies are overcome. For example, Geoffrey Kemp argues that recipient countries must solve what he calls the "back-end" problem of arms transfers—dependence on suppliers of platforms and technologies for infrastructure and support. 11 Christopher Parker views collaborative agreements that include co-development and co-production as one possible method to overcome these problems. (Without them, he argues, transfers of advanced systems may not increase capabilities.) 12 Michael Moodie extends this line of reasoning in observing that entire production processes are being shared today. He concludes, therefore, that in the future, buyers will place a greater emphasis on the transfer of intermediate technology

United nations Association, 1976), p. 6; and David Mussington, "Understanding Contemporary International Arms Transfers," *Adelphi Paper 291* (London: Brassey's, 1994).

See W. Seth Carus, "Weapons Technology and Regional Stability," in *Arms Control and Proliferation* in the Middle East and South Asia (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), pp. 9-16, 10.

⁹ Ibid.

Steven J. Rosen, "The Proliferation of New Land-based Technologies: Implications for Local Military Balances," in Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy, Arms Transfers in the Modern World (New York: Praeger, 1979), pp. 109-130, 115.

Geoffrey Kemp, "Arms Transfers and the 'Back-end' Problem in Developing Countries," in Uri Ra'anan, Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp, eds., Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Military Buildup in Less Industrial Countries (Boulder: Westview, 1978), pp. 264-275. Kemp also argues that if countries have sole dependency on a reliable supplier or are autarkic, the "back-end" problem is a non-issue.

¹² Christopher S. Parker, "New Weapons for Old Problems: Conventional Proliferation and Military Effectiveness in Developing States," *International Security*, 23, 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 119-147.

capable of generating "enabling technologies." Those enabling technologies will in turn assist recipients in taking full advantage of the abilities of advanced weapons. 13

The Skill Factor

The cautionary notes sounded by some of the commentators just mentioned, however, mostly relate to the presumption that the problems that recipients may face with regard to absorbing advanced technology are largely a function of low human capital. The assumption that co-production and co-development can facilitate absorption is in reality an assumption that a lack of training and education is the only impediment to effective use of modern weapons systems. If indeed this is merely a matter of direct and indirect application of resources (the indirect application being that of devoting some resources to general or targeted improvement in human capital), then it may indeed be a slight impediment, at least for some developing countries.

Though most of the sources-of-national-power and arms-transfer literature fails to mention it explicitly, a military's ability to "absorb" advanced technology is really one particular form of skill effect. Obviously, operators and support personnel must be trained on the new equipment. But successful absorption doesn't stop there. Modern weapons operate as weapon systems, and so a complete factor-inputs to weapon-outputs system must be designed and implemented, and the personnel who will staff each part of the system must be trained. These various weapon systems must be meshed with operational doctrine and tactics and with specific operational plans, and the resulting aggregate integrated into a system-of-systems that supplies the ability to identify and engage targets, assess results, and plan next steps. This, as noted by some of the commentators cited above, requires additional enabling systems, which generate their own demands on training and operator skill (and in many cases these "operators" are highly trained staff specialists). As we have argued in our underlying work on the effect of skill on combat outcomes, the evidence indicates that a failure to achieve a high level of skill in each of these levels of system organization will lead to poor overall capabilities. Low-skill militaries, even if equipped with advanced weapons and facing opponents with inferior weapons, will thus perform poorly when confronting highly skilled enemies. 14 Put

Michael Moodie, "The Challenge of Technology Diffusion," Washington Quarterly, 18, 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 183-202, 189.

¹⁴ See the citations in footnote 5 in Chapter 1.

another way, transfer of advanced technology and weapons may have little influence on future regional balances and instability if recipients fundamentally lack the skill to conduct effective military operations.

This understanding of what skill is (the integration of individual performance, unit performance, and staff performance in a system of systems to reliably produce an intended effect) allows us to focus on what may be the key indicator of future military capability. An important question, then, as shown in Figure 2-4, is whether the only necessary and sufficient conditions for a country to develop and sustain high military skill levels are abundant resources and a will to do so. We hypothesize that there are, in fact, two additional necessary conditions: 1) the presence of good civil-military relations, and 2) congruence between the organizational expectations of the designers of equipment in inventory and the organizational norms of its users. And we note that these two conditions are not present in many of the developing countries that are today seeking advanced weapons systems. How we came to develop this hypothesis is the subject of the next section.

• Amount of training resources

> Financial, physical, technical

Amount of human capital

> Personnel with educational pre-requisites for training

Civil-military relations

> Does distrust cause government to intervene detrimentally in decisions on training or promotion?

• Organizational culture (culture lag)

➤ How well do the organizational norms of interpersonal interaction match those assumed in design of integrated, combined arms, system-of-systems?

Figure 2-4. Hypothesized Determinants of Skill Attainment

Civil-Military Relations

The literature on civil-military relations has focused primarily on explaining why different patterns of relations emerge and the effect of such relations on a country's

propensity for war. Little if any attention has been given to the impact that civil-military relations can have on military readiness.¹⁵ In the next section we offer some cause-effect arguments that speak to this important relationship.

Loyalty vs. Competence

As Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle proposed in their seminal work, it seems reasonable to suppose that *poor* civil-military relations may manifest behavior and policy on the part of the government that systematically act to constrain a military's ability to attain and maintain skill. These constraints appear in many forms. If a country has poor civil-military relations, it is likely that political loyalty, rather than military competence, will be the dominant criterion for assignment and/or promotion. Leaders with tenuous holds on power have a propensity to name military officers loyal to them to command assignments regardless of their qualifications. Consequently, many of the best-qualified officers (by objective skill measures such as officer efficiency reports) may be excluded from command, lowering the average skill levels of commanders. And command tenure tends to be brief in these countries, limiting the learning curve for commanders and the ability of talented commanders to improve troop training and operational planning. Moreover, those skilled but less-than-loyal officers who do somehow manage to advance through the command hierarchy are likely to be purged, along with their staff.

Saddam Hussein's regime and its relationship with the Iraqi armed forces are stellar examples of these phenomena. Most commanders in Iraq's military and security forces are Tikriti (as is Saddam) and have been selected for their loyalty. When the loyalty of a commander has been called into question, there has been no hesitation to purge him. In October 1998, 30 officers of the Hammurabi Division of the Republican Guard were reportedly executed for this reason. Similarly, about the time of Operation DESERT FOX at least five officers of the 11th Mechanized Division of the III Corps were

For a notable exception, see Stephen Biddle and Robert Zirkle, "Technology, Civil-military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 19, 2 (June 1996), pp. 171-212.

The commands of the Special Republican Guard, for example, are populated with officers either drawn from areas noted for loyalty to Saddam, such as Tikrit, or related to him by blood or marriage. "Saddam's Shield: The Role of the Special Republican Guard," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, January 1999, p. 29.

reportedly executed for suspicion of disloyalty.¹⁷ More recently, a former commander of Baghdad's air defense system, along with 23 other officers suspected of disloyalty, was reportedly executed for conspiring against the regime.¹⁸ These are but three of many recent reports of officer purges in Iraq.¹⁹ Transfers of command are just as frequent.²⁰

It is also common in Communist, authoritarian, and totalitarian systems to appoint outsiders, often from internal security organizations or the ruling party, to command positions. To use Iraq again as an example, many military commanders are members of the Ba'ath party and/or security elements, and have had only abbreviated military careers or skipped much of the normal combat arms officer career path.²¹

Duplicate Chains of Command and Missions

Poor civil-military relations can also often result in duplicative organizations and chains of command in the military. This occurs because the regime is unwilling to permit any single military organization to gain a monopoly on the use of force, for fear that it could overthrow the government. The result is a proliferation of organizations that have essentially the same mission (the army and Republican Guards, for instance) and a myriad of security apparatus that watch each other. For example, Iraq has at least three military organizations with substantial ground combat power: the Special Republican Guard—the only force permitted in central Baghdad—consisting of four infantry brigades, armor, air defense, and artillery; the Republican Guard; and the Regular Army.

¹⁷ Ian Black, "Iraqi Resistance Gets Data from Saddam's Intelligence," Washington Times, November 20, 1998, p. 17.

¹⁸ "Iraq Said to Execute 24 Army Officers," Washington Post, March 10, 1999, p. 18.

See, for additional examples, "For the Record," Washington Post, December 1, 1998, p. 19; "Report of Iraqi Executions," New York Times, January 8, 1999; "Iraqi Officers' Arrests said Linked to Security Breach," Al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 14, 1999, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Near East/South Asia Report (online edition) (hereinafter FBIS), May 14, 1999; and "Baghdad Discovers Coup Plot Cell in the Public Security Service," Al-Zaman, July 8, 1999, in FBIS, July 8, 1999.

See "INC Reports Saddam Shifts Military Commanders," Iraqi national Congress (Internet) WWW, June 6, 1998, FBIS, June 6, 1998. This practice is also prevalent in President Mubarak's relationship with the Egyptian armed forces. See "Military Still Looks to the West for Doctrine," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 28, 1996, p. 22.

²¹ "Qusayy To 'Cleanse' Army by Retiring Senior Officers," London Al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 22, 1997, p. 6, FBIS, May 22, 1997.

A similar situation exists in Cuba, where the Ministry of Interior has Special Troops and other assets with considerable light infantry and military police capability.

Saddam carries this duplication pattern into his security services as well. The Special Security Organization, the Iraqi Intelligence Service, and the Secret Police are all responsible for monitoring each other as well as the behaviors of the officer corps in the parallel military organizations.²² This system makes conspiracy by the military difficult and provides the regime with the early warning of dissension it needs to expeditiously purge individuals who pose inordinate risk. While this ensures the survival of the regime, it also punishes excellence and initiative in the officer corps and creates an overall environment of fear and distrust that is detrimental to unit cohesion. And it creates an obvious dis-economy of scale in the use of training budgets and resources. These duplicative organizations share few facilities, so double (sometimes triple) sets of training infrastructure and staff are needed. And of course many of these training establishments themselves tend to be commanded by loyalist appointees whose priority is indoctrination, not effective military training.

Lack of Integration, Tendency Toward Hyper Centralization

Training that is accomplished in regimes with poor civil-military relations is often narrowly focused on small-unit, single service operations. This is because little lateral or horizontal cooperation is permitted between commands (indeed, it is often explicitly prohibited and physically impossible). The same is true of joint training and deliberate planning for joint operations. Most command communications nets hub through central points to facilitate security monitoring and to inhibit plotting. In this system designed explicitly to engender distrust, organization and service component commanders are suspicious of each others' motives. Taking the initiative to improve integrated training can be a career-threatening event.

In keeping with his policy of appointing loyal persons to sensitive posts, Major General Kamal Mustafa Al Tikriti—brother of the husband of Saddam's youngest daughter—was appointed commander of the SRG in 1997; the SSO is headed by Saddam's son Qusay; and the Saddam Fedayeen is led by his eldest son Uday. Recently, Saddam carried out large-scale changes to increase the number of Tikriti officers occupying sensitive positions. See "The Number of Tikriti Officers Increases in the Important Positions," Kuwait Al-Qabas WWW (Internet), March 22, 1999, FBIS, March 22, 1999.

For the same reasons that regimes limit opportunities for integration, they also limit opportunity for realistic and large-scale field training and exercises. "Big" is threatening to these regimes, so most field exercises are either limited in size or rigidly scripted and controlled at very high echelons. (The regime wouldn't want a maneuver division to turn toward the capital.) No-notice readiness exercises are largely excluded for the same reason. And, partly to spare the frequently unqualified unit commanders embarrassment, there is little of the concept of learn-by-failing in the exercises that do occur. Scripting ensures that results match the plan.

All of the above are obvious disadvantages in preparing for modern combat operations, which require that forces be disciplinarily integrated and coordinated. Consequently, in many regimes with poor civil-military relations, competence—where it exists at all—is limited to simplistic planning and small-unit operations.

Regimes that feel threatened by their militaries also tend to hyper-centralize military decision-making. Nearly all decisions regarding training, battle plans, ammunition, logistics, etc., must be approved by the central military authorities and by the regime. Often this centralized control is used to punish politically incorrect unit commanders by denying them ammunition and logistic support. Saddam Hussein reportedly limits supplies to some ground units and rations jet fuel to others, severely restricting their training activity and possibly exerting an even greater impact on operations.²³

Little Overseas Training or Contact with Outsiders

Finally, regimes that feel vulnerable to their militaries frequently restrict or deny their officers any opportunities for interaction with foreign military experts. They will not send personnel overseas for technical training or staff college, they do not invite foreigners for personnel exchanges or extended in-country training, and they carefully monitor all contacts with foreign personnel that do occur. Regimes impose these restrictions in part because of the fear that their officers (particularly junior officers) may become counter-indoctrinated or recruited by hostile intelligence services. But perhaps

more importantly, they fear the development of a network of personal relationships between their own officers and foreign officers. The fear is that such networks make it possible for coup plotters to solicit outside help and support with confidence that their outside contacts will not denounce them. Another fear is that the networks could be used in reverse by other governments interested in fomenting a coup,²⁴ or at least to subvert officers into becoming unwitting agents of influence for a foreign government.²⁵

No-contact policies have predictable results. They deprive the affected militaries of opportunities for technical training and studying cutting edge thinking about operational art. They also sacrifice opportunities for officers to be exposed to critical thinking and challenges to conventional wisdom (not normally part of a political commissar's repertoire).

DE MINIMIS EXCEPTION

All of the protective behaviors described in this section place fundamental constraints on a military's ability to attain and maintain the skills necessary to perform effectively—even though they may be willing to spend substantial sums on training and readiness. (See Figure 2-5.) But, this is not to say that so-called pockets of excellence capable of operating effectively at the tactical level cannot exist in such militaries. (For

See James Morrison, "State of Paranoia," Washington Times, January 15, 1999, and Con Coughlin, "Saddam Seeks Kamikazi Squad but Doesn't Trust His Pilots," London Sunday Telegraph, March 21, 1999

²⁴ Bruce W. Farcau, *The Coup: Tactics in the Seizure of Power* (Westport, CT: 1994), pp. 103-100 and passim, and Steven R. David, *Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987). Note, though, that David says such training programs for foreign personnel in the United States intended to help influence foreign attendees may not produce as much influence as commonly supposed (p. 33).

For example, the personal contacts between the U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and his Indonesian counterpart, which occurred as part of the Defense Department's military-to-military contact efforts, are credited with having helped gain the Indonesian military's agreement to deployment of an international peacekeeping force to East Timor. Elizabeth Becker, "U.S.-To-Jakarta Messenger: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs," New York Times, September 14, 1999. A source quoted in that news report stated, "It was a big plus to have someone who could call the Indonesian military—they were the ones calling the shots," said a senior administration official. "We had a unique asset and I don't see how our military could have done it without their past history with these generals."

Political loyalty the criterion for assignment and promotion

- > Purges of officer corps
- > Frequent rotation of commanders
- Hyper-centralized decision making
- Little horizontal cooperation among forces
- Duplicate organizations and chains of command
- Minimal joint training
- Few opportunities for interaction with foreign expertise
- All of these factors inhibit skill attainment
 - > So their militaries face significant obstacles to improvements in skill

Figure 2-5. Hypothesized Effects of Poor Civil-Military Relations

example, Syria's Special Forces are regarded as highly capable at light infantry and ambush tactics.)²⁶ For this reason, we explicitly rule out of our hypothesis the claim that poor civil-military relations make it impossible for affected militaries to make *any* use of advanced technologies. An initial salvo of missiles, the delivery of a few NBC-armed missiles, the lucky shot that brings down an F-117, cannot be ruled out. And so our hypothesis may have less to say about circumstances in which one side has a zero tolerance for casualties, or in which an opponent is willing to use a small number of deliverable weapons of mass destruction in countervalue mode. We argue instead that the prohibitions and impediments to realistic training and operational coordination will quickly degrade such countries' ability for sustained, effective, larger-scale conventional military operations.²⁷ And to the extent that pockets of excellence exist at all in such

Syrian commandos, for example, conducted one of the most successful ambushes that has occurred against the Israeli Defense Force (in 1982 at Ain Zhalta in Lebanon). Richard A. Gabriel, Operation Peace for Galilee: The Israeli-PLO War in Lebanon (New York: Hill & Wang, 1984), p. 97. In addition, reports express concern that Syrian special forces may be capable of destroying Israeli radar sites as the first step of a non-notice Syrian strike against Israel. U. S. House of Representatives, Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare, Approaching the New Cycle of Arab-Israeli Fighting, December 10, 1996.

According to the QDR, such operations are the constraining cases for force size and capability in the current defense program.

militaries, the units involved are likely to be small and even themselves unable to maintain high skills for sustained periods.²⁸

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE

Culture (defined as the totality of socially transmitted behavior patterns) is a factor that has received scant attention in the scholarship on military effectiveness.²⁹ Yet culture has been found to have a significant effect on organizational behavior, and militaries are often the largest organization in any given country.

How does culture affect organizations? Societies develop generally accepted norms of behavior that are transmitted to their members through acculturation. As a matter of social self-preservation, norms regarding behavior that affect others are particularly strong, as are the sanctions for breaking them. People take this imbedded programming with them when they join institutions and organizations. Members of organizations, therefore, generally wish to honor society's norms of behavior even when acting as members of an organization.³⁰ It is true that organizations can have goals that are not completely co-joint with their host society's, especially over the short term. (Most organizations have a preference for autonomy and accumulation of resources, even, for example, when resource accumulation results in social costs such as environmental pollution.) And some organizations try to create internal norms of behavior that are consciously differentiated from the social average. (Vide the current management literature's fascination with corporate cultures that foster innovation through "out of the box thinking.")³¹ The acceptance of such imposed norms is rare, however, as deviations from social norms are usually quite small.

²⁸ Because of the inherent suspicion in non-democratic systems of elite units.

²⁹ The definition is taken from Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary (Boston: Riverside Publishing Co, 1994).

See Fons Trompenaars and Charles Hampden-Turner, Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Cultural Diversity in Global Business (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998), pp. 161-185.

Companies such as Apple Computer and Nordstrom are often regarded as having distinct corporate cultures. Guy Kawaski, *The Macintosh Way* (Scranton, PA: Harper Collins, 1990).

So organizations eventually evolve their own culture of behavior or "organizational culture," which is distinct from but usually coupled to underlying societal norms. Organizational culture can thus be defined as a set of strongly established, culturally sanctioned action and interaction patterns and expectations within an organization.

Dysfunction occurs when attempts are made to influence members of an organization to behave in ways that run counter to those culturally sanctioned patterns. This happens frequently when some outside agency attempts to force an organization to undertake activity that goes against its sense of identity and culture. (This has been cited, for example, as the reason why airlift is chronically underfunded in the Defense program.)³² It can also happen when a "foreign" process or system is introduced into an organization (even in cases when the decision-makers in an organization favor the innovation). If the foreign process carries with it an expectation of behavior that runs counter to the norms of the organizational culture (again, generally matched with those of the host society), massive inefficiency can occur, and even complete system failure is possible. People do not function well for long in situations where their organization is formally insisting they do one thing but every instinct (acculturation) is urging them to do something else. Few people, for example, will happily "re-engineer" their own job out of existence. Large-scale strikes occur in Europe when organizations attempt to shift priority from job security to economies of scale that cut jobs.

Measuring Organizational Culture

To behavioral scientists and management theorists, organizational culture is thought to result from the interaction of four sets of behavioral norms. Using that set as a taxonomy, the behavior of people within an organization can be measured using the coding criteria shown in Figure 2-6, and a composite description (or "score") can be

John D. Harrington, "Neglected U.S. Military Missions: Contending Theories of Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Culture and the Case of Airlift Mobility," Ph. D. Thesis, Georgetown University, 1996.

developed of the organization's culture.³³ This is a particularly useful concept when comparing behavior in organizations across societies, as we will do in the next chapter.

Norms for managing others (bases for selection and advancement)

- > Objective qualification and advancement standards, or
- > Personal relationships/other criteria

Norms for managing oneself (bases for loyalty)

- Obedience to hierarchy
 - Individuals to organization and sub-organizations to higher-level organization ("task orientation"), or
- > Obedience to patrimonial/honorific ties
 - Individuals to persons or groups ("personal or sectarian orientation")

Norms for managing uncertainty

- Acceptance
 - Flexibility in operations, or
- > Avoidance
 - Strict adherence to scripted rules and operational plans

• Norms for managing time

- > Future oriented, or
- > Immediatist

Figure 2-6. Categorizing Organizational Behavior

Skill can be defined as the ability to reliably produce an intended effect, given that the resources involved are physically capable of it. It follows that organizational skill can then be defined as the ability of an organization to reliably produce an intended effect (again, given that the organization possesses requisite resources). Using this definition, it becomes clear that organizational culture should in theory be an important determinant of skill. Organizational culture can facilitate task accomplishment if the processes through which resources are employed match closely with the organization's behavioral norms. And organizational culture can greatly impede task accomplishment if the processes employed demand that people behave contrary to those norms. Resources must be organized into processes or systems in order to be employed. Systems involving high

See Geert Hofstede; Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-related Values (London: Sage, 1984) and Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner, op. cit.

technology tend to be especially complex, and so the ability to produce intended effects from these systems is even more highly dependent on a close match between the technology's operational expectations and organizational culture.³⁴

"Culture Lag"

While there are few studies focusing directly on "culture lag" in militaries, investigators have examined the question of why developing countries frequently experience difficulty in assimilating advanced technology. Many agree that the source of the problem seems to be cultural mismatch between system designers and operators.

The process of attempting to reconcile imported technology and the cultural norms and expectations of the adopting society is called "technological adaptation." Problems may occur when system designers unknowingly design behavioral expectations into systems. Behavioral norms are deeply ingrained and therefore largely subconscious. Processes—maintenance and operating procedures, for example—are partly normative and are therefore normally less completely expressed in system designs. This makes them difficult to transfer where even small differences in culture exist, and very difficult to adapt when there are large differences. This problem is so common in technology transfer that it has even been given a moniker—"cultural lag."

Why? Because advanced technology tends to be more expensive on a unit basis than the resources it replaces. To improve productivity (and therefore profits) the organization therefore must achieve economies of scale by servicing more customers on a unit basis (internal or external) with the new equipment than the old. Because there is less new equipment to go around, each part of the organization that depends on the new equipment is now more interdependent, and interdependency is an attribute of complexity.

The hoped-for economy of scale will occur only if the people having control of the new improved equipment share the organization's priorities. If instead they give first priority to support for their relatives or ethnic kinsmen, or if they simply sell the new equipment and pocket the proceeds, the organization is worse off than it was before. This is why the behavioral expectations embedded in the process for using the new technology must match the organizational culture in which it is to operate in order for the introduction of new technology to have any prospect of improving overall performance.

William C. Schaniel, "New Technology and Culture Change in Traditional Societies," *Journal of Economic Issues*, 22 (June 1988), pp. 493-98, at 497.

Arunoday Saha, "Cultural Impediments to Technology Development in India," International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 10, 8 (1990), pp. 25-53, p. 27.

Military Organizational Culture and Advanced Weapons

Modern military organizations tend to be the epitome of advanced technology and complex, interdependent operational and support systems. So if organizational culture is a skill determinant and if technology magnifies its importance, it is reasonable to suppose that organizational culture is especially important in assessing *military* skill. And as evermore technologically sophisticated weapons systems are introduced into militaries and linked into an evermore interconnected system-of-systems, organizational culture's effect on skill should intensify and the penalty for a mismatch between culture and technology and its operating and support systems should become greater. So we will turn next to why it may be reasonable to suppose that such culture lag exists, particularly for would-be recipients in developing countries.

Most advanced weapons systems are designed in "Western" countries. (This term will be defined in Chapter 3.) For reasons explained above, these systems have embedded within them expectations regarding how the personnel that operate them will behave. Understandably enough, these behavioral expectations derive from the culturally based organizational behavioral norms of the Western designers. Many of the countries that purchase these systems are "non-Western" in terms of their culturally derived behavior norms. So the importation of Western weapons systems into non-Western militaries creates a mismatch between the designers' expectations of how the systems will be operated and the organizational norms of the non-Western users. This results in inefficient operation of those systems.

What does it mean to say that most advanced conventional weapons systems are designed and produced in states that can be characterized as having "Western cultures?" Measured in constant 1998 U.S. dollars the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and other Western European countries were the source of 88 percent of all arms transfers during the period 1991-1998.³⁷ (Many of the remaining transfers came from Russia, which is more culturally similar to the four "Western" arms suppliers than it is to most developing nations.)

Grimmett, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing nations, op. cit., p. CRS-81.

The "big four" arms suppliers are quite similar to one another in terms of the four norms of organizational behavior shown in Figure 2-6.³⁸ For example, with regard to *how leaders manage others*, their bases for selection and advancement in most governmental and business organizations tend to be meritocratic. Regarding *how managers and workers manage themselves*, the expectation in the West is that both will be obedient, loyal to an organization's hierarchy, and task-oriented. They also tend to accept *uncertainty* and to focus on the future in how they *manage time*. Not surprisingly, researchers have found that these expectations shape the approaches taken in designing complex systems. For example, Charles Perrow, a scholar of human factors and system design, has reported the following:

The design of systems, and the equipment that is used, is not entirely determined by technical or engineering criteria; designers have significant choices available to them that will foster some types of social structures and operator behaviors rather than others.³⁹

Perrow's conclusions about system design in general have been found to hold true in particular in the design of advanced weapons systems. Chris Demchak studied the U.S. Army's effort to develop its "fully networked," systems-of-systems future fighting force. She found that the design for the networked battlespace implicitly includes assumptions regarding the organizational norms within which the system will operate, including the "Western" norms of meritocratic assignment and promotion, loyalty to the organization, and task orientation.

NON-WESTERN RECIPIENTS

Given that Western cultural values are engineered into most weapons systems, there is every reason to expect problems with culture lag when Western systems are

In Chapter 3, we will present research that quantifies those characteristics for the Western suppliers and other nations.

³⁹ Charles Perrow, "The Organizational Context of Human Factors Engineering," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 28 (1983), pp. 521-41.

Chris C. Demchak, "Tailored Precision Armies in Fully Networked Battlespace: High Reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the 'Information Age," *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 4, 2 (June 1996), pp. 93-103.

exported to developing countries, because most of these recipients have markedly different cultures of organizational behavior.

This becomes evident when those countries' norms for organizational behavior are measured against the taxonomy in Figure 2-6, above. Western managers tend to assign and promote using a meritocratic system. Many non-Western managers base those decisions on personal relations. Western managers and workers tend to be hierarchically obedient and task-oriented; non-Westerners tend to be obedient and loyal to non-organizational entities (e.g., individuals, families, tribes, or sects) and are generally relationship oriented. Western managers tend to accept uncertainty; non-Western managers seek to avoid it and prefer, instead, multitudes of scripted rules and plans. Western managers are future oriented, but non-Western managers tend to be immediatist, thinking primarily of the satisfaction of short- term goals.

American security assistance personnel have commented on how these non-Western behavior norms can hinder assimilation of Western military technology and processes. For example, one American advisor to the Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps (SAAOC) who was assisting in the design of a modern combat service support system made the following observations:

Counterpart [Saudi] personnel tended to accept the requirement for short-range planning; mid- and long-range planning requirements were not generally accepted and were often rejected totally. This seemed especially true of senior counterparts ... This proclivity for short range, immediate action was often observed to cause sub-optimizations.

There is a large difference between Western advisers and Saudi counterparts regarding whether one should have his performance evaluated against some objective standard. There is a lack of organizational loyalty: loyalties are personal in nature and are not directed towards achievement of organizational objectives. Thus, performance evaluation techniques along Western lines, if used at all, evaluate and document personal relationships and ties and do not necessarily reflect actual performance.

... rank often appeared to have far less meaning than it does in the US Army. Individual advisors reported witnessing scenes in which privates did not hesitate to 'tell off' an SAAOC colonel, especially if they were of the same tribe. no matter how immature subordinates appeared to be, SAAOC counterparts normally dealt

with them in relationship-oriented terms rather than imposing a more structured task-oriented behavior. 41

These observations illustrate how culturally different many foreign militaries are from their Western counterparts, and highlight the sub-optimizations that can therefore occur when attempting to transfer systems and technology from the latter to the former.

LARGE OR SMALL EFFECTS?

The logic of the arguments presented in this chapter suggests that civil-military relations and culture lag are determinants of military skill, and therefore combat outcomes. But exactly how important are they? We turn to that question in the next chapter, in which we present the results of testing our hypotheses using a statistical analysis of combat since 1946.

⁴¹ Major J. Mayton, Jr., Cultural Factors in Managing an FMS Case Program: Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps (SOCP) Program (Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management College, 1977), pp. 23-24.

3. TESTING THE ALTERNATIVE HYPOTHESES

To test our hypotheses regarding the impact of civil-military relations and culture on military effectiveness, we conducted a large-*n* analysis of performance in 457 military conflicts during the 1946-92 period.¹ Our independent variables were capital resources, human capital, civil-military relations, and culture and our dependent variable was military performance in war. Capital resources and human capital were included in the analysis to control for two obviously important factors in a military's ability to both purchase weapons platforms and technologies and attain skill.

OPERATIONALIZING THE VARIABLES 2

A state's gross domestic product per capita is widely accepted as an indicator of economic development and spending potential, and was used to define the variable capital resources.³ We chose literacy rate as the measure of human capital because it is

We express our appreciation to Herb Tillema for granting access to his Overt Military Interventions database. See Herbert K. Tillema, Foreign Overt Military Interventions, September 2, 1945 – December 31, 1991 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri, 1995). Additional casualty data were drawn from Michael Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1619-1991, Volume II, 1900-1991 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1992).

A codebook with the values for each of our 457 records is printed as an appendix to this paper.

GDP data were drawn from the *Penn World Table (version 5.6)*, The Center for International Comparison at the University of Pennsylvania. Those data are available online at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu; and are described in Alan Heston and Robert Summers, "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, (May 1991), pp. 327-368.

Supplementary data came from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 1998 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998); International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics [Computer file], 2nd release (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund [producer], 197?); Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1979); International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database April 1999, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/1999/01/data/index.htm; Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean [computer file]; and World Bank, Africa Live Database, available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extpb/aldb.htm.

representative of basic educational achievement and ability to learn in the future.⁴ (We investigated other possible measures, such as school enrollment, but data from the 1950s and 1960s were impossible to find for many developing countries.)

Civil-military relations was operationalized as a dichotomous variable, i.e., either good or bad. If a country experienced a coup plot, failed attempt, or successful coup within 2 years prior to a conflict in which it participated, we coded it as having poor civil-military relations. Otherwise, it was coded as having good civil-military relations. ⁵ (At a future date we plan to perform sensitivity analyses by both adjusting that 2-year window and discriminating between coup plots/failed attempts and coup successes.)

Culture was operationalized based on data from a survey conducted in 1970 of over 72,000 personnel in overseas subsidiaries of a large "Western" multinational business organization with facilities in over 40 countries. The survey asked respondents to characterize the behavioral norms of their host-country business counterparts. In analyzing the results of the responses, Geert Hofstede determined that organizational culture could be characterized in four different dimensions, which he termed *Power*

Literacy data were drawn from World Bank, World Development Indicators CD-ROM 1998 (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998); United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization, UnESCO Statistics: World Education Indicators, available at http://unescostat.unesco.org/Indicator/Indframe.htm; and U.S. Bureau of the Census, International Database, available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.htm].

Coup data were compiled from Patrick J. McGowan, African Military Intervention Events, January 1, 1956 to December 31, 1985 (Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University, 1986); T.Y Wang, African Coup Events Data, 1986-1990 [Computer file], ICPSR version (Normal, IL: T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University, Dept. of Political Science [producer], 1995, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1997); Edward Luttwak, Coup D'Etat: A Practical Handbook (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969); Robert H. Dix, "Military Coups and Military Rule in Latin America," Armed Forces & Society (Spring 1994), 439-456; and Harvey G. Kebschull, "Operation 'Just Missed': Lessons from Failed Coup Attempts," Armed Forces & Society (Summer 1994), pp. 565-579.

Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-related Values, op. cit. and Geert Hofstede, Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991). Hofstede's findings have been replicated by others in more recent studies. See, for example, Peter Smith, Shaun Dugan, and Fons Trompenaars, "National Culture and the Values of Organizational Employees," Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology, 27, 2 (March 1996), pp. 231-264.

Distance (how leaders manage others), Individualism, Masculinity (how workers manage themselves), and Uncertainty Avoidance.⁷

Each dimension was defined as representing a spectrum of behavioral tendencies. The survey questionnaire asked a series of questions about worker and manager practices and expectations regarding each dimension of behavior. These responses were averaged by countries, and factor analysis was used to cluster them. Index scores were than constructed to rank these responses relative to each other with reference to the "Western" behavior characteristics shown in Figure 2-6.8

We used these dimensional indices to determine each country's degree of "Western-ness" with respect to a particular dimension. We did so by defining the highest country score to be the baseline for that particular Western cultural norm and calculated a distance score for each country relative to the defined Western norm. This methodology resulted in a quantitative measure of each state's relative Western-ness. The range of distance scores resulting from this approach was from one to 219, where one represents the most Western (that is, closest to the defined Western cultural baseline) and 219 the least Western. The scores were then normalized by calculating z-scores based upon the median score of the top weapons exporting countries in the world. The final rankings had the added virtue of matching intuition in most cases. (For example, the United States,

Hofstede's four dimensions correspond to only three of the four factors governing organizational culture that we posited in Chapter 2, i.e., how leaders manage others, how managers and workers manage themselves, and how they manage uncertainty. We are in the process of obtaining a more recent and comprehensive set of survey data (compiled using the same survey methodology) that will also permit us to code attitudes toward time management.

As an example of the technique, see his detailed example of the construction of his Power Distance Index, Geert Hofstede, *Cultures and Organizations*, op. cit., Chapter 2.

⁸ Again, with the exception of time management.

We are focusing on a "Western" culture because nearly all exports of weapons systems and military technology (88 percent on a dollar-value basis over the period 1991-1998) come from the United States and Western Europe. It follows that there is a high probability that exports selected at random originated from one of those sources.

¹⁰ The United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and France.

Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and West Germany scored closest to the Western baseline).¹¹

All of the pertinent literature suggests that the cultural norms measured in Hofstede's survey change only very slowly. We therefore assumed that the 1970 survey was a valid measurement of each country's cultural norms over the whole period 1946-1992. A larger survey of international businesses using similar techniques was conducted in the 1990s. We hope to be able to obtain those data (which are unpublished) to test the stability of country scores over time.

There are of course many different ways that one might measure our dependent variable of combat outcomes. We chose *combat fatalities*. This was partly because it has been the measure of greatest interest to our government sponsors in our ongoing skill-technology research, and it was partly a concession to resource limitations. Budgets for internally funded research projects at IDA are small, so we were obliged to use existing databases. This forced us to narrow our focus to casualties suffered only by the intervenor (or initiator) in each conflict, because those are the only casualty statistics in the Foreign Overt Military Intervention dataset. We hope to obtain data on non-intervenor losses soon.

For each conflict in our database, we calculated intervenor fatalities per day of conflict. In addition, each conflict was coded as one of the following five types of military operations:

- Conventional ground force operations using regular military units of company size or larger
- Raids involving units of less than battalion size (larger raids were coded as conventional ground operations)
- Air strikes only
- Shelling only by ground-based artillery or rockets
- Naval bombardment only

The 1970 survey respondents from South African businesses, of course, tended to be part of the white minority business elite.

¹² This is supported by findings from additional research using Hofstede's methodology cited in footnote 6.

This approach permitted us to test whether the impact of the independent variables varied by type of operation.

THE EFFECT OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

To test our theory of the impact of civil-military relations on combat outcomes we formulated the following formal hypotheses:

H1: Controlling for intervenor and target capital resources, human capital, and culture, countries with good civil-military relations that attack countries with poor civil-military relations will suffer fewer normalized fatalities than when they attack countries with good civil-military relations.

H2: Controlling for intervenor and target capital resources, human capital, and culture, countries with bad civil-military relations that attack countries with good civil-military relations will suffer greater normalized fatalities than when they attack countries with bad civil-military relations.

Applying all of those controls reduced the number of usable records in our dataset from 457 to an n of 77 records. We partitioned the data by type of intervenor and target civil-military relations, calculated average combat fatalities within each sub-group for all conflicts, and tested the significance of the differences between the means. The results including all types of military operations are shown below in Table 3-1.

Table 3-1. Mean Intervenor Fatalities per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Civil-Military Relations for All Types of Military Operations (n=77)

		Target Civ-mil	
		Good	Bad
Intervenor Civ-mil	Good	2.1 (<i>n</i> =50) s.d.=3.9	1.9 (11) s.d.=3.2
	Bad	4.3 (12) s.d.=9.9	0.24 (4) s.d.=.3

The findings displayed in the top row of Table 3-1 offer some support of our first hypothesis. Intervenors having good civil-military relations suffered slightly fewer fatalities against targets with poor civil-military relations than they did when battling states with good civil-military relations (t = .154, p = .878). The second row of Table 3-1 provides strong support for our second hypothesis. Intervenors with poor civil-military relations suffered, on average, nearly 20 times the number of fatalities in conflicts against states with good civil-military relations as they did against states with poor civil-military relations (t = .811, p = .431). As can be seen, these results are difficult to generalize, given the low t scores.

We wondered whether the relatively weak effect suggested by the results in the top row and the high standard deviations might be an artifact of combining in one database many different types of operations. Large-scale, sustained conflicts are of most interest to planners dealing with force sizing issues, so we partitioned the data into two sets, one dealing with conventional operations and one set including all other types of military operations. We paid a penalty in robustness of results in consequence. While imposing our original controls on capital resources, human capital, and culture reduced our original n to the 77 records reported on in Table 3-1, applying additional constraints, as can be seen in Tables 3-2 and 3-3, resulted in cells having very small n or missing cases. This makes generalizing from the results risky, but they are nevertheless suggestive.

Table 3-2. Mean Intervenor Fatalities per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Civil-Military Relations for Conventional Military Operations Only (n=12)

		Target Civ-mil	
		Good	Bad
Intervenor Civ-mil	Good	2.2 (n = 6) s.d.=2.1	5.5 (3) s.d. = 4.5
	Bad	6.6 (3) s.d. = 11.5	(0)

Focusing only on conventional ground operations of company size or larger pared down our 77-record subset to 12 records. The mean intervenor fatalities found in these records are shown in Table 3-2. Unfortunately, the resulting n's are low, making it risky to draw within-condition conclusions. As we continue to build the database, we hope to populate these cells with more cases so such a meaningful analysis can be made. These figures, however, are still useful for the purpose of doing an across-condition analysis to compare the relative impact of civil-military relations on large vs. small size operations. For this, we turn to the analysis in Table 3-3.

Table 3-3. Mean Intervenor Fatalities per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Civil-Military Relations for All Types of Military Operations Except Conventional (n=65)

		Target Civ-mil	
		Good	Bad
Intervenor Civ-mil	Good	2.1 (n = 44) s.d. = 4.1	0.5 (8) s.d. = 1.1
	Bad	3.6 (9) s.d. = 9.9	.2 (4) s.d. = .3

Including only records involving small-scale operations resulted in a subset of 65 records. The results in Table 3-3 offer strong within-condition support for our hypothesis. In the partitioned data, countries with good civil-military relations attacking countries with poor civil-military relations suffered three times fewer casualties than when they attacked states with good civil-military relations (t = 2.106, p = .04). And the second row of Table 3-3 shows that countries with poor civil-military relations that attacked states with good civil-military relations suffered nine times as more fatalities per day than when they attacked countries with poor civil-military relations (t = .655, p = .526).

Perhaps even more interesting is a comparison of the results in Tables 3-2 and 3-3. Such a comparison suggests that poor civil-military relations has a stronger impact on performance in larger-scale operations as opposed to smaller-scale operations. A

comparison of the bad-good civil-military relations cells in each table (mean normalized casualties of 6.6 vs. 3.6, respectively, t = .453, p = .660) offers support for this suggestion. This is consistent with our discussion regarding the detrimental effects of denying the military permission for large-scale exercises, joint training, and horizontal communication because the importance of these factors is magnified in conjunction with the scale of a conflict.¹³

THE EFFECT OF CULTURE LAG

To test our theory of the impact of culture lag on combat outcomes we formulated the following formal hypothesis:

H3: Controlling for intervenor and target capital resources, human capital, and civil-military relations, Western countries that attack non-Western countries will suffer fewer normalized fatalities than non-Western countries that attack Western countries.

Recall that the cultural distance score of each country was normalized using the z-score method based upon the median score of the top weapons exporting countries. The resulting distribution of normalized culture scores is illustrated in Figure 3-1.




Figure 3-1. Organizational Culture z-scores

Again to ensure the point has been driven home, the p values make generalization difficult.

We categorized countries as "Western" and "non-Western" by working with standard deviation units in this distribution (approximately 1.0). We did two analyses to incorporate a sensitivity test. In our first analysis, those countries that fell within +/- one standard deviation of the mean of this distribution were categorized as "Western" and those beyond +/- one standard deviation were categorized as "non-Western." These results are shown as the first row in Tables 3-4 (where the intervenor is Western) and 3.5 (where the intervenor is non-Western).


Table 3-4. Mean Intervenor Fatalities per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Culture for All Types of Military Operations

		Target Culture Non-Western
Intervenor Culture	Western	0.79 (n = 10)* s.d. = 1.61
		2.18 (22)** s.d. = 3.97

Western states were within +/- 1.0 standard deviations from the mean Western states were within +/- 1.5 standard deviations from the mean

We did a second analysis increasing the spread of the standard deviation units, in which states were considered Western if they fell within +/-1.5 standard deviation units of the mean and non-Western if outside that range. These results are shown in the second row of Tables 3-4 (intervenor is Western) and 3-5 (intervenor is non-Western).

Table 3-5. Mean Intervenor Fatalities Per Day as a Function of Intervenor and Target Culture for All Types of Military Operations



Non-Western states were outside of +/- 1.0 standard deviations from the mean Non-Western states were outside of +/- 1.5 standard deviations from the mean

A review of the first row of numbers in these Tables 3-4 and 3-5 supports our hypothesis. Comparing the entries in each table where we have Western vs. non-Western and non-Western vs. Western states, respectively, we observe that Western states suffered fewer casualties against non-Western (t=.433, p=.670). The results shown in the second row in each table represent a more liberal definition of "Western." These results also support our hypothesis, albeit less strongly (t=.041, p=.968). This is not surprising, as we likely diluted the effect of cultural difference by casting our net wider. A review of the distributions of intervenor and target z-scores shows that as you move to 1.5 standard deviations from the mean, the number of intervenors and targets with culture scores in this range increases significantly. In fact, in most of the conflicts in which states in the range participated, they fought like-cultured states; thus, the cultural effect is diluted.

SUMMARY OF RESULTS

All the tests reported in this chapter support our hypotheses. Civil-military relations and culture lag do appear to affect skill, and hence combat outcomes, especially in instances of larger-scale, conventional conflict. They have explanatory power even after the effects of differences in resources and human development are taken into

¹⁴ These distributions appear in the appendix as Figures 1 and 2.

account. The magnitude of the effect is somewhat more difficult to assess given the sensitivity that some of the results display. The sensitivity may be an artifact of the relatively small numbers of cases in the data we had available. (Conflict, fortunately, is a relatively rare event.)

The results of our initial investigation certainly demonstrate that further research on these issues is justified. We hope to increase our number of records by adding additional economic and human development data. We also hope to obtain the more recent survey research on organizational culture. (This would also add to our total number of records, as the more recent research covers more countries.) And we also hope to explore alternative definitions of the independent variables (for example, absolute GDP differences). Finally, once we have located data on target state casualties, we hope to use regression analysis to explore the interaction between civil-military relations, culture gap, wealth, and human development on combat outcomes.

4. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The results of our preliminary testing are not conclusive, of course.¹ Much more work will need to be done before we can be satisfied that these phenomena are actually affecting combat outcomes in the way we theorize. But the initial results lead to some interesting speculation about implications if indeed our hypotheses are shown to be robustly true.

PLANNING UNCERTAINTY AND SIZE OF THE THREAT

The conventional wisdom is that the size of tomorrow's defense challenges is extremely uncertain. That may be incorrect. The size of tomorrow's threats may be easier to forecast—and smaller—than generally supposed.

Table 4-1 lists nations that are commonly identified as potential threats to American security or as potential regional powers or even (in the case of a few) as possible near-peer competitors 25 years or more from now. Every country listed has either bad civil-military relations or very non-Western norms of organizational culture or both. If our hypotheses are correct, these characteristics may act as significant brakes on their ability to improve military skills and thus generate combat power. This does not gainsay the possibility that some of these nations may have quite large military establishments. Economic growth may even permit them to have sizable quantities of advanced equipment. And the human raw material available for military service may be better educated. But their ability to integrate those assets into sustained, large-scale military operations may be quite limited. Nations limited in this way will be at a significant military disadvantage vis-a-vis skilled opponents, even skilled opponents equipped with somewhat less modern systems. Recall that the U.S. Marines achieved the

Especially because of the small n for many of them.

same dominant outcome over poorly skilled Iraqis as did U.S. Army counterparts, although the Marines were using equipment that in many cases was a generation or more less modern.²

The serendipity of these effects from the perspective of the United States is that authoritarian and totalitarian regimes will find them hardest to change. Most of them earned their poor state of civil-military relations the hard way. Easing up control on the military is thus, for many of them, a risky strategy. And shifts in organizational culture can be especially destabilizing for closed societies. They lack pluralistic outlets for expressions of concern and fear about the changes that are occurring, as for those affected adversely to ask for assistance in the transition. Dictators and authoritarians who attempt to shift behavioral norms as a matter of policy run the risk that the result may reproduce Iran in 1979 or Eastern Europe in 1989.

Are there any alternative strategies that these regimes could employ to try to overcome the disadvantages imposed by culture lag and distrust of their militaries? There are two possibilities, but both have strings attached.³ First, countries can build-in redundancy to warfighting systems by purchasing redundant equipment. In theory this helps overcome their inability to provide sustained support by replacing end-items needing repair or maintenance with fresh ones. But the costs of such a strategy are becoming prohibitive because the unit costs of modern weapons systems continue to increase. And of course, a redundancy strategy is itself a tax on capability because all of the resources expended on the redundant systems represent resources that more efficient users could devote to purchasing usable capability. Countries could also attempt to rely on outside (Western) specialists to aid in the operations of the systems. Recall, however, that countries with poor civil-military relations tend to restrict interactions with foreign military experts. And this is an expensive strategy as well since a premium over and above their already-high host-country wages often has to be paid to such specialists to get them to agree to relocate. Moreover, their willingness to stay and support systems in the midst of combat must be questioned.

² Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood," op. cit., p. 153.

Drawn from Serge Taylor's discussion of the options available to states importing new technologies. See his "Organizational Complexity in the New Industrial State: The Role of Technology," in Todd R. LaPorte ed., Organized Social Complexity: Challenges to Politics and Policy (Princeton: Princeton University, 1975), pp. 77-116.

Table 4-1. Characteristics of Potential Planning Cases

Country	Civil-Military Relations*	Distance in Std. Dev. from Western Organizational Culture**
a con China and Charles	Service Colon Wally 2005 1 (1991)	24 April 4123.0844
India	Good	1.70
esses de la Kiennado de la Companya	er alle de Badeste alle et 📖	始起来的 对
North Korea	Wary	3.33
e Vicinalitătole vice de Santonia e	en en de de le	128 6. 128 6.
Iran	Wary	2.87
as assititorent and assistant	Comment & AWard/Baid/2004 Comment	65560 (A) (A) (B) (B) (A)
Russia	Wary	Not Scored

Wary – significant monitoring of military by security apparatus and presence of political officers
 Bad – actual coup attempt or reported plotting within last 5 years

Ellis Joffee makes similar observations in "Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect," *The China Quarterly*, 146 (June 1996), pp. 299-314. Joffee reports that the Peoples Liberation Army has "enduring, albeit fluctuating, conflict" with the Chinese Communist party (p. 300), that the post-Deng era "contains the potential for unprecedented military influence on the makeup of Party leadership and on its policies." (p. 309), and that the Chinese military's extensive involvement in starting and running commercial enterprises will debilitate it: "Economic entanglement must also be at the expense of military professionalism." P. 311, and will "undermine unity and subordination to central control" (p. 312). Joffee concludes that, "[The PLA] cannot be a professional army in the Western sense..." (p. 300).

June Teufel Dreyer finds in "The New Officer Corps: Implications for the Future," *The China Quarterly*, 146 (June 1996), pp. 315-335, that there is a "strong emphasis on strengthening the political loyalties of the PLA" (p. 324), that most generals are "political" (pp. 326-327) and that "factionalism" is intense (pp. 329-332). "Corruption within the officer corps is a serious and apparently intractable problem." (p. 335)

Bates Gill and Michael O'Hanlon find in "China's Hollow Military," *The National Interest*, 56 (Summer 1999), that, "The PLA is still a party army with nepotism and political/family connections continuing to predominate in officer appointment and advancement. The soldiers, for the most part, are semi-literate peasants; there is no professional NCO corps..." Because these characteristics are likely to endure, they conclude that "[the PLA's] capability to act ... is severely limited...and will remain so for years."

^{**} A score of +1.0 means 15% of all countries were more Western; +2.0 means 48% of all countries were more Western; and +3.0 means 81% of all countries were more Western.

Because it is so frequently predicted that China is emerging as a significant military power (and occasionally as even a nascent "superpower"), we feel compelled to add a few paragraphs amplifying its entries in Table 4-1. There is a substantial amount of literature on the indicators of, and deleterious effects of, China's civil-military relations and organizational culture. See for example M. Ehsan Ahari, "U.S. Military Strategic Perspectives on the PRC," Asian Survey, XXXVII, 12 (December 1997), pp. 1163-1180. Ahari finds that, "Lest one be left with the impression that the incorporation of I[formation] W[arfare] capabilities is likely to be easy for the PRC, one is advised to consider ...the sociocultural constraints ... of Confucianism and communism..." which "restricts the movement of ideas and labor," creates "resistance to new ideas," military training that emphasizes "staying within the canon and rote memorization at the expense of independent inquiry," and promotes the "chauvinistic concept" of tiyong which "makes integration of foreign ideas difficult" (p. 1177). Ahari finds that the Chinese military lacks "institutionalized horizontal information-sharing," and that "bureaucrats and ideologues" play a dominant role (p. 1178). And these characteristics are likely to endure. "Any large-scale abandonment of the Soviet-style organizational principles would require China to become a more open society. . . . By the same token, suggestions ... that the Chinese would abandon the principle of ... control and fully incorporate the principle of multiorganizational networks so vital to information-based warfare must be regarded with skepticism" (pp. 1178-1179).

POLICIES ON ARMS TRANSFER AND CONTROL

If our hypotheses are correct, arms transfers to developing nations are probably much less likely to cause significant shifts in regional conventional arms balances than commonly supposed. (Again, as stated previously, we are not asserting that this is true about transfers of nuclear, biological, or chemical arms or technologies.) Many recipients will simply lack the skill to fully utilize the modern weapon system capabilities. So to the extent that regional powers make realistic assessments of their neighbors' military capability, arms races will not automatically be kindled by the introduction of even advanced systems into a region. Nor would the transfer of such weapons to a potentially hostile power necessarily increase the risk to our allies in the region or to our forces should we need to operate there.

One area that *should* perhaps be of greater concern to us is the transfer of sophisticated technologies for training and simulation. These are increasingly important to the degree that of the high level of skill and readiness maintained by U.S. forces depends on them. (This is especially true in training and skill development of higher echelon staffs and task force commanders.) Acquisition and effective use of these technologies by hostile militaries could in theory pose an acute challenge to our ability to dominate future battlefields. Of course, our hypotheses suggest that the likelihood is low that our potential enemies could assimilate the advanced training and simulation technologies. But the possibility is still troubling.

NET ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUES AND INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS

Most net assessment techniques are of the "bean-counting" variety, focusing on the numbers and technical characteristics of the two sides' weapons. ⁵ That's also true of intelligence reporting. If our theories are correct, this approach may result in serious over

⁵ See, e.g., Paul K. Davis, ed., New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994); U. Candan, L.S. Dewald, and L.R. Speight, Present NATO Practice in Land Wargaming (The Hague: SHAPE Technical Center, 1987), Professional Paper STC-PP-252; Wayne P. Hughes, Jr., ed., Military Modeling (Alexandria, Va.: Military Operations Research Society, 1984); and John A. Battilega and Judith K. Grange, eds., The Military Applications of Modeling (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984).

estimations of the military effectiveness of potential enemies.⁶ As we have argued, the possession of the material products of technology should in no way imply that these products could be used effectively. From our perspective, this approach to net assessment focuses on the wrong level of analysis and, in so doing, confuses latent weapons capability with military effectiveness. This is especially true of assessments at the theater, force-on-force levels that drive much defense programming (and hence defense budgets). The longer, more wide-ranging and more intense a conflict is, the more the effects discussed in this paper will become apparent.

In our ongoing skill work we have suggested it is imperative that the new generation of combat assessment models now under development include a proper comprehension of how skill and technology interact to produce real combat outcomes. If the hypotheses we explored here are correct, it may be equally important that tools used to forecast future capabilities of foreign forces incorporate civil-military relations and culture lag as factors. And it will be important for the Intelligence Community to have the capability to collect and analyze indicators related to those factors. Failing to do so may result in gross overestimates of the capabilities of potential opponents.

For a discussion of the over-estimations of Iraqi warfighting effectiveness prior to the Gulf War, see Stephen Biddle, "Victory Misunderstood," op. cit., pp. 139-179, 142.

⁷ Biddle, Hinkle, and Fischerkeller, "Skill and Technology in Modern Warfare," op. cit.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahari, M. Ehsan. "U.S. Military Strategic Perspectives on the PRC." Asian Survey, XXXVII, 12 (December 1997), 1163-1180.

"Baghdad Discovers Coup Plot Cell in the Public Security Service," Al-Zaman, July 8, 1999, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service: Near East/South Asia Report (hereinafter FBIS), July 8, 1999.

Battilega, John A., and Judith K. Grange, eds. *The Military Applications of Modeling*. Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1984.

Becker, Elizabeth. "U.S.-To-Jakarta Messenger: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs." *New York Times*, September 14, 1999.

Biddle, Stephen. "Victory Misunderstood: What the Persian Gulf Conflict Tells Us About the Future of Conflict." *International Security*, 21, 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 139-179.

——. "The Past as Prologue: Assessing Theories of Future Warfare." Security Studies, 8, 1 (Fall 1998).

Biddle, Stephen, Wade Hinkle, and Michael Fischerkeller. "Skill and Technology in Modern Warfare." *Joint Force Quarterly*, 22 (Summer 1999).

Biddle, Stephen, and Robert Zirkle. "Technology, Civil-military Relations, and Warfare in the Developing World." *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, 19, 2 (June 1996), pp. 171-212.

Black, Ian. "Iraqi Resistance Gets Data from Saddam's Intelligence." Washington Times, November 20, 1998, p. 17.

Brewer, John. *The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783.* London: Routledge, 1994.

Candan, U., L.S. Dewald, and L.R. Speight. *Present NATO Practice in Land Wargaming*. The Hague: SHAPE Technical Center, 1987, Professional Paper STC-PP-252.

Carus, W. Seth. "Weapons Technology and Regional Stability." In *Arms Control and Proliferation in the Middle East and South Asia*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992, pp. 9-16.

Clodfelter, Michael. Warfare and Armed Conflicts: A Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other Figures, 1619-1991, Volume II, 1900-1991. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1992.

Cohen, William S. Secretary of Defense. *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*. Washington, Department of Defense, 1997. Figures on 1998 are from the Defense Department Comptroller's office, http://www.dtic.mil/comptroller/ FY2000budget/FY00P1U.pdf.

——. Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review. Washington: Department of Defense, May 1997. From online version at http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr/.

Colquhoun, Patrick. A Treatise on the Wealth, Power, and Resources of the British Empire. London: Joseph Mawman, 1815.

Coughlin, Con. "Saddam Seeks Kamikazi Squad but Doesn't Trust His Pilots." *London Sunday Telegraph*, March 21, 1999.

David, Steven R.. Third World Coups d'Etat and International Security. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987.

Davis, Paul K., ed. New Challenges for Defense Planning: Rethinking How Much is Enough. Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1994.

Demchak, Chris C. "Tailored Precision Armies in Fully Networked Battlespace: High Reliability Organizational Dilemmas in the 'Information Age." *Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management*, 4, 2 (June 1996), pp. 93-103.

Dix, Robert H. "Military Coups and Military Rule in Latin America." *Armed Forces & Society* (Spring 1994), pp. 439-456.

Dreyer, June Teufel. "The New Officer Corps: Implications for the Future." *The China Quarterly*, 146 (June 1996), pp. 315-335.

Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Statistics and Economic Projections Division. Statistical Yearbook for Latin America and the Caribbean [computer file].

Farcau, Bruce W. The Coup: Tactics in the Seizure of Power. Westport, CT: Prager, 1994.

Fitchett, Joseph. "Escalation of Air War Underscores Its Flaws: Low-Tech Serb Tactics Stymie NATO Plan." *International Herald Tribune*, April 14, 1999, p. 1.

"For the Record." Washington Post, December 1, 1998, p. 19.

Forczyk, Robert A. "Emergent India and the Assessment of Third World Regional Powers in the Post-Cold War." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Maryland at College Park, 1993.

Gill, Bates, and Michael O'Hanlon. "China's Hollow Military." *The National Interest*, 56 (Summer 1999). Online at http://www.brook.edu/views/articles/

Gordon, Michael R., with Eric Schmitt. "War Games in Kosovo: Allies Seek, Serbs Hide." New York Times, April 7, 1999, p. 1.

Grimett, Richard. CRS Report for Congress: Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1991-1998. Washington: Library of Congress, 1990.

Harrington, John D. "Neglected U.S. Military Missions: Contending Theories of Bureaucratic Politics and Organizational Culture and the Case of Airlift Mobility." Ph. D. Thesis, Georgetown University, 1996.

Heston, Alan, and Robert Summers. "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988." *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, May 1991, pp.327-368.

Hinkle, Wade, Michael Fischerkeller, and Stephen Biddle. Beyond Firepower: Including Skill and Operational Sophistication in Combat Modeling. IDA Paper P-3477. Alexandria, VA: Institute for Defense Analyses.

Hofstede, Geert. Cultures and Organizations: Software of the Mind. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1991.

———. Culture's Consequences: International Differences in Work-related Values. London: Sage, 1984.

Hughes, Wayne P., Jr., ed. *Military Modeling*. Alexandria, Va.: Military Operations Research Society, 1984.

International Monetary Fund. *International Financial Statistics* [Computer file], 2nd release (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund [producer], 197?); Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1979).

———. World Economic Outlook Database April 1999. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/1999/01/data/index.htm.

"INC Reports Saddam Shifts Military Commanders." Iraqi National Congress WWW (Internet), June 6, 1998, FBIS, June 6, 1998.

"Iraq Said to Execute 24 Army Officers." Washington Post, March 10, 1999, p. 18.

"Iraqi Officers' Arrests Said Linked to Security Breach." Al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 14, 1999, in FBIS.

Joffee, Ellis. "Party-Army Relations in China: Retrospect and Prospect." *The China Quarterly*, 146 (June 1996), pp. 299-314.

Kawaski, Guy. The Macintosh Way. Scranton, PA: Harper Collins, 1990.

Kebschull, Harvey G. "Operation 'Just Missed': Lessons from Failed Coup Attempts." Armed Forces & Society (Summer 1994), pp. 565-579.

Kemp, Geoffrey. "Arms Transfers and the 'Back-end' Problem in Developing Countries." In Uri Ra'anan, Robert Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp, eds. Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Military Buildup in Less Industrial Countries. Boulder: Westview, 1978, pp. 264-275.

Kennedy, Paul M. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000. New York: Random House, 1987.

Krauthammer, Charles. "Why We Must Contain China." Time, July 31, 1995, p. 72.

Luttwak, Edward. Coup D'Etat: A Practical Handbook. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1969.

Mansfield, Edward D. Power, Trade, and War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.

Mayton, Jr., Maj. J. Cultural Factors in Managing an FMS Case Program: Saudi Arabian Army Ordnance Corps (SOCP) Program. Ft. Belvoir, VA: Defense Systems Management College, 1977.

McGowan, Patrick J. African Military Intervention Events, January 1, 1956 to December 31, 1985. Tempe, AZ: Arizona State University, 1986.

"Military Still Looks to the West for Doctrine." Jane's Defence Weekly, February 28, 1996, p. 22.

Moodie, Michael. "The Challenge of Technology Diffusion." Washington Quarterly, 18, 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 183-202.

Morrison, James. "State of Paranoia." Washington Times, January 15, 1999.

Mussington, David. "Understanding Contemporary International Arms Transfers." *Adelphi Paper 291*. London: Brassey's, 1994.

National Panel on Conventional Arms Control. Controlling the Conventional Arms Race. New York: United Nations Association, 1976.

Parker, Christopher S. "New Weapons for Old Problems: Conventional Proliferation and Military Effectiveness in Developing States." *International Security*, 23, 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 119-147.

Penn World Tables Project at the University of Pennsylvania. Available online at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu.

Perrow, Charles. "The Organizational Context of Human Factors Engineering." *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 28 (1983), pp. 521-41.

"Qusayy To 'Cleanse' Army by Retiring Senior Officers." London Al-Sharq al-Awsat, May 22, 1997, p. 6, FBIS, May 22, 1997.

"Report of Iraqi Executions." New York Times, January 8, 1999.

Rosen, Steven J. "The Proliferation of New Land-based Technologies: Implications for Local Military Balances." In Stephanie G. Neuman and Robert E. Harkavy. *Arms Transfers in the Modern World.* New York: Praeger, 1979, pp. 109-130.

Roy, Denny. "The China Treat Issue: Major Arguments." Asian Survey, XXXVI, 8 (August 1996), pp. 758-771.

"Saddam's Shield: The Role of the Special Republican Guard." Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1999, p. 29.

Saha, Arunoday. "Cultural Impediments to Technology Development in India." International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy.

Schaniel, William C. "New Technology and Culture Change in Traditional Societies." *Journal of Economic Issues*, 22 (June 1988), pp. 493-98.

Schultz, Kenneth A. *The Democratic Advantage: The Institutional Sources of State Power in International Competition.* Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, Stanford University, 1996.

Shalikashvili, John M., Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Vision 1996*. Washington: Department of Defense, 1997.

Smith, Peter, Shaun Dugan, and Fons Trompenaars. "National Culture and the Values of Organizational Employees." *Journal of Cross-cultural Psychology*, 27, 2 (March 1996), pp. 231-264.

Taylor, Serge. "Organizational Complexity in the New Industrial State: The Role of Technology." In Todd R. LaPorte ed. *Organized Social Complexity: Challenges to Politics and Policy.* Princeton: Princeton University, 1975, pp. 77-116.

"The number of Tikriti Officers Increases in the Important Positions." Kuwait Al-Qabas WWW (Internet), March 22, 1999, FBIS.

Tillema, Herbert K. Foreign Overt Military Interventions, September 2, 1945 – December 31, 1991. Columbia, MO: University of Missouri, 1995.

Trompenaars, Fons, and Charles Hampden-Turner. Riding the Waves of Culture: Understanding Cultural Diversity in Global Business. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1998.

United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization. *UNESCO Statistics: World Education Indicators*. Available at http://unescostat.unesco.org/Indicator/ Indframe.htm.

U.S. Bureau of the Census. *International Database*. Available at http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html.

Wang, T.Y. African Coup Events Data, 1986-1990 [Computer file], ICPSR version (Normal, IL: T.Y. Wang, Illinois State University, Dept. of Political Science [producer],

1995, Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1997).

Webster's II New Riverside University Dictionary. Boston: Riverside Publishing Co, 1994.

World Bank. World Development Indicators CD-ROM 1998. Washington, DC: World Bank, 1998.

——. *Africa Live Database*. Available at http://www.worldbank.org/html/extpb/ aldb.htm.

Zhao, Suisheng. Dynamics of Power Competition in East Asia: From the Old Chinese World Order to Post-Cold War Regional Multipolarity. London: Macmillan, 1998.

Zysman, John. *Power, Wealth, and Technology: Industrial Decline and American National Security.* Berkeley, CA: Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy, University of California, 1990.

Appendix

DATASET CONSTRUCTION

FOREIGN OVERT MILITARY INTERVENTIONS

In order to test our hypotheses, we needed a set of data on modern military conflict. Funding constraints limited us to adaptation of existing datasets. As completed, our dataset is composed of three main sections: the first includes measures of the various independent variables, such as intervenor and target country financial resources, human capital measures, civil-military indicators, and cultural measures; the second section, based on a dataset constructed by Herbert K. Tillema on foreign overt military interventions, provides information regarding the dependent variable, conflict data and battle outcomes; and the third portion is composed of composite and comparative statistics that provided for hypothesis testing. This appendix describes the construction of the dataset, provides a codebook to interpret the data, and reproduces the dataset in its entirety.

The first step in constructing the dataset involved modifying the Tillema dataset of Overt Military Interventions, hereafter referred to as OMI. The OMI describes 690 foreign overt military interventions initiated between September 2, 1945, the day after Japanese armistice ended World War II, and December 31, 1991, one week after formal dissolution of the Soviet Union. Overt military intervention is operationally defined by Tillema as:

combatant or combat-ready military operations conducted upon foreign territory by units of a state's regular military forces. Overt military intervention includes conventional deployments of ground combat units that involve such actions as alert patrol, offensive maneuver, riot quelling, armed occupation of territory, and battle. It also includes other, usually less intense combatant military operations such as: commando or other small unit raids; aerial bombing, strafing, or rocketry; ground-based artillery or rocketry; and naval gunnery and rocketry. Overt military intervention includes all such operations within territories subject to others' jurisdiction, and also within distinct non-self-governing territories such as colonies, protectorates, mandate and trustee territories or occupied lands not fully integrated

Herbert K. Tillema, "OMILIST: 690 Foreign Overt Military Interventions, September 2, 1945-December 31, 1991," OMILIST Codebook.

within the generally recognized boundaries of a state. It excludes operations conducted by a state within its own integral territory.²

The OMI dataset also excludes engagements among vessels at sea and encounters among aircraft in flight.

The OMI data includes 690 individual foreign overt military interventions over the time period examined. For each intervention, it lists an intervening state and target territory; intervention start and end dates; a code for the initial type of military operation; and any subsequent changes in operations, whether the target consents to the intervention, the number of fatalities suffered by the intervenor, whether a resolution within the UN Security Council approving the use of force was passed prior to the initiation of intervention, and a name for the intervention.

To utilize the OMI for the purposes of the present research, we examined only those interventions that involved force-on-force engagements. As a result we followed several coding rules and thus removed a number of cases from the OMI in constructing our dataset. We removed all interventions involving foreign patrolling, rioting and riot suppression, and policing activities meant to assist the target territory in suppressing internal civil disturbances. Similarly, when the true target of an intervention was a rebel group attacking its own government from a foreign territory in an attempt to gain independence (e.g., the PLO or ANC), we excluded the record. If, however, a rebel group attacked its own government from foreign soil and a third state intervened to attack the rebel group in the foreign territory, we included the record, indicated that it was an insurgency movement, noted the target territory as the state from which the group sought independence and indicated the rebel group in parentheses, and listed the place of the attack by the third party, i.e., the foreign territory, in parentheses after the name of the conflict.

Finally, while Tillema lists the target territory as the geographical location of the intervention, we recoded the target to indicate the nationality of the troops being attacked by the intervening force. Thus, the intervenor and target in our dataset represent the attacking and defending forces for each conflict, regardless of the place where the engagement occurred.

Applying these additional coding rules to the OMI resulted in 457 military interventions involving force-on-force engagements, each coded to include the identity of the intervening state,

² Tillema, OMILIST Codebook.

the target state (and rebel group when appropriate), inclusive dates of the engagement, type of military operations, and fatalities for the intervenor. These 457 interventions form the basis for our dataset.

Dependent Variable

In order to make comparisons across all interventions and all types of engagements we normalized the fatalities suffered by the intervenor. Based on the start and end dates listed in the OMI we computed the length of the intervention in days and then normalized intervenor fatalities by this time measure. Thus, the dependent variable in our analyses is intervenor fatalities per day of conflict.

Independent Variables

For each dyad we obtained information regarding economic resources, human capital, civil-military relations, and culture. In an effort to minimize unnecessary error variation across the several sources needed to obtain the information for each variable we generally employed the most comprehensive source of data. For financial resources this source proved to be the Penn World Tables, which "displays a set of national accounts economic time series covering many countries. Its expenditure entries are denominated in a common set of prices in a common currency so that real quantity comparisons can be made, both between countries and over time." The Penn World Tables offered the most comprehensive coverage both over time and in the breadth of national financial data covered. The Penn World Tables measures Real GDP per capita in constant 1985 US dollars. When Penn World Tables data was missing for either country in a dyad we used data from the World Bank, expressed as GNP per capita in constant 1987 US dollars. Finally, when World Bank data was unavailable for both nations in an intervention dyad, we employed International Monetary Fund data, expressed as GDP per capita in constant 1975 US dollars.

Penn World Table (version 5.6), The Center for International Comparison at the University of Pennsylvania. Data available online at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/; and described in Heston and Summers, "The Penn World Table (Mark 5): An Expanded Set of International Comparisons, 1950-1988," Quarterly Journal of Economics (May 1991), pp. 327-368.

⁴ World Bank and IMF Financial data were obtained directly from internal databases held at those institutions.

Because we were principally interested in the relative economic disparity between the two combatants, we always used a single source for the financial data for both states. As a result, though we use different economic measurements across the population of interventions, we are able to make across-dyad comparisons because we compare the ratio of one state's economic resources to its adversary's, both expressed in a common currency and controlling for inflation. The use of the ratios, therefore, helps to overcome some of the error introduced by employing different measures. Further, when they overlap, there is a high degree of consistency among the three measures; the correlations between the Penn World Tables and the World Bank and IMF are r = .932 (p < .001, n = 3103) and r = .849 (p < .001, n = 2254), respectively, while the World Bank and IMF figures correlate at r = .863 (p < .001, n = 1053).

Human capital was measured as the illiteracy rate for a nation's total population 15 years of age and older. As with per capita income, due to data constraints, we were forced to use illiteracy estimates from a number of sources. Where possible we used the World Bank World Development Indicators (1998) figures and supplemented this with data from the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) World Education Indicators, and the United States Census Bureau's International Database. Within a five year window prior to and following the start of the conflict, we used the illiteracy estimate that was closest to the date of the intervention. When an intervention fell between two estimates, an interpolation based on known data was computed. For interventions prior to 1960, illiteracy data was typically lacking. When possible, backward extrapolation was made based on known data points obtained more recently. These interpolations and backward extrapolations are noted in the dataset.

For comparative purposes, individual illiteracy rates were converted into z-scores based on the mean illiteracy of the four leading weapons exporting nations (US, UK, France, and Germany; mean = 2%) and the average annual standard deviation across all years of World Bank illiteracy data coverage (1960-1995, average annual standard deviation = 24.77). From these individual z-scores an illiteracy difference measure was computed for each dyad using the formula: intervenor illiteracy z-score minus target illiteracy z-score. This composite measure was used to control for the potential impact of illiteracy differences on battle outcomes.

Obtained online from http://unescostat.unesco.org/Indicator/Indframe.htm and http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html

Civil-military relations was measured as the presence or absence of coup activity in a country within two years prior to the start of an intervention. For complete global and temporal coverage we referenced a number of coup studies, as noted in Chapter 3, and supplemented this with additional research to expand the coverage of events. While many of the coup studies differentiate between coup plots, failed attempts, and successes, in our analyses we collapsed these categories into one category indicating poor civil-military relations. States were coded as having good civil-military relations if there were no coups, plots or attempts within two years prior to the initiation of the intervention, though a coup, plot, or attempt may have occurred outside that time frame.

The culture scores for each country were obtained from Geert Hofstede's work.⁶ In order to compare combatants, each state's culture score was converted into a z-score based on the median culture score of the four leading weapons exporting nations (US, UK, France, and Germany; median = 36) and the standard deviation of the entire distribution of states (s.d. = 59.13). From these z-scores a cultural difference measure was computed for each dyad using the formula: intervenor z-score minus target z-score. It is this cultural difference score that was used both to control for cultural differences and to test for the significance of cultural differences among combatants.

Please direct questions regarding the dataset to: Matthew N. Diascro, Institute for Defense Analyses, Strategy, Forces and Resources Division, 1801 N. Beauregard Street, Alexandria, Virginia, 22311, (703) 845-2298, mdiascro@ida.org.

⁶ Geert Hofstede, Culture's Consequences, op. cit.

CODEBOOK

The dataset is presented in Table A1.

NUM	Intervention Number		
INTERVEN	Intervening State		
ILIT	Intervenor Illiteracy Rate		
ILITSO	Intervenor Illiteracy Data Source		
	Value	Label	
	1	World Bank	
	2	UNESCO	
	3	US Census Bureau	
	4	Interpolation using World Bank Data	
	5	Backward projection using World Bank Data	
	6	IDA Estimation	
ICOUP Intervenor Coup Type		enor Coup Type	
	Value	Label	
	0	No Coups	
	1	No Coups within 2 years prior to intervention	
	2	Plot within 2 years prior to intervention	
	3	Failed Coup within 2 years prior to intervention	
	4	Successful coup within 2 years prior to intervention	
	8	No data within 2 years prior to intervention	
	9	No coup data for state	

ICSO	Intervenor Coup Data Source		
	Value	Label	
	1	Luttwak study	
	2	Dix study	
	3	McGowan study	
	4	Wang study	
	5	Kebschull study	
	6	IDA Online Research ⁷	
ICULT	Intervenor Cu	lture Score (from Hofstede)	
TARGET	Target State (Name of Rebel Group Target, if applicable)		
TLIT	Target Illiteracy Rate		
TLITSO	Target Illiteracy Data Source		
	Value	Label	
	1	World Bank	
	2	UNESCO	
	3	US Census Bureau	
	4	Interpolation using World Bank Data	
	5	Backward projection using World Bank Data	
	6	IDA Estimation	
TCOUP	Target Coup	Туре	
	Value	Label	
	0	No Coups	
	1	No Coups within 2 years prior to intervention	
	2	Plot within 2 years prior to intervention	
	3	Failed Coup within 2 years prior to intervention	
	4	Successful coup within 2 years prior to intervention	
	8	No data within 2 years prior to intervention	
	9	No coup data for state	

⁷ Infoplease Encyclopedia http://www.infoplease.com/encyclopdict.html and Library of Congress Country Studies http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/cshome.html.

TCSO	Target Co	Target Coup Data Source		
	Value	Label		
	1	Luttwak study		
	2	Dix study		
	3	McGowan study		
	4	Wang study		
	5	Kebschull study		
	6	IDA Online Research		
TCULT	Target Cul	ture Score		
ILDIF	Illiteracy D	Difference Score – Intervenor Illiteracy Z-Score Minus		
		Target Illiteracy Z-Score		
CUDIF	Cu	ltural Difference Score - Intervenor Culture Z-Score Minus		
		Target Culture Z-Score		
NAME	Name of I	ntervention		
DATE	Intervention	Intervention Start Date		
ENDDATE	Intervention	Intervention End Date		
LENGTH	Length of	Length of Intervention in Days		
MILOPS	Type of M	ilitary Operations		
	Value	Label		
	1	Conventional Ground Operation		
	2	Small Unit Commando Raid		
	3	Air Strike		
	4	Artillery Bombardment		
	5	Naval Bombardment		
IFATAL	Total Inter	Total Intervenor Combat Fatalities for Intervention		
NORMAL	Intervenor	Intervenor Combat Fatalities Normalized by Length of Intervention		
(in Fatalities per D	Day)		
RATIO	Financial F	Financial Resources Ratio (Intervenor / Target)		

RCODE	Financial I	Resources Ratio Code
	Value	Label
	1	Penn World Tables Data
	2	World Bank Data
	3	IMF Data

NON	NUM INTERVEN	ILIT ILITSO K) 	UP ICSO	CULT	TARGET	TIT	TLITSO	TCOUP T	cso TCL	AT ILDIF	CUDIF
	Afghanistan	81.8	- - -	9	147	lian	52.3		9			0.5
5	Afghanistan	100.0 5	-	9	147	Pakistan	93.8	ວ	0			0.0
ю.	Afghanistan	81.8	#	9	147	Pakistan	73.8	-	9			0.0
4	Afghanistan	75.9 1	-	9	147	Pakistan	73.8	1	1 6			0.0
ıo	Albania			9	155	Greece	19.6		9			-0,2
9	Algeria	73.6 1	-	9	143	Israel	12.1	6	-0			- :
, and the second	Algeria	81.2	-	9	143	Morocco	86.2		1 6			0.0
œ	Algeria	81.2 1	-	9	143	Morocco	86.2	-	1 6			0.0
o,	Algena	60.9		9	143	Morocco	78.6		T. Carlotte	143		0:0
9	Argentina	8.6 1	-	-	119	Chile	16.4	-	8	THE PERSON NAMED IN	r Test assessment	-1.1
	Argentina	8.6	7		119	Paraguay	25.4	7				-0.1
12	Argentina	6.1	-	2	119	United Kingdom	1.0	က	9 0			2.0
ဗ	Australia	2.0	0	9	8	DPRK			6			.2.3
4	Australia		0	9	22	DPRK			6			-2.3
12	Australia	2.0 6	0	9	8	Indonesia	61.0		9			-2.2
16	Australia		0	9	22	Indonesia	61.0	-	1 6			-2.2
17	Australia	2.0 6	0	9	8	Malaysia (MPABA)	61.4	9	9 0			.2.2
18	Australia		0	9	22	Rep. Of Vietnam (VC & DRV)	25.9	4	4			-2.3
19	Belgium	2.0	0	9	116	DPRK			6	160	1903) 1945 1945 1945	-0.7
ន	Belgium		0	9	116	DPRK			6	160		-0.7
73	Belgium		0	9	116	Rwanda	61.8	1.5	03	143		-0.5
52	Belgium		0	9	116	Rwanda	49.8	4	4	143		-0.5
ន	Belgium		0	9	116	Zaire	0 83	2	3	143		-0.5
24	Belgium	2.0 6	0	9	116	Zaire (FNLC)	34.1	-	2 3			-0.5
52	Belgium	2.0 6	0	9	116	Zaire (Gizenga Faction)		1	3			-0.5
26	Burkina Faso	91.2 1	4	က	151	Mali	90.6	1	1 3	The second second	0.0	0.0
7	Burkina Faso	85.5	ď	ဇာ	151	Mali	77.3		- 3			0.0
88	Burma (Myanmar)		0	-	160	Taiwan (Kuomintang)			9 0			0.2
ଝ	Burma (Myanmar)	38.8	0	-	160	Taiwan (Kuomintang)			9 0			0.2
က	Burma (Myanmar)	22.0 1		9	160	Thailand	9.3	-	1 6	State Control	SALAL STATE OF THE SALAR STATE O	0.0
	Cambodia	59.8		9	160	Dem, Rep. Of Vietnam	16.6	c	1 6			0.0
35	Cambodia	61.1 4	-	9	160	Rep. Of Vietnam	16.6	2	1 6		200120120120	0.0
3	Cambodia	63.9		9	160		32.3					0.0
9 64 7 7 7 7	Cambodia	63.9		و و	160	I nailand Thoilgad	7.9.7 7.4.7	4				0.0
3 %	Cambodia	60.5 4	-	.	150	Thailand	120		1. 4 6	9		00
37	Canada		0	9	41	ЪРЯК	i	ı	6	160		-2.0
38	Canada	2.0	0	9	41	DPAK		44500: 11060000Kpromies, payous silent	6		excellent comme	-2.0
36	Chad	77.0	·	4	143	Libya	43.5	F	1 6			0.0
40	Chad	77.0 1	-	က	143	Nigeria	57.3	-	2 3			-0.1
- 14	Chad	70.2 1	6	4	143	Sudan	72.9		2			0.2
42	China		-	ဖ	151	Burma (Myanmar)	41.6	2	0		***************************************	-0.2
8	China		7	9	151	Burma (Myanmar)	38.8	5	-	160		-0.2
44	China	***************************************	-	9	151	Burma (Myanmar)	31.1	4		160		-0.2
2	China	34.0 2		9 0 u	151	Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam	16.6	7 7 u	T .	160	1.7	2.0
2 67	China		-	o (4	101	Delli, nep. Ol viellatti (vietilitti)	0./0	·	ر. ا	00		2.0
48	China	מיני הסיל		9	151	India	70.5		•	50		9 o
67	China		-	o «	151	liodia	2:7/	- +	9	66		6.0
2	China	53.4 5	-	9	151	India	68.5	5	0 6	66		6.0
	-											

Properties Pro		70R-07-07		The second secon		一方行 ところのは、大けの大切を変えて			
15-Sep 1997 16-Dec 1991 105	PUSHTUN SEPARATISM	30-Sep-1950	30-Sep-1950	The second secon	2	0	0.0		Section 5 and 16
19-Sep-1933 30-Mar-1987 1200 3 1 1000	AFGHAN WAR	05-Sep-1981	18-Dec-1981	105	3	0	0.0		
13-Mujr 1949 14-Mujr 1949 2 2 200 10.00	AFGHAN WAR	18-Sep-1983	30-Mar-1987	1290	က	1	0.0	Sector in product Sector production of the control	فالقائل بميارات والمتارات والمتارات
17-Oct-1973 26-Oct-1973 12 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	SREEK CIVIL WAR	13-Aug-1949	14-Aug-1949	2	2	8	- 10.0		
RA 12_MJ-1962 16_Oct-1962 99 2 0.0 0.0 sin Sahara) 27_Am-1962 28 1 100 3.6 sin Sahara) 27_Am-1963 28 1 100 3.6 sin Sahara) 27_Am-1963 28 2 0 0.0 sin Sahara) 27_Am-1963 3 1 30 10.0 sin Sahara) 27_Am-1963 3 1 30 10.0 sin Sahara (1964) 27_Am-1963 3 1 30 0.0 sin Sahara (1964) 27_Am-1963 3 1 30 0.0 R 11-Sap-1964 36 1 1 0.0 0.0 R 11-Sap-1965 25-Au-1960 35-Au-1960 35-Au-1960 30 0.0 R 11-Sap-1966 35-Au-1960	YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egypt)	17-Oct-1973	28-Oct-1973	12	-	0	0.0	0.3	2
A/AR QB-Coct-1963 Qd-HVov-1963 28 1 100 3.6 sh Saharia) 2C-Carl-1976 Qd-May-1986 Qd-May-1976 3 1 30 10.0 sh Saharia) QD-May-1986 Qd-May-1986 Qd-May-1986 3 2 0 0 Sh Alar-1896 Qd-May-1986 Dd-May-1986 Ad-Day-1986	TINDOUF RAIDS	12-Jul-1962	18-Oct-1962	66	2	0	0.0		
Schmidt 27-Jain-1976 33 11 30 100	MOROCCAN-ALGERIAN WAR	08-Oct-1963	04-Nov-1963	28	-	100	3.6		
19	OLISARIO WAR (in Spanish Sahara)	27-Jan-1976	29-Jan-1976	3	+	30	10.0	3.5	2
13-May-1962 15-May-1962 4 1 0 0.00 13-May-1962 25-Jun-1962 14 1 100 0.1 14-Jul-1962 77-Jul-1953 1120 3 100 0.1 15-Jul-1963 0.27-Jul-1963 1120 3 100 0.1 17-Oc-1960 0.27-Jul-1963 105 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	SNIPE ISLAND INCIDENTS	09-May-1958	09-Aug-1958	93	2	0	0.0	1.6	-
02-Apr-1982 20-Jun-1982 80 1 700 818 17-Cot-1960 27-Jul-1983 1120 1 9 100 0.1 17-Cot-1960 27-Jul-1983 1015 1 100 0.1 17-Cot-1960 27-Jul-1983 1015 1 0 0.0 29-Oct-1964 11-Aug-1986 852 1 1 0 0.0 29-Oct-1964 11-Aug-1986 852 1 1 0 0.0 31-Jun-1951 27-Jul-1983 899 1 500 0.2 01-Jun-1952 07-Jul-1983 899 1 500 0.2 01-Jun-1953 07-Jul-1983 899 1 500 0.0 01-Jun-1973 07-Jul-1984 5 1 2 0 0.0 01-Jun-1973 07-Jul-1978 87 1 0 0 0.0 19-Mar-1974 10-Jul-1978 1 1 2 0 0.0 10-Jun-1962 28-Doct-1993 1 2 0.0 10-Jun-1973 10-Jul-1978 20 0 0.0 10-Jun-1973 11-Jul-1978 20 0 0.0 10-Jun-1962 27-Jul-1978 20 0 0.0 10-Jun-1963 11-Jul-1978 20 0 0.0 10-Jun-1963 11-Jul-1978 20 0 0.0 10-Jun-1963 11-Jul-1963 20 0.0 10-Jun-1963 11-Jul-1963 12-Jul-1963 12-Jul-1	PILCOMAYO INCIDENT	13-May-1962	16-May-1962	7		0	0.0	3.7	-
Comparison Com	FALKLANDS WAR	02-Apr-1982	20-Jun-1982	80	-	200	8.8	0.5	
17-Oct-1950 27-Jul-1953 1015 1 100 0.1 2-Oct-1964 14.6 14.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	COREAN WAR	04-Jul-1950	27-Jul-1953	1120	ဇ	100	0.1		
Part	(OREAN WAR	17-Oct-1950	27-Jul-1953	1015	-	100	0.1		
15-Aug-1956 11-Aug-1956 552 1 1 0.0 15-Aug-1950 30-Jul-1950 3538 3 390 0.0 15-Aug-1950 30-Jul-1953 299 1 50 0.1 15-Aug-1951 27-Jul-1953 299 1 50 0.1 15-Aug-1951 27-Jul-1953 299 1 50 0.1 15-Aug-1952 27-Jul-1953 299 1 50 0.1 15-Aug-1953 20-Cic-1950 27 1 0 0.0 15-Aug-1953 20-Cic-1950 27 1 0 0.0 15-Aug-1978 10-Jul-1978 53 1 0 0.0 15-Aug-1978 10-Jul-1978 1 2 0 0.0 15-Aug-1978 25-Dic-1965 1 2 0 0.0 15-Aug-1978 25-Dic-1965 1 2 0 0.0 15-Aug-1978 10-Jul-1978 25 2 0 0.0 15-Aug-1979 25-Dic-1965 25-Dic-1965 1 2 0 0.0 15-Aug-1979 25-Dic-1965 25-Dic-1965 1 2 0 0.0 15-Aug-1979 10-Jul-1978 25 2 0 0.0 15-Aug-1979 10-Jul-1978 25 2 0 0.0 15-Aug-1979 10-Jul-1978 25 2 0 0.0 15-Aug-1979 10-Jul-1979 25-Dic-1979 25-Dic	IRST INDO-CHINESE WAR	11-Sep-1945	02-Feb-1946	345		0	0.0		
WAR 15-Aug-1950 30-Jul-1960 3639 3 30 0.0 WAR 03-Jun-1965 08-Dec-1971 2380 1 500 0.1 03-Jun-1965 27-Jul-1963 909 1 500 0.1 01-Jun-1961 27-Jul-1963 909 1 50 0.1 01-Jun-1961 27-Jul-1963 78 1 0 0.0 04-Oct-1990 28-Oct-1991 37 1 0 0.0 24-Sept-1991 30-Oct-1991 37 1 0 0.0 24-Sept-1991 22-Nor-1975 25-Dec-1983 1 0 0.0 24-Sept-1962 28-Nor-1984 5 1 0 0.0 24-Sept-1963 26-Dec-1963 17 3 0 0.0 30-Un-1965 25-Dec-1963 1 2 0 0.0 12-Mar-1964 15-Am-1976 2 0 0 0 12-Mar-1965 12-Am-1966 12-Am-1966 1	SONFRONTATION	29-Oct-1964	11-Aug-1966	652	-	-	0.0	14.2	-
WAR 03-Jun-1967 03-Dec-1971 2380 1 500 0.2 1-Jun-1967 27-Jul-1963 909 1 50 0.1 01-Jun-1967 27-Jul-1963 98 1 50 0.0 01-Jun-1969 27-Jul-1962 98 1 50 0.0 04-Ort-1990 28-Oct-1990 25 1 0 0.0 19-May-1976 28-Oct-1991 37 1 0 0.0 19-May-1976 28-Oct-1994 5 1 0 0.0 19-May-1976 28-Oct-1994 5 1 0 0.0 24-Sept-1967 28-Dec-1963 17 3 0 0.0 24-Sept-1967 28-Dec-1963 17 3 0 0.0 25-Dec-1965 29-Dec-1964 1 2 30 0.0 30-Jun-1977 10-Jun-1976 12-Jun-1977 10-Jun-1976 15-Jun-1977 10-Jun-1976 AAR 11-Jun-1966 12-Jun-1966 25	MALAYAN INSURGENCY	15-Aug-1950	30-Jul-1960	3638	3	98	0.0	and the same of the same	
31-Jan-1951 27-Jul-1963 509 1 50 01 01-Jun-1951 27-Jul-1963 788 1 50 01 01-Jun-1951 27-Jul-1963 599 1 50 01 04-Oct-1909 20-Oct-1909 25 1 0 0.0 04-Oct-1909 20-Oct-1909 25 1 0 0.0 19-May-1978 10-Jul-1978 53 1 0 0.0 19-May-1978 10-Jul-1978 53 1 0 0.0 24-Sep-1963 26-Dec-1965 1 2 30 0.0 25-Dec-1965 26-Dec-1965 1 2 30 0.0 26-Dec-1965 26-Dec-1965 1 3 0 0.0 19-May-1978 12-Jul-1978 20 0 0.0 19-May-1978 12-Jul-1978 20 0 0.0 19-May-1977 12-Jul-1978 20 0 0.0 19-May-1977 12-Jul-1978 20 0 0.0 19-May-1977 12-Jul-1978 20 0 0.0 19-Dec-1966 13-Dec-1966 25 0 0.0 19-Dec-1967 13-Dec-1967 3 1 70 0.0 19-Dec-1968 13-Dec-1968 391 2 0 0.0 19-Dec-1969 20-Apr-1960 376 2 0 0.0 19-Dec-1969 20-Apr-1960 376 2 0 0.0 19-Dec-1969 14-Dec-1964 3346 2 0 0.0 10-Apr-1969 14-Dec-1964 3346 2 0 0.0 10-Apr-1969 21-Apr-1969 31-Jul-1968 76 2 0 0.0 10-Apr-1969 21-Apr-1969 20-Apr-1969 76 2 0 0.0 10-Apr-1969 21-Apr-1969 76 2 0 0.0 10-Apr-1969 21-Apr-1969 20-Apr-1969 76 0 0 10-Apr-1969 21-Apr-1969 76 0 0 0 10-Apr-1969 21-Apr-1969 31-Jul-1969 76 0 0 0 10-Apr-1969 21-Apr-1969 76 0 0 0 10-Apr-1969 31-Jul-1969 76 0 0 0 10-Apr-1969 21-Apr-1969 76	SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR	03-Jun-1965	08-Dec-1971	2380	-	500	0.2		
O1-Jun-1951 27-Jul-1953 798 1 50 01 O4-Nov-1959 01-Jul-1978 998 1 5 00 O4-Nov-1959 02-Oct-1990 25 1 0 0.0 O4-Nov-1954 28-Nov-1954 5 1 0 0.0 O4-Nov-1954 28-Nov-1954 5 1 0 0.0 O4-Nov-1954 28-Nov-1954 5 1 2 0.0 O4-Nov-1954 28-Nov-1954 5 1 2 0.0 O5-Nov-1954 28-Nov-1954 5 1 2 0.0 O5-Nov-1955 28-Nov-1955 1 2 0 0.0 O5-Nov-1955 28-Nov-1955 2 0 0.0 O5-Nov-1955 12-Nov-1955 2 0 0.0 O5-Nov-1955 12-Nov-1955 2 0 0.0 O5-Nov-1955 12-Nov-1955 378 2 0 0.0 O5-Nov-1955 12-Nov-1955 378 2 0 0.0 O5-Nov-1955 14-Doc-1956 378 2 0 0.0 O5-Nov-1955 14-Doc-1956 38-Nov-1955 38-Nov	COREAN WAR	31-Jan-1951	27-Jul-1953	606		- 20	0.1		
OB-Nov-1959 OT-Aug-1962 999 1 3 00 04-Oct-1990 28-Oct-1990 25 1 0 0.0 19-May-1994 28-Oct-1990 25 1 0 0.0 19-May-1994 28-Nov-1964 5 1 0 0.0 24-Nov-1964 22-Nov-1964 5 1 0 0.0 03-Jun-1975 03-Jun-1975 1 2 0 0.0 03-Jun-1975 03-Jun-1975 1 2 0 0.0 OS-Jun-1975 03-Jun-1975 1 2 0 0.0 OS-Jun-1975 26-Dec-1985 26-Dec-1985 1 2 0 0.0 Iland) 20-Dec-1985 28-Mar-1986 25 2 0 0.0 0 IR 15-Mar-1966 15-Jan-1966 25 2 0 0 0 0 R 11-May-1976 15-Jan-1966 25-Jan-1966 27-Jan-1966 27-Jan-1966 27-Jan-1966		01-Jun-1951	27-Jul-1953	788	-	50	0.1		
1990 04-Oct-1990 28-Oct-1990 254-Sep-1991 30-Oct-1991 37 1 0 0.00 24-Sep-1991 30-Oct-1991 37 1 0 0.00 19-May-1978 10-Jul-1978 53 1 0 0.00 22-Dec-1985 28-Nov-1984 5 1 2 0 0.00 25-Dec-1985 25-Dec-1985 2 2 0 0.00 25-Dec-1985 27-Jul-1983 73 2 0 0.00 25-Dec-1985 27-Jul-1983 73 2 0 0.00 25-Dec-1985 27-Jul-1983 73 2 0 0.00 25-Dec-1985 25-Dec-1985 76 2 2 0 25-Dec-1985 25-Dec-1985 76 2 2 0 25-Dec-1985 27-Dec-1985 76 2 0 25	TUTSI-HUTU VIOLENCE	08-Nov-1959	01-Aug-1962	866	1	3	0.0		
24-Sep-1991 30-Oct-1991 37 1 0 0.0 19-Mar-1978 10-Jul-1978 53 1 0 0.0 24-Nov-1964 5 1 2 0.0 0.0 24-Nov-1965 22-Nov-1964 5 1 2 0.0 32-Jun-1975 1 4 0 0 0 32-Dec-1985 26-Dec-1985 17 3 0 0.0 32-Dec-1985 26-Dec-1985 17 3 0 0.0 33-Jun-1956 22-Mar-1956 1 2 30 0.0 30-Jun-1967 12-Mar-1984 12-Mar-1984 1 2 0 0.0 30-Jun-1968 25-Mar-1976 12-Jun-1965 1 0 0 0 ARR 01-Mar-1966 13-Feb-1966 25-Dec-1967 2 0 0 0 0 ARR 01-Mar-1966 13-Feb-1966 25-Dec-1967 2 0 0 0 0 0	IUTSI INVASION	04-Oct-1990	28-Oct-1990	25	-	0	0.0	17.5	-
19-May-1978 10-Jul-1978 53 1 0 0.0 24-Nov-1964 28-Nov-1964 5 1 2 0.4 23-Jun-1975 03-Jun-1975 1 4 0 0.0 03-Jun-1975 03-Jun-1975 1 2 30 30.0 13-Mar-1953 05-Oc-1955 1 3 0 0.0 12-Mar-1964 12-Mar-1984 1 2 15 15.0 12-Mar-1975 15-Jan-1976 20 2 2 0 0.0 13-Mar-1975 15-Jan-1976 20 2 2 0 0.0 14-Mar-1975 15-Jan-1976 20 2 0 0.0 15-Mar-1975 15-Jan-1976 22 0 0.0 15-Mar-1975 12-De-1986 22 2 0 0.0 15-De-1966 13-Pe-1966 22 2 0 0.0 15-De-1967 12-De-1987 3 1 20 0.0 15-De-1968 20-Apr-1987 3 1 20 0.0 15-Jan-1959 20-Apr-1950 37-6 2 0 0.0 15-Jan-1959 20-Apr-1950 27-Jul-1950 39-7 2 0 0.0 15-Jan-1959 07-Nov-1969 297 2 0 0.0 15-Jan-1959 30-Jan-1950 33-Jan-1950 33-Jan	(INSHASA RIOTS	24-Sep-1991	30-Oct-1991	37		0	0.0	103.8	2
Carrolle	(OLWEZI RESCUE	19-May-1978	10-Jul-1978	53	-	0	0.0	20.2	-
03-Jun-1975 03-Jun-1975 1 4 0 0.0 1 ce-Dec-1985 26-Dec-1985 1 2 30 30.0 1 ce-Dec-1985 26-Dec-1985 1 2 30 30.0 1 ce-Dec-1985 26-Mar-1956 27 3 0 0.0 1 ce-Dec-1985 29-Mar-1985 29-Mar-1986 1 2 15 15.0 1 ce-Dec-1985 29-Mar-1986 25-Mar-1987 15-Jan-1978 250 0 0.0 RR 11-Aug-1982 12-Jan-1986 25 2 0 0.0 20-Jun-1965 20-Jun-1965 25 2 0 0.0 RR 22-Jun-1968 25-Jun-1968	CONGOLESE CIVIL WAR	24-Nov-1964	28-Nov-1964	9		2	0.4	12.3	
26-Dec-1985 15 26-Dec-1985 17 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	AGACHER SHELLING	03-Jun-1975	03-Jun-1975	1	4	0	0.0	0.9	-
Ildand) 20-Sep-1953 06-Oct-1953 17 3 0 0.0 IlON (in Thailand) 29-Mar-1955 29-Mar-1955 1 3 0 0.0 ION (in Thailand) 29-Mar-1955 29-Mar-1955 1 5 5 0 0.0 ION (in Thailand) 22-Mar-1964 1 2 5 5 0 0.0 IR 15-Mar-1977 10-Jul-1978 2 2 0 0.0 0.0 VAR 01-May-1962 12-Jun-1962 2 2 0 0.0 0.0 R 20-Jun-1965 12-Jun-1965 2 0 0 0.0 0.0 R 20-Jun-1966 12-Dec-1984 2943 2 0 0.0 0.0 R 22-Jun-1966 12-Dec-1984 2943 2 0 0.0 0.0 R 22-Jun-1967 17-Jun-1963 27-Jun-1963 17-Jun-1963 17-Jun-1963 17-Jun-1963 17-Jun-1963 17-Jun-1963 17-Jun-1	AGACHER BATTLE	26-Dec-1985	26-Dec-1985		. 2	8	30,0	6.0	
ON (in Thailand) 29-Mar-1956 15-Mar-1956 15-Mar-1984 12-Mar-1984 12-Mar-1984 12-Mar-1984 12-Mar-1984 15-Mar-1984 15-Mar-1987 16-Jul-1978 25-Mar-1977 16-Jul-1978 25-Mar-1978 25-Jul-1962 12-Jul-1962 12-Jul-1966 13-Tent-1966 13-Tent-1967 1	MONGHSAT RAIDS (in Thailand)	20-Sep-1953	06-Oct-1953	17	3	0	0.0	0.2	-
Name	S	29-Mar-1955	29-Mar-1955		3	0	0.0	0.2	
IGARIA (15-Mar-1977) IG-Juli-1976 483 2 5000 10.4 VAR 01-May-1975 15-Jan-1976 260 2 20 0.1 VAR 11-Mug-1962 12-Aug-1962 2 2 0 0.0 11-Mug-1966 12-Aug-1966 25 2 0 0.0 20-Jun-1966 13-Feb-1966 25 0 0.0 R 22-Nov-1976 12-Dec-1984 2943 2 0 0.0 R 12-Nov-1976 12-Dec-1984 2943 2 0 0.0 R 12-Nov-1967 12-Dec-1987 39 1 200 0.0 R 12-Dec-1987 27-Jul-1983 73 2 80 1.1 30-Apr-1987 17-Jul-1983 73 2 4 0.0 30-Apr-1989 20-Apr-1980 37-6 2 0 0 30-Apr-1989 11-Jul-1983 29 4 0 0 30-Apr-1989 15	MAW POKEY INCIDENT	12-Mar-1984	12-Mar-1984	-	2	15	15.0	0.2	-
VAR 01-May-1975 15-Jan-1976 260 2 20 0.1 11-Aug-1962 12-Jan-1965 2 2 0 0.0 20-Jun-1965 20-Jun-1965 1 2 0 0.0 R 20-Jun-1966 13-Feb-1966 26 2 0 0.0 R 22-Nov-1976 12-Dec-1984 2943 2 0 0.0 R 22-Nov-1976 12-Dec-1984 2943 2 0 0.0 R 19-Dec-1960 27-Jul-1963 395 1 200 0.2 10-Sep-1987 27-Jul-1983 73 2 80 1.1 30-Apr-1983 11-Jul-1983 73 2 80 1.1 30-Apr-1989 20-Apr-1980 37-B 2 0 0.0 30-Jan-1950 14-Dec-1966 391 2 4 0.0 30-Jan-1969 15-Jan-1968 394 2 0 0.0 A 0-Apr-1978	THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	15-Mar-1977	10-Jul-1978	483	2	2000	10.4		
11.Aug-1962 12.Aug-1962 2 0 0.0 co.Jun-1965 20-Jun-1965 1 2 0 0.0 co.Jun-1965 13-Feb-1966 25 2 0 0.0 co.Jun-1966 13-Feb-1966 25 0 0.0 co.Jan-1966 12-Dec-1984 2943 2 0 0.0 co.hov-1976 12-Dec-1984 2943 2 0 0.0 0 co.hov-1976 12-Dec-1984 2943 2 10 0.0 0 0 co.hov-1976 12-Dec-1987 2 1 200 0.0 0	SECOND INDOCHINESE WAR	01-May-1975	15-Jan-1976	260	2	20	0.1		
Co-Jun-1965 20-Jun-1965 1 2 0 0.0	PREAH VIHEAR RAIDS	11-Aug-1962	12-Aug-1962	2	2	. 0	0.0		
RR 20-Jan-1966 13-Feb-1966 25 0 0.0 RR 22-Nov-1976 12-Dec-1984 2943 2 100 0.0 22-Nov-1976 12-Dec-1984 2943 2 100 0.0 28-May-1951 27-Jul-1953 792 1 200 0.2 28-May-1951 27-Jul-1953 792 1 70 23.3 10-Sep-1987 07-Sep-1987 3 1 70 23.3 10-Apr-1989 20-Apr-1980 376 2 0 0.0 30-Jan-1950 30-Jan-1950 376 2 4 0.0 30-Jan-1969 20-Apr-1969 297 2 4 0.0 RR 21-Apr-1978 15-Oct-1967 3465 2 20000 5.8 RR 21-Apr-1978 15-Oct-1967 33 1 0 0.0 RR 21-Apr-1978 21-Oct-1967 22 20000 5.8 RR 21-Apr-1976 31-Apr-1976<	PREAH VIHEAR CLASHES	20-Jun-1965	20-Jun-1965	1	2	0	0.0		
RR 22-Nov-1976 12-Dec-1984 2943 2 100 0.0 19-Dec-1950 27-Jul-1953 792 1 200 0.2 28-May-1951 27-Jul-1953 792 1 200 0.3 30-Sep-1987 07-Sep-1987 3 1 70 23.3 10-Apr-1989 17-Jul-1983 73 2 0 0.0 30-Apr-1989 17-Jul-1980 376 2 0 0.0 30-Jan-1950 30-Jan-1950 30-Jan-1950 30-Jan-1960 0.0 0.0 R 21-Jan-1969 07-Nov-1969 297 2 0 0.0 R 21-Apr-1978 15-Oct-1987 3465 2 20000 5.8 R 07-Aug-1959 21-Out-1969 27-Out-1969 27-Out-1969 20 0.0 R 07-Aug-1959 21-Out-1969 22 20000 5.8 0.0 R 07-Aug-1959 21-Out-1969 22 20000 5.0 0.0<	PREAH VIHEAR CLASHES	20-Jan-1966	13-Feb-1966	. 25	2	0	0.0		
19-Dec-1950 27-Jul-1953 952 1 200 0.2 28-May-1951 27-Jul-1953 792 1 200 0.3 28-May-1951 27-Jul-1953 792 1 200 0.3 30-Apr-1983 11-Jul-1983 73 2 80 1.1 30-Apr-1983 20-Apr-1990 376 2 0 0.0 30-Jan-1950 30-Jan-1950 1 2 0 0.0 48 21-Apr-1955 14-Dec-1956 391 2 4 0.0 49 21-Apr-1978 15-Ct-1987 34-65 2 20000 5.8 49 07-Apr-1978 31-Jul-1946 333 1 0 0.0 40 07-Apr-1959 21-Out-1956 12-Apr-1956 22-Nov-1956 12-Apr-1956 11-Dec-1956 12-Apr-1956 11-Dec-1956 12-Apr-1956 11-Dec-1956	THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	22-Nov-1976	12-Dec-1984	2943	2	100	0.0		
28-May-1951 27-Jul-1953 792 1 200 0.3 0-5-Sep-1987 07-Sep-1987 3 1 70 233 30-Apr-1983 11-Jul-1983 73 2 80 1.1 10-Apr-1989 20-Apr-1990 376 2 0 0.0 30-Jan-1950 30-Jan-1950 1 2 0 0.0 30-Jan-1950 30-Jan-1950 1 2 0 0.0 15-Jan-1969 07-Nov-1969 297 2 0 0.0 15-Jan-1969 07-Nov-1969 297 2 0 0.0 16-Jan-1969 15-Jan-1969 297 2 0 0.0 17-Jan-1969 15-Jan-1969 297 2 0.0 18-Jan-1969 15-Jan-1969 25-Jan-1969	KOBEAN WAR	19-Dec-1950	27-Jul-1953	952	1	200	0.2		
05-Sep-1987 07-Sep-1987 3 70 23/3 30-Apr-1983 11-Jul-1983 73 2 80 1.1 30-Apr-1989 20-Apr-1990 376 2 0 0.0 30-Jan-1950 30-Jan-1950 1 2 0 0.0 10-Jan-1950 30-Jan-1950 1 2 0 0.0 10-Jan-1950 07-Nov-1956 297 2 0 0.0 15-Jan-1969 07-Nov-1969 297 2 0 0.0 18 21-Apr-1976 15-Oct-1987 3465 2 2000 5.8 18 02-Sep-1945 31-Jul-1946 333 1 0 0.0 100-1940 27-Jul-1952 27-Jul-1959 76 5- 0.1 100-1041 21-Jul-1967 111-Jac-1967 125 4 100 0.0	KOREAN WAR	28-May-1951	27-Jul-1953	792	-	200	0.3		
30-Apr-1983 11-Jul-1983 73 2 80 1.1 10-Apr-1989 20-Apr-1990 376 2 0 0.0 30-Jan-1950 30-Jan-1950 1 2 0 0.0 15-Jan-1959 07-Nov-1959 297 2 0 0.0 15-Jan-1969 07-Nov-1969 297 2 0 0.0 16 02-Sep-1945 31-Jul-1946 333 1 0 0.0 17 007-Aug-1959 21-Out-1959 76 2 5- 0.1 18 02-Sep-1945 21-Out-1959 76 2 0.0 19 00-Jul-1965 21-Jul-1965 15- 0.1 10 00-Jul-1965 11-Jul-1965 12- 0.0	JIBYAN-CHADIAN WAR	05-Sep-1987	07-Sep-1987	. 3		70	. 23.3	0.0	N
10-Apr-1989 20-Apr-1990 376 2 0 0.00 30-Jan-1950 30-Jan-1950 1 2 0 0.00 30-Jan-1950 30-Jan-1950 1 2 0 0.00 15-Jan-1969 07-Nov-1969 297 2 0 0.0 IR 21-Apr-1978 15-Oct-1987 3465 2 20000 58 IR 02-Sep-1945 31-Jul-1946 333 1 0 0.0 In Incident) 21-Jul-1952 22-Nov-1959 76 2 0.01	LAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES	30-Apr-1983	11-Jul-1983	73	7	80	[:	0.2	,
30-Jan-1950 30-Jan-1950 1 2 0 0.0 20-Nov-1955 14-Dec-1956 391 2 4 0.0 15-Jan-1969 07-Nov-1969 297 2 0 0.0 IR 21-Apr-1978 15-Oct-1987 3465 2 20000 5.8 IR 02-Sep-1945 31-Jul-1946 333 1 0 0.0 In Incident) 21-Jul-1952 21-Oct-1959 76 2 5 0.1 In Incident) 21-Jul-1962 21-Oct-1965 11-Dec-1968 125 4 1000 8.0	ANTI-DEBY RAIDS	10-Apr-1989	20-Apr-1990	376	2	0	0.0	0.5	
20-Nov-1955 14-Dec-1956 391 2 4 0.0 15-Jan-1969 07-Nov-1969 297 2 0 0.0 IR 21-Apr-1978 15-Oct-1987 3465 2 20000 5.8 IR 02-Sep-1945 31-Jul-1946 333 1 0 0.0 In 07-Aug-1959 76 2 0.1 In 10-Incident) 21-Jul-1962 22-Nov-1962 125 4 1000 8.0	KENGTUNG RAID	30-Jan-1950	30-Jan-1950	-	7	0	0.0		
HR 21:Apr-1969 07-Nov-1969 297 2 0 0.0 HR 21:Apr-1978 15-Oct-1987 3465 2 20000 5.8 HR 02-Sep-1945 31-Jul-1946 333 1 0 0.0 HR 07:Aug-1959 21:Oct-1959 76 2 5 0.1 HR 02:Aug-1959 21:Oct-1959 76 2 4 1000 8.0 HR 03:Aug-1969 12:Aug-1962 12:Aug-1962 12:Aug-1962 12:Aug-1962 13:Aug-1968 10:Aug-1968 10:A	CHINESE BORDER RAIDS	20-Nov-1955	14-Dec-1956	391	ય	4	0.0	1.8	3
LR 21-Apr-1976 15-Oct-1987 3465 2 20000 5.8 LR 02-Sep-1945 31-Jul-1946 333 1 0 0.0 07-Aug-1959 21-Oct-1959 76 5 0.1 In Incident) 21-Jul-1962 22-Nov-1962 125 4 1000 8.0 no-incident Skirmishes 21-Sep-1965 111-Dec-1965 82	CHINESE BORDER RAIDS	15-Jan-1969	07-Nov-1969	297	2	0	0.0	1.5	-
R 02-Sep-1945 31-Jul-1946 333 1 0 0.0 07-Aug-1959 21-Oct-1959 76 2 5 0.1 n Incident) 21-Jul-1962 22-Nov-1962 125 4 1000 8.0 no-incident Skirmishes 21-Sep-1965 111-Dec-1965 82	THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	21-Apr-1978	15-Oct-1987	3465	Q	2000	5.8		
n Incident) 21-Jul-1969 21-Oct-1959 76 2 5 0.11 n Incident) 21-Jul-1962 22-Nov-1962 125 4 1000 8.0 no-Incident Skirmishes 21-San-1965 11-Doc-1965 82 4 10 0.1	FIRST INDO-CHINESE WAR	02-Sep-1945	31-Jul-1946	333	-	0	0.0		
n Incident) 21-Jul-1962 22-Nov-1962 125 4 1000 8.0 no-incident Skirmishes 21-Sen-1966 111-Dec-1965 82	SINO-INDIAN CONFLICT	07-Aug-1959	21-Oct-1959	76	2	5.	0.1		
no-Indian Skirmishas 21: San-1965 11-Dac-1965 82 4 10 01	_	21-Jul-1962	22-Nov-1962	125	4	1000	8.0	9.0	-
	2	MANDENSCHAFT CALCULATION CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTR	Alle 17. 1 . San annual market for the construction of the second	the second name of contrast being being an or					

1 6 151 1 151 1 151 1 1 151 1				The state of the s								
10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	China	0.08	S.	.	151	Laos	88.2	Q	0		6	2.0
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,	China	34.0	7	1 6	151	Laos	58.3	N	1 6		-1.0	-0.2
1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 1,	China	61.8	2	9 1	151	Nepal	91.2				-1.2	0.0
1.0 1.0	China	71.5			151	e d'incresse l'annual de la company de l Porticoal	38.1	i neglimangan danasiya at hidawa i	1	or new Wiles contractions		-0.7
7,10 1,10 1,10 <th< td=""><td>China</td><td>OKY</td><td></td><td>9</td><td></td><td>Des Of Waters</td><td>- 30°</td><td></td><td></td><td>NA STATE</td><td>O. Firest</td><td></td></th<>	China	OKY		9		Des Of Waters	- 30°			NA STATE	O. Firest	
140 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 1	VIII A	7,5		•			, CO3					7.6
14.0 5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Crina	/4.0	5	1	151	HOK.	29.4	T greconsessumentensesses	_ 	4/L		-0.4
151 1154 151 1154 151 1154 151 1154 151 1154 151 1154 151 1154 151 1154 151 15	Culua	74.0	2		151	ROK	29.4			174	œ. -	-0.4
Section Sect	China	-	5	1 6	151	Tibet			9 6	151		0.0
Beat 50.9 5 16 DPRN 6 16 DPRN 77.6 4 3 16 16 DPRN 77.6 4 3 16 16 DPRN 6 16	Ohina		Q	1 6	151	Tibet			o	151		0.0
big 27.1 1 8 156 DPHK 9 160 big 27.1 1 8 156 Compo 77.5 4 9 160 14.9 4 1 1 156 Compo 67.0 77.5 4 9 160 14.9 4 1 1 156 Compo 67.0 80.1 1 1 1.83 2.99 180 10.0 2 1 2 156 Compo 28.1 1 2 180 2.00 180 2.9 180 2.00 180 2.9 180 2.00 3 180 2.00 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 180 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 6 180 4 4 6 180	China	50.9	S.	1 6	151	USSR			8 6			
List DPHK Fig. DPHK PPHK 9 143 2.6 14.9 4 1 1 156 DPHK 9 1 2 143 2.6 14.9 4 1 1 156 Morosoo 86.2 1 2 143 2.9 133 2.6 1 2 156 Zarief RNA 86.1 1 2 143 2.9 130 6.9 130 1.9 1.1 2 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.1 2 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.1 2 1.8 1.9 2 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9	Colombia	27.1	-	8	156	DPRK			6	160		10
143	Colombia	27.1	-	8	156	DPRK	entregere significant of the best of the second of the sec		0	160	ACCOUNTS AND A SECOND S	- -
14.9 1 1 15 16 Monoson 86.2 1 1 1 14 2. 15 Monoson 86.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Cuba	13.9	4		156	Cando	77.5	4	3	143	-2.6	0.2
10.00 2 1 2 156 25maler 231 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Cuba	14.9		odistracijes se se dokumin izbeste 	156	Morocco	86.2	1046161418141815101011 -	- Zaskadda, doddai'r 1917. 1	143	-0 G-	0.0
10.8 2 1 2 1.05 2. Zaine (FMLA) 241 1 2 2 143 4.03 10.6 2 1 2 1.05 2. Zaine (FMLA) 241 1 2 1.05 10.6 2 1 1 6 1.05 Carindoida 24.6 4 6 1.05 10.6 1 1 6 1.05 Carindoida 24.6 4 6 1.05 10.6 1 1 6 1.05 Carindoida 24.6 4 6 1.05 10.6 1 1 6 1.05 Carindoida 24.6 4 6 1.05 10.6 1 1 6 1.05 Carindoida 24.6 1 6 1.05 10.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1 1 10.6 1 1 1	Cuba	10.8		1	156	Somalia	- K3 1		-	134	56	<u> </u>
Rep. Of Vertram 16.8 2 1 2 15.0 Carmodal 64.6 4 4 6 14.3 G.S. Particolar 64.6 4 4 6 14.3 G.S. Particolar 64.6 4 4 6 16.0 17.7 Rep. Of Vertram 66.8 2 1 6 160 Carmodal 64.6 4 4 6 160 17.7 17.	Ciba	401	7. January		756	Zairo	- VC	-	0	67 F	i c	0.0
Rep Olviernam 2.9 4 1 6 100 Cambridge 64.6 4 4 4 6 100 17.8 Rep Olviernam 16.6 1 1 6 1 1 6 160 17.8 Rep. Olviernam 16.6 2 1 1 6 1.9	Ouba	10.8	9	2	92. 188	Zaire (ENI A)	24.1	- •	,	144	6.0-	2.0
Of Volteriam 16.6 2 1 6 100 Calmodus 59.8 4 1 6 100 13.1 Of Volteriam 16.6 2 1 6 160 China 34.0 2 1 6 151 -0.7 Of Volteriam 16.6 2 1 6 1.00 -1.3 -0.7 -0.	Dom Don Of Vioteem	2000		•	3	Combodio	- C 1.1.2	1	•	2 9) - -	
Of Victorian 160 China 34.0 2 1 6 150 1	Dem. nep. Of Vietnam	6.22	**************************************	- •	100	Calribodia	04.0	,	4 •	190	/	0.0
Colf Vielnam 16.6 2 1 160 China 34.0 2 1 6 151 -0.7 Of Vielnam 30.1 4 9 160 China 34.0 2 1 6 151 -0.7 Of Vielnam 30.1 4 9 160 China 25.9 4 1 6 157 4 1 160 0.0 Of Vielnam 25.9 4 9 160 Poly 22.9 4 1 4 6 150 0.0 Of Vielnam 25.9 4 9 160 POK 22.9 1 10 1 17 1 <		0.01		٠,	8	Çarılı Dolla	0.00	•		8	01.	200
Oct Victorium 30.1 Cinna 77.1 4 0 1 150 4/1 Oct Victorium 30.1 9 160 Lage (Finod) 58.3 2 1 6 1.9 1.19 -1.9	Dem. nep. Oi vietnam	0.0	7	_	001	China	34.0	7.	-	<u>c</u>	/·o-	0.2
Oct Victorium 16.6 2 1 160 Lage (Hmong) 77.1 4 0 1 f60 -13 Oct Victorium 25.9 4 1 160 Lage (Hmong) 77.1 4 0 1 f60 -1.7 Oct Victorium 25.9 4 1 160 Hebr Of Victorium 25.9 4 1 1 f60 0.1 Oct Victorium 25.9 1 160 HOK 29.4 1 4 6 160 0.0 Oct Victorium 16.6 POK 29.4 1 4 1 160 0.0 Oct Victorium 17.0 1 2 160 Pok 1 4 1 1 17.4 1 17.4 1 17.4 1 <td>Dem. Hep. Of Vietnam</td> <td>16.6</td> <td></td> <td></td> <td>160</td> <td>China</td> <td>34.0</td> <td>2</td> <td>9</td> <td>151</td> <td>Ä</td> <td>Z. O</td>	Dem. Hep. Of Vietnam	16.6			160	China	34.0	2	9	151	Ä	Z. O
Col Vieltram 16.6 2 1 160 Laps (Mineral) 683 2 1 6 17. O.O Vieltram 25.9 4 9 160 Point (Mineral) 25.9 4 1 1 1 160 0.00 O.O Vieltram 26.0 2 1 4 6 160 Doil 1.20 2 4 1 1 160 0.00 O.O Vieltram 16.0 Point 1.20 2 4 1 4 6 1.74 1 1 4 1	Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam	30.1	4	6	160	Laos	77.1	4	0	or a second seco	-1.9	0.0
O. Of Vietnam 25.9 4 9 160 Rep. Of Vietnam 25.9 4 1 160 0.00 O. Of Vietnam 166 2 1 160 ROK 23.4 1 4 6 160 0.0 O. Of Vietnam 166 2 1 2 160 Pont 22.4 1 4 6 174 1.7.0 1 1 2 160 Penu 18.0 1 1 2 179 0.1 1.7.0 1 1 2 160 Penu 18.0 1 1 2 179 0.1 1.7.0 1 1 2 160 Penu 18.0 1 1 2 179 0.1 1.1.0 1 1 1 143 Israel 11.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam	16.6	N		160	Laos (Hmong)	583	N	9		-17	00
156 2 1 160 11 174	Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam	25.9	4	6	160	Rep. Of Vietnam	25.9	4	-		0.0	0.0
9 160 POK 294 1 3 1 174 9 160 POK 294 1 3 1 174 9 160 POK 213 4 6 174 1 1 1 174 170 1 2 160 Peru 213 2 1 2 179 0.0 516 1	Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam	16.6	લ	1	160	Thailand	12.0	2	4		0.2	0.0
160 ROK 294 14 4 6 174 170 1 1 2 160 Penu 21.5 4 1 1 174 170 1 1 2 160 Penu 18.1 2 179 0.0 51.8 1 1 2 160 Penu 18.1 1 2 179 0.0 51.8 1 1 2 143 Iraq 40.3 1 1 2 179 0.0 82.8 6 1 143 Iraq 40.3 1 1 2 179 2.2 74.2 1 1 143 Israel 18.8 5 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 1 143 Israel 12.1 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 1 143 Israel 12.1 1 7 7 <t< td=""><td>DPRK</td><td></td><td></td><td>6</td><td>160</td><td>ROK</td><td>29.4</td><td>-</td><td>3</td><td></td><td></td><td>-0.2</td></t<>	DPRK			6	160	ROK	29.4	-	3			-0.2
17.5 1. 2 160 Point 21.5 4 1 174 174 174 175 179 1				6	160	ROK	29.4	F	4			-0.2
17.9 2 160 Peru 21.1 2 179 0.1 17.0 1 1 2 160 Peru 18.0 1 1 2 179 0.0 51.6 1 1 6 143 Inches 1 1 6 143 1 1 6 143 1 1 6 143 1 1 6 143 1 1 6 143 1 <	DPRK	Milleon constitutions, and calculations (III) (1) to	en e	5	160	ROK	21.5	4	-	nd Market of the first of the first	Albein 1997 saktur 1997 saktur	-0.2
17.0 1 1 2 160 Peru 18.0 1 1 2 179 0.0 61.8 1 1 6 143 Iraq 40.3 1 1 6 161 2.1 82.8 5 4 1 14.3 Israel 18.8 5 1 6 143 0.5 74.2 1 1 1 14.3 Israel 18.4 5 1 79 2.4 74.2 1 1 1 14.3 Israel 17.9 5 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 1 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 1 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 1 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 1 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 65.8 1 1 1 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.0 66.8 1 1 1 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.0 67.8 1 1 1 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 1 1 79 0.0 69.8 1 1 1 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 60.1 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 74.2 1 1 1 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 75.9 2.0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Ecuador	17.9	2	1	160	Peru	21.1	2	1	179	-0.1	-0.3
61.8 1 1 6 143 Grouns 11 6 143 Iraq 403 1 1 6 143 Israel 403 1 1 6 143 Israel 212 5 1 6 143 0.5 784 5 4 1 143 Israel 184 5 1 79 2.3 742 1 1 1 143 Israel 17.9 5 1 79 2.3 74.2 1 1 1 143 Israel 17.9 5 1 79 2.3 61.8 4 1 1 1 143 Israel 17.9 5 1 79 2.2 61.8 4 1 1 1 143 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 </td <td>Ecuador</td> <td>17.0</td> <td>aleman in the Charles and Charles Street.</td> <td>1 2</td> <td>160</td> <td>Peru</td> <td>18.0</td> <td>1</td> <td>-</td> <td>179</td> <td>0.0</td> <td>-0.3</td>	Ecuador	17.0	aleman in the Charles and Charles Street.	1 2	160	Peru	18.0	1	-	179	0.0	-0.3
51.6 1 6 143 Iraq 40.3 1 1 6 143 Iraq 143 Israel 21.2 6 1 79 2.5 78.4 5 4 1 143 Israel 18.8 5 1 79 2.2 74.2 1 1 143 Israel 17.9 5 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 143 Israel 17.5 5 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 1 143 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 6 143 Israel 12.1 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 1 1 143 Verment Arab Republic (Royalists) 36.8 4 6 143 0.9 60 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	Egypt	618		. B	b71	Significant	11.0			161	16	-0.3
82.8 5 0 1 143 israel 21.2 5 1 79 2.5 734 5 4 1 143 israel 18.8 5 1 79 2.4 734 5 4 1 143 israel 18.4 5 1 79 2.3 68.8 4 1 1 143 israel 12.1 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 6 143 israel 12.1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 1 1 143 israel 12.1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 2 1 1	Eavot	516	assartificate	1	143		403	-	-	143	0.5	0.0
78.4 5 4 1 143 Israel 18.4 5 1 79 2.3 74.2 1 1 143 Israel 17.9 5 1 79 2.3 74.2 1 1 143 Israel 17.9 5 1 79 2.3 65.8 4 1 6 143 Israel 12.1 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 6 143 Israel 12.1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 1 6 143 Israel 12.1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 <td< td=""><td>Fowt</td><td>808</td><td>Ľ</td><td></td><td>143</td><td>legal.</td><td>010</td><td>. u</td><td>. +</td><td>δζ</td><td>96</td><td>1.1</td></td<>	Fowt	808	Ľ		143	legal.	010	. u	. +	δζ	96	1.1
74.2 1 14.3 Israel 18.4 5 1 79 2.3 74.2 1 1 14.3 Israel 17.9 5 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 1 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 6 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 6 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 6 14.3 Israel 12.1 1 79 2.0 61.8 1 1 1 14.3 Saudi Arabia 63.8 4 0 6 14.3 0.9 or 42.2 1 1 1 14.3 Phoduras 47.4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 <t< td=""><td>Fovot</td><td>78.7</td><td>X r</td><td></td><td>1/3</td><td>lorgol</td><td>48.5</td><td>) u</td><td></td><td>) o Z</td><td>70</td><td>Data and Commences</td></t<>	Fovot	78.7	X r		1/3	lorgol	48.5) u) o Z	70	Data and Commences
74.2 1 1 14.3 Israel 17.9 5 1 79 2.3 68.8 4 1 1 143 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.3 65.8 4 1 6 143 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 1 6 143 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 1 6 143 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 1 1 4 46.1 2 3 6 143 0.6 74.2 1 1 1 4 4 4 6 143 0.9 10r 2 187 Honduras 47.4 4 6 143 0.9 10r 2 187 Honduras 47.7 4 1 179	Egypt	674	•	- •	Ct.	Side	40.0	ט כ	- •	04	. e c	- •
688 4 1 143 Israel 17.5 5 1 7 2.2 65.8 4 1 6 143 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 65.8 4 1 6 143 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 1 6 143 Israel 46.1 2 3 6 143 0.6 61.8 1 1 1 143 Venner Arab Republic (Royalists) 46.1 2 3 6 143 0.4 for 42.9 1 1 1 1 4 6 143 0.4 for 42.9 1 1 1 4 6 143 0.9 for 2 1 4 4 6 143 0.9 for 3 1 1 1 1 1 1	1978:	- 1. 7. 7.			27.7	Siggi	11.0) L		20) (C	
65.8 4 1 143 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 1 6 143 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 1 6 143 Libya 46.1 2 3 6 143 0.6 61.8 1 1 1 1 43 Libya 46.1 2 3 6 143 0.6 61.8 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 6 143 0.9 6 74.2 1 1 1 1 1 4 4 4 6 143 0.9 1 2 187 Honduras 37.7 2 4 2 179 0.0 55.8 1 0 1 134 DPRK 3 160 160 55.8 1 0	Lgypt	2.47		-	?	Isidel	8.71	· C	- •	6/	6.0	
65.8 4 1 6 143 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 1 6 143 Israel 12.1 1 1 79 2.2 61.8 1 1 6 143 Libya 46.1 2 3 6 143 0.6 742 1 1 1 143 Yemen Arab Republic (Royalists) 96.2 4 4 6 143 0.9 or 42.9 1 1 2 187 Honduras 37.7 2 4 4 6 143 0.0 or 95.8 1 0 1 134 DPRK 9 179 0.0 95.8 1 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 0 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 <td>Euver</td> <td>9 9 9 9</td> <td>•</td> <td></td> <td>2</td> <td>Israel</td> <td>62</td> <td>đ.</td> <td></td> <td>A)</td> <td>770</td> <td></td>	Euver	9 9 9 9	•		2	Israel	62	đ.		A)	770	
61.8 1 143 Israel 1421 1 1 79 2.0 61.8 1 1 43 Libya 46.1 2 3 6 143 2.0 74.2 1 1 1 43 Yemen Arab Republic (Royalists) 66.2 4 4 6 143 0.9 or 42.9 1 1 2 187 Honduras 37.7 2 4 4 1 4 0.9 or 37.0 2 1 2 187 Honduras 37.7 2 4 2 173 0.0 or 1 134 DPRK 3 7 2 4 2 179 0.0 95.8 1 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 0.5 <td>Egypt</td> <td>65.8</td> <td>4</td> <td>1 6</td> <td>143</td> <td>Israel</td> <td>12.1</td> <td>-</td> <td>-</td> <td>6/</td> <td>2.2</td> <td>1.1</td>	Egypt	65.8	4	1 6	143	Israel	12.1	-	-	6/	2.2	1.1
61.8 1 1 6 143 Libya 46.1 2 3 6 143 0.6 74.2 1 1 143 Saudi-Arabia 63.8 4 0 6 143 0.4 or 47.2 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 6 143 0.2 or 47.2 1 2 187 Honduras 37.7 2 4 2 179 0.2 or 95.8 1 0 1 134 DFRK 3 160 9 95.8 1 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 0 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 3 134 0.5	Egypt	8.10	_	9	143	Israel	12:1	-	-	79	20	- 1
7412 1 143 Saudi-Arabia 653 B 4 0 6 143 0.4 74.2 1 1 143 Yemen Arab Republic (Royalists) 96.2 4 4 6 143 0.9 10r 42.9 1 1 2 187 Honduras 37.7 2 4 2 179 0.02 10r 2 1 1 134 Honduras 37.7 2 4 2 179 0.02 95.8 1 0 1 134 DPRK 9 160 160 95.8 1 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 0 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 0.5	Egypt	61.8	-	1 6	143	Libya	46.1	2	စ		9.0	0.0
74.2 1 1 14.3 Yemen Arab Republic (Royalists) 96.2 4 4 6 143 -0.9 for 42.9 1 2 187 Honduras 47.4 4 1 2 178 -0.2 for 95.8 1 0 1 134 DPRK 9 160 160 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 9 160 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 3 134 0.5	Egypt	74.2		-	143	Saudi Arabia	63.8	4			0.4	0.0
lor 42.9 1 1 2 179 40.2 47.4 4 1 2 179 40.2 or 37.0 2 1 2 187 Honduras 37.7 2 4 2 179 40.2 or 95.8 1 0 1 134 DPRK 9 160 160 95.8 1 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 0 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 0.5	Egypt	74.2		-	143	Yemen Arab Republic (Royalis	ls) 96.2	4	4		-0.9	0.0
lor 37.0 2 1 2 187 Honduras 37.7 2 4 2 179 0.0 95.8 1 0 1 134 DPRK 9 160 95.8 1 0 1 134 Somalia 83.1 1 0 3 154 0.5 95.8 1 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 0.5	El Salvador	42.9	_	1 2	187	Honduras	47.4	4	1		-0.2	-5
95.8 1 0 1 134 DPRK 9 160 95.8 1 0 1 134 Somalia 83.1 1 0 3 154 0.5 95.8 1 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 0.5	El Salvador	37.0	2	1	187	Honduras	37.7	0	4		0.0	0.1
95.8 1 0 1 134 DPRK 9 160 95.8 1 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 0 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 0.5	Ethiopia	95.8		01	134	DPRK			6			-0.4
95.8 1 3 134 0.5 5.8 1 1 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 0.5	Ethiopia	95.8	-	0	134	DPRK			6	160		-0.4
95.8 1 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 0.5 95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 3 134 0.5	Ethiopia	95.8	-	1.3	134	Somalia	83.1		0	134	0.5	0.0
95.8 1 3 134 Somalia 83.1 1 1 3 134 05	Ethiopia	95.8		1 3	134	Somalia	83.1	1	1	134	0.5	0.0
	Ethionia	8.30			404	Semalia	F 68			184	90	υU
	Europia	270	利内で大学なEDE	うる教育は今日の経典の意		のでは他に、100mmの時間は100mmであるというしている。 100mmである。100mmの100mmであるというしている。 100mmである。100mmでは、100mmである。100mmである。100mmである。100mmでは、100mmである。100mmである。100mmでは、100mmである。100mmでは、100mmである。100mmでは、	なるとうというできることにないないないないでは、	And the second s		CONTRACTOR SANCES OF THE PARTY	The second secon	

THOSE INCOCHINESE WART 0.74Mar-1992 0.24Mar-1992 0.24Mar-1993 0.24Mar-1	:		DAIE	ENDDATE	LENGTH	MILOFS	IFATAL.	NOHMAL	RATIOR	RCODE
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 77-Mar-1979 20-Mar-1982 1110 2 100 MACKOLO RODER DUELS 28-Mar-1982 20-Mar-1982 1-1 2 20 MACKOLO RODER DUELS 28-Mar-1982 20-Mar-1982 1-1 2 20 MACKOLO RODER DUELS 28-Mar-1982 20-Mar-1982 1-1 2 20 KORFEAN WAR 28-Mar-1982 22-Mar-1982 1-1 2 20 KORFEAN WAR 28-Mar-1982 22-Mar-1982 1-1 2 20 KORFEAN WAR 1-1 28-Mar-1982 1-1 28 KORFEAN WAR 1-1 28-Mar-1982	1		02-Sep-1945	25-Apr-1946	236	-	0	0.0		
MACAGE SECURE 28-0ct-1990 26-0ct-1990 17 26-0ct			07-Mar-1979	20-Mar-1982	1110	2	100	0.1	to the fill decented billings of the first artifact for the transferrence	The feet for the state of the s
MACAGES SEZUME 1940-1952 30-bi-1952 20-bi-1952 20-bi-1952 20-bi-1952 20-bi-1952 20-bi-1952 20-bi-1952 20-bi-1953		MUST ANG INCIDENT	28-Oct-1960	28-Oct-1980		6		UU		HEALTH AND
PÁRÁCELS SEZÜME 19-JBF 20-JBF 1974 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	1	MACAO RORDER DI IFI S	20. hil. 1052	20. Jul. 1052	2. T Addison as	A	70 V	0.00	Company of the Control of the Contro	
CANADAM NATE 25-06-1950 27-Jul-1953 1007 1.	1.	DABACEI S SEIZI IDE	10 Per 4074	50 les 1074	7	************	7.	20.0	de la companya del companya del companya de la comp	
MARCHEAN WARF Cabber 1950	Ţ.	A COUNTY OF THE	15.0000	- 20 Vall 1 37 T				200	Lateral Britainski Blick Charles	
SACRONAL NO. CHILDER WAR 15-Apri 1956 15-Apri	100	CAV VACOR		Z/-JUI-1953	/001	-	ററററാട	496.5		Control of the Contro
SAME CONFLICT 15-58p-1965 15-4p-1965	'n	KOHEAN WAR	26-Dec-1950	27-Jul-1953	945	•	20000	229.1		
SAMERIA RAIDS 15-Apr.1989 15-Apr.1989 1-Apr.1989 1-Apr.1989 1-Apr.1989 1-Apr.1989 1-Apr.1989 1-Apr.1989 1-Apr.1989 1-Apr.1981 1-Apr.1982		SINO-TIBETAN CONFLICT	_	09-Sep-1965	5474	7	40000	7.3		
SAME		GYABRIA RAID (in Nepal)	15-Apr-1959	15-Apr-1959		2	•	0.0		
CONGO MUTING Cong	_	SINO-SOVIET CONFLICT	02-Mar-1969	15-Mar-1969	14	2	300	21.4	0.2	Gar Farmerd's 12322 familia.
COREAN WAR 19-Jun-1951 27-Jul-1953 770 70 70 70 70 70 70		KOREAN WAR	16-Jun-1951	27. Int. 1953	773		201	101		
CONTROL MUTINY CR-Juni 1987 CR-Juni 1982 CR-Juni 1983 CR-Juni 1982 CR-Juni 1983 CR-Juni 1	7	KORFAN WAR	10, lin_1051	97. Inf. 1069	770		2.2	- X	de territorio de la compania del compania del compania de la compania del la compania de la compania de la compania del la compania de la compania de la compania del la comp	Harm House
COMBON DIAM CANALITION CANALON LINE CORRECIONAL CIGERIAN WAR IN Ethiopia) 37-0e-1977 20-Oct-1979 659 1 0 MORDCCANALCIRIA WAR IN Ethiopia) 37-0e-1977 20-Oct-1979 659 1 0 ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR 04-Oct-1976 16-6-1977 16-6-1977 669 1 0 ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR 04-Oct-1976 17-4pr-1975 1846 1 0 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 16-Mar-1977 14-Mar-1977 14-Mar-1977 1-4-Mar-1977 1 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 25-Dec-1988 15-Oct-1987 3839 2 5000 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 25-Dec-1987 36-Dec-1987 36-D		CONSO WITHIN	9-001-100-61	2/ -Jul- 1933	2//		2	- 0		
MANCOCANALGE-HINA WART 27-Oct 1933 9 1 00	S.		20-Jun-1900	0061-Unr-ne			1	0.0		Chien basiness
ANGOLEN WAR (In Ethiopia) 81-De-1977 20-Oct-1979 659 1 10000 ANGOLEN CIVIL WAR OCC-1976 10-Jan-1976 22 4 0 ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR OCC-1976 10-Jan-1976 4633 1-7 2000 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 25-Mar-1977 1-7 1-7 26-Sep-1989 2 2 00000 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 25-Mar-1977 1-7 1-7 26-Sep-1989 2 2 00000 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 25-Mar-1977 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-7 1-7 1		MOHOCCAN-ALGERIAN WAR	27-Oct-1963	04-Nov-1963	o	-	0	0.0		
AMOCOLAN CIVIL WAR ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIR		OGADEN WAR (in Ethiopia)	31-Dec-1977	20-Oct-1979	659		1000	1.5		
ANGOLAN CIVIL WARE		ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR	09-Jan-1976	10-Jan-1976	2	4	0	0.0	anderdaksand für Baktookloruk von ekkar neutstelle. Org	CONTRACTOR ACCUSES
SECOND INDOCHINESE WAR 29-Mar-1970 17-Apr-1975 1846 1 500 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 15-Juni-1977 28-Sep-1889 4487 3 50000 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 25-Juni-1978 26-Sep-1889 4487 3 5000 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 25-Juni-1978 36-Sep-1897 25-Dec-1968 35-39 2 5000 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 23-Dec-1978 30-Dec-1967 36-Sep-1977 36-Sep-1977 1000 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 18-Dec-1978 30-Dec-1967 31-Ber-1977 34-Ber-1977 36-Ber-1977	<u> </u>	ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR	04-Oct-1975	08-Aug-1988	4693		2000	0.4	Maria Maria Maria Maria	
THED INDO-CHINESE WAR THEO INDO-CHINESE WAR THE INDO-CHINESE WAR THEO INDO-CHINESE WAR THEO INDO-CHINESE WAR THE INDO-CHINESE WAR THEO INDO-CHINESE WAR TH	1	SECOND INDOCHINESE WAD	20-Mar-1070	17. Apr 1075	1016	-		0.0		
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 044M-1977 04-May-1977 04-May-1977 04-May-1977 04-May-1977 04-May-1977 04-May-1977 04-May-1977 04-May-1979 05-May-1979 05-May-19	100	TUBE WES CHINESE WALL		0.61-144-71	0+01		2000	0.0	a de la composition della comp	CHAIR CHAIR LANG
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WARH	ĵ.) Al-un-c	ZO-28D-1308	46(2000			
THIND INDO-CHINESE WAR 25-Aujr-1978 15-Oct-1987 33399 2 5000		HIND INDO-CHINESE WAR	04-May-1977	04-May-1977	,-	2	0	0.0		
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 23-Dec-1958 23-Aug-1975 6088 1 1000	0.5	THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	25-Aug-1978	15-Oct-1987	3339	2	200	0,1		
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 04-be-1976 30-be-1986 3679 1 150000 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 16-Nov-1965 30-Apr-1975 3451 1 150000 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 16-Nov-1965 30-Apr-1977 3149 2 2 200000 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 26-Jan-1992 71-Jan-1963 1644 2 2 200000 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 26-Jan-1992 71-Jan-1963 165-Jan-1992 71-Jan-1963 165-Jan-1992 71-Jan-1963 71-Jan-1964 71	_	SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR		23-Aug-1975	6088	1	1000	0.2	sel innomice consistentian franklikel in Staff Feder Source 2000	A STATE OF S
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 16-Nov-1965 30-Apr-1975 3451 1 150000 THRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 16-Mar-1979 16-Oct-1987 3148 2 500 KOREAN WAR 26-Jan-1949 27-Jul-1953 1644 2 200 KOREAN CONFLICT 06-Sep-1987 16-Dat-1968 27-Jul-1963 26-Zep-200 200 KOREAN CONFLICT 16-Sep-1971 16-Jan-1984 17-Jan-1984 17-Jan-1984 <t< td=""><td>6.5</td><td>THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR</td><td></td><td>30-Dec-1986</td><td>9679</td><td></td><td>500</td><td>LU-LU-</td><td></td><td></td></t<>	6.5	THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR		30-Dec-1986	9679		500	LU-LU-		
THEID INDO-CHINESE WAR 04-Mar-1939 15-Oct-1987 3148 2 500 COREAN WAR COREAN WAR 26-Jan-1949 27-Jul-1953 1644 2 500 KOREAN CONFLICT 26-Jan-1949 27-Jul-1963 1426 2 20 KOREAN RAIDS 16-Jan-1949 27-Jul-1963 18-Sep-1971 2 Info 2 50 COHACLOUZA RAIDS 16-Jan-1940 17-Jan-1944 17-Jan-1944 1 2 1 2 COHACLOUZA RAIDS 16-Jan-1944 15-Jan-1944 15-Jan-1944 1 2 2 0 COHACLOUZA RAIDS 16-Jan-1976 15-Jan-1984 15-Jan-1984 15-Jan-1984 1 2 2 0 GULE WAR 27-Jan-1985 27-Jan-1984 27-Jan-1984 27-Jan-1986	i	SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR	18-Nov-1065	30. Anr. 1075	3451		15000	/2 E		
KOREAN WAR CASINOVA 1867 17-20x1-1957 16-30x1-1957 27-Jul-1957	6	THIRD INDOCHINESE WAS	0701-1070	16 Oct 1007	04.40	-	2000-	0.00		
KOREAN CONFLICT Co-bar 1949 27-Jul 1953 27-Jul 1954	2	MANAGEMENT AND	06 los 4040	10100130	9140		00000	7.00		
COPIENT CONTRICT US-SEP 1922 US-NOV-1963 425 2 20 COLALOUZARIOS 13-Oct-1965 18-Sep-1971 2167 2 20 COLALOUZARIOS 16-Jan-1878 17-Jan-1894 1 2 0 CORRIENTES INCIDENT 15-Jan-1894 15-Jan-1894 1 2 0 CORRIENTES INCIDENT 15-Jan-1894 15-Jan-1894 1 2 0 CORRIENTES INCIDENT 15-Jan-1894 15-Jan-1894 1 2 0 GULF WAR 24-Feb-1991 28-Feb-1991 28-Feb-1991 2 0 GOLE WAR 25-Mar-1954 06-Jan-1956 73 2 0 EGYPTIAN REPRISALS 21-Jan-1956 06-Jan-1956 7 4 0 SUEZ WAR (GAZA SHELLING) 05-Apr-1956 06-Apr-1956 7 4 0 CANAL CONFLICT 29-Mar-1971 29-Mar-1977 10-Mar-1977 10-Mar-1977 10-Mar-1977 10-Mar-1977 10-Mar-1977 10-Mar-1976 12-Mar-1976 12-Mar-1976	1	NODE AN OOMER 1977	20-0all-1949	20Inc-/2	1044	7	300000	182.5	ediate describing had a language	The District of the Party of th
COMPLEAN MAILUS	2.4		Zosi-dec-co	SOAL-NON-SO	450	K	8	00		
COPALIZATION AND STATES 16-Jan-1978 17-Jan-1978 2 0 COPALIZATION CAMPORT RAID 15-Jan-1984 15-Jan-1984 1 2 1 CALE WAR 19-Feb-1997 19-Feb-1978 1 2 0 PALESTINE WAR 24-Feb-1997 28-Feb-1978 1 2 0 PALESTINE WAR 25-Mar-1964 06-Jan-1969 237 1 200 EGYPTIAN REPRISALS 25-Mar-1964 06-Jan-1969 237 1 200 EGYPTIAN REPRISALS 25-Mar-1964 06-Jan-1966 2 4 0 SUEZ WAR (GAZA SHELLING) 05-Apr-1966 06-Apr-1966 2 4 0 WAR OF ATTRITION 14-Jul-1967 05-Apr-1966 06-Apr-1966 12-Jan-1971 4 0 CANAL CONFLICT 29-Mar-1977 29-Mar-1977 10-Jan-1977 10		ROHEAN RAIDS	13-Oct-1965	18-Sep-1971	2167	2	200	0.2		
CORRIENTES INCIDENT 15-Jan-1984 15-Jan-1994 1 2 2 LABRACA AIRPORT RAID 19-Feb-1978 19-Feb-1978 1 2 20 PALESTINE WAR 15-Mar-1984 15-Jan-1984 25 2 20 PALESTINE WAR 15-Mar-1994 05-Jan-1984 05-Jan-1984 05-Jan-1984 05-Jan-1984 05-Jan-1984 05-Jan-1984 05-Jan-1984 05-Jan-1984 05-Jan-1984 05-Jan-1986 05-Jan-1987 05-Jan-1986 05-Jan-1986 05-Jan-1986 05-Jan-1986 05		COALCUIZARAIDS	16-Jan-1978	17-Jan-1978	2	2	0	0.0		
CANDACA AIRPOINT RAID 19-Feb-1976 19-Feb-1976 11-20 20 GULF WAR 24-Feb-1991 28-Feb-1991 5 1 20 GULF WAR 15-May-1948 06-Jan-1949 5 1 20 PALESTINE WAR 25-Mar-1954 25 1 20 EGYPTIAN REPRISALS 25-Mar-1956 06-Apr-1956 25 3 EGYPTIAN REPRISALS 21-Jan-1956 06-Apr-1956 2 4 0 SUEZ WAR (GAZA SHELLING) 05-Apr-1956 06-Apr-1956 2 4 0 SUEZ WAR (GAZA SHELLING) 05-Apr-1957 07-Apr-1956 12 4 0 CANAL CONFLICT 29-Mar-1977 10 2 4 0 CANAL CONFLICT 20-Mar-1977 10 2 50 YEMENI CONFLICT 16-Jul-1977 25-Jul-1977 10 2 50 YEMENI CONLIL WAR 04-Oct-1962 12-May-1967 1839 1 1000 MCOCT-1962 16-Oct-1967 18-30 1		CORRIENTES INCIDENT	15-Jan-1984	15-Jan-1984	-	7	- -	1.0	1.1	
GULF WAR 24-Feb-1991 28-Feb-1991 5 1 20 PALESTINE WAR 15-May-1948 06-Jan-1949 237 1 200 PALESTINE WAR 15-May-1948 06-Jan-1954 237 1 200 EGYPTIAN REPRISALS 25-Mar-1956 05-Mar-1956 13-Mar-1956 06-Mar-1956 1 2 0 EGYPTIAN REPRISALS 25-Mar-1956 06-Mar-1956 06-Mar-1956 1 4 0 SUEZ WAR (GAZA SHELLING) 05-Apr-1967 07-Aug-1977 1 4 0 CANAL CONTELICT 29-Mar-1977 1 4 0 0 CANAL CONTELICT 29-Mar-1977 1 4 0 0 CANAL CONTELICT 20-Mar-1977 1 4 0 0 0 50 VOM KIPEUR WAR 06-Oct-1967 18-Jan-1977 1 1 4 0 0 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 06-Oct-1962 16-Oct-1967 1839 1 1 1000 SALVADORAN WAR	(}	LARNACA AIRPORT RAID	19-Feb-1978	19-Feb-1978	-	2	20	20.0	0.3	
PALESTINE WAR 15-May-1948 06-Jan-1949 237 1 2000 EGYPTIAN REPRISALS 25-Mar-1954 1 2 0 0 EGYPTIAN REPRISALS 25-Mar-1954 1 2 3 0 EGYPTIAN REPRISALS 25-Mar-1956 03-Apr-1956 73 2 3 SUEZ WAR (GAZA SHELLING) 05-Apr-1956 06-Apr-1956 2 4 0 WAR OF ATTHITON 14-Jul-1967 07-Aug-1974 1 4 0 WAR OF ATTHITON 29-Mar-1971 29-Mar-1974 1 4 0 YOM KIPPUR WAR (PLAN BADR) 06-Oct-1973 18-Jan-1977 10 2 50 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 02-Nov-1962 12-May-1967 1839 1 1000 FOOTBALL WAR 04-Oct-1962 16-Oct-1967 183 1 1000 SALVADORAN RAIDS (Sazalpa Raids) 14-Jul-1976 31-Jul-1956 27-Jul-1969 2 2 KOREAN WAR 19-Aug-1967 127-Jul-1969 1 60		GULF WAR	24-Feb-1991	28-Feb-1991	5	_	20	4.0	1.1	
EGYPTIAN REPRISALS 25-Mar-1954 25-Mar-1954 1 2 0 EGYPTIAN REPRISALS 21-Jan-1955 03-Apr-1955 73 2 3 SUEZ WAR (GAZA SHELLING) 05-Apr-1956 06-Apr-1956 2 4 0 WARDOFATTHITON 14-Jul-1967 05-Apr-1957 1 4 1000 CANAL CONFLICT 29-Mar-1971 29-Mar-1971 1 4 000 CANAL CONFLICT 4 06-Oct-1973 12-Mar-1977 10 2 50 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 16-Jul-1977 25-Jul-1977 10 2 50 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 06-Oct-1962 12-May-1967 1839 1 1000 FOOTBALL WAR 06-Jul-1969 22 2 2000 SALVADORAN RAIDS (Sazalpa Raids) 14-Jul-1976 18 2 2 KOREAN WAR 06-May-1961 27-Jul-1953 709 1 60 GGADEN KARINSHES 12-Jul-1964 27-Jul-1963 2000 GGADEN KARINSHES 12-Jul-1964 89 3 1000 GGADEN WAR 12-Jul-1964 89 3 1000		PALESTINE WAR	15-May-1948	06-Jan-1949	237		2000	8.4		
EGYPTIAN REPRISALS 21.Jan-1955 03-Apr-1956 73 2 3 SUEZ WAR (GAZA SHELLING) 05-Apr-1956 06-Apr-1956 2 4 0 WAR OF ATTRITION 14-Jul-1967 07-Aug-1970 1121 4 0 CANAL CONFLICT 29-Mar-1971 1 4 0 CANAL CONFLICT 29-Mar-1971 1 4 0 YOM KIPPUR WAR (PLXN BADR) 06-Oct-1973 16-Jul-1974 106 1 400 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 02-Nov-1962 12-Mul-1967 1839 1 1000 FOOTBALL WAR 02-Nov-1962 16-Oct-1967 1839 1 1000 FOOTBALL WAR 06-Ui-1962 29-Jul-1969 22 2 200 KOREAN WAR 06-Ui-1962 29-Jul-1969 22 2 2 KOREAN WAR 06-May-1961 27-Jul-1963 14 1 60 OGADEN SKIRMISHES 12-Jul-1964 8 3 3 AGADEN WAR 144-Jug-1967 02-Jul-1964 <td></td> <td>EGYPTIAN REPRISALS</td> <td>25-Mar-1954</td> <td>25-Mar-1954</td> <td></td> <td>2</td> <td>0</td> <td>0.0</td> <td>0.3</td> <td>red with 7 de . A submireday</td>		EGYPTIAN REPRISALS	25-Mar-1954	25-Mar-1954		2	0	0.0	0.3	red with 7 de . A submireday
SUEZ WAR (GAZA SHELLING) 05-Apr-1956 06-Apr-1956 2 4 0 WAR OF ATTRITION 14-Jul-1967 07-Aug-1970 1121 4 1000 CANAL CONFLICT 29-Mar-1971 29-Mar-1971 1 4 0 YOM KIPPUR WAR PLANDER CLASH 06-Oct-1973 18-Jan-1977 10 2 50 LIBYAN BORDER CLASH 16-Jul-1977 25-Jul-1977 10 2 50 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 06-Oct-1973 12-Jul-1977 15-Jul-1977 16-May-1967 1839 1 1000 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 04-Oct-1962 16-Oct-1967 1839 1 1000 SALVADORAL WAR 06-May-1969 29-Jul-1969 22 20 20 KOREAN WAR 16-Aug-1951 27-Jul-1953 709 1 60 GGADEN SKIRMISHES 12-Aug-1967 07-Jul-1964 27-Jul-1964 2 20 OGADEN WAR 16-Aug-1977 01-Jan-1985 28-B86 3 100		EGYPTIAN REPRISALS	21-Jan-1955	03-Apr-1955	73	2	3	0.0	0.3	
WAR OF ATTRITION 14-Jul-1967 07-Aug-1970 1121 4 1000 CANAL CONFLICT 29-Mar-1971 29-Mar-1971 1 4 0 YOM KIPPUR WAR (PLAN BADR) 06-Oct-1973 18-Jan-1974 105 1 4000 LIBYAN BORDER CLASH 16-Jul-1977 25-Jul-1977 10 2 50 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 02-Nov-1962 12-May-1967 1653 3 0 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 04-Oct-1962 16-Oct-1967 1839 1 1000 FOOTBALL WAR 08-Jul-1969 29-Jul-1969 22 2 200 SALVADORAN RAIDS (Sazalpa Raids) 14-Jul-1976 31-Jul-1963 27-Jul-1963 814 1 60 KORDEAN WAR 19-Aug-1967 27-Jul-1963 27-Jul-1963 2 2 20 OGADEN SKIRMISHES 12-Jan-1964 09-Apr-1969 3 30 30 OGADEN WAR 16-Aug-1977 01-Jan-1965 3 30 30			05-Apr-1956	06-Apr-1956	2	4	0	0.0	0.2	energy of the second
CANAL CONFLICT 29-Mar-1971 29-Mar-1971 1 4 0 YOM KIPPUR WAR (PLAN BADR) (66-Oct-1973 16-Jan-1974 105 1 4000 LIBYAN BORDER CLASH 16-Jul-1977 25-Jul-1977 10 2 50 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 02-Nov-1962 12-May-1967 1653 3 0 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 04-Oct-1962 16-Oct-1967 1839 1 1000 FOOTBALL WAR 08-Jul-1968 29-Jul-1969 22 2 200 SALVADORAN RAIDS (Sazalpa Raids) 14-Jul-1976 31-Jul-1976 31-Jul-1976 18 2 2 KOREAN WAR 19-Aug-1967 27-Jul-1953 709 1 60 MCADEN KIRMISHES 12-Jan-1964 09-Au-1964 27-Jul-1964 3 30 OGADEN WARR 16-Aug-1977 01-Jan-1985 2696 3 30	6.5	WAR OF ATTRITION	14-Jul-1967	07-Aug-1970	1121	7	1000	6.0	0.2	
YOM KIPPUR WAR (PLAN BADR) 06-Oct-1973 18-Jan-1974 105 1 4000 LIBYAN BORDER CLASH 16-Jul-1977 25-Jul-1977 10 2 50 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 02-Nov-1962 12-May-1967 1653 3 0 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 04-Oct-1962 16-Oct-1967 1839 1 1000 EOOTBALL WAR 06-Jul-1976 31-Jul-1976 18 2 200 SALVADORAN RAIDS (Sazalpa Raids) 14-Jul-1976 31-Jul-1976 18 2 2 KOREAN WAR 19-Jul-1969 27-Jul-1953 814 1 60 KORADEN KAINSHES 12-Jul-1953 709 1 60 GGADEN KRMISHES 12-Jul-1964 89 3 30	3	CANAL CONFLICT	29-Mar-1971	29-Mar-1971	- T	4	C	0.0	1	
LIBYAN BORDER CLASH 16-Jul-1977 25-Jul-1977 10 2 50 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 02-Nov-1962 12-May-1967 1653 3 0 YEMENI CIVIL WAR 04-Oct-1962 16-Oct-1967 1839 1 1000 FOOTBALL WAR 06-Jul-1968 29-Jul-1969 22 2 200 SALVADORAN RAIDS (Sazalpa Raids) 14-Jul-1976 31-Jul-1976 18 2 200 KOREAN WAR 19-Aug-1951 27-Jul-1953 814 1 60 KORDEN RAIDS 19-Aug-1960 02-Jul-1953 709 1 60 GGADEN SKIRMISHES 12-Jul-1964 02-Jul-1965 3 30 GADEN WAR 16-Aug-1977 01-Jan-1965 2696 3 30		YOM KIPPUR WAR (PI AN BADR)	06-Oct-1979	18-lan-1974	105	1	4000	48.1	0.5	
YEMENI CIVIL WAR YEMENI CIVIL WAR YEMENI CIVIL WAR FOOTBALL WAR FOOTBALL WAR FOOTBALL WAR SALVADORAN RAIDS (Sazalpa Raids) 14-Jul-1976 18 2 2 2 KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR H-Aug-1960 02-Jul-1953 709 1 60 OGADEN SKIRMISHES 12-Jul-1964 02-Jul-1964 28 3 30 OGADEN SKIRMISHES 12-Jul-1964 28 3 30 OGADEN WAR 16-Jul-1964 01-Jul-1965 3 100			16 to 1 1077	05 1.1 4077	200		X (1)	3 0		
YEMENI CYLL WAR UCANON 1902 LEANING 1903 OF COLOR		VENEVIL OF THE VENEVI	10-001-13/10	40 Line 4067	10	2	6.6	0.0	4. 0.0	
TEMENI CVIL WARH 04-Uct-1962 16-Uct-1967 1839 1 1000 FOOTBALL WARF 08-Uct-1969 29-Jul-1969 22 20 SALLVADORAN RAIDS (Sazalpa Raids) 14-Jul-1976 31-Jul-1976 18 2 KOREAN WAR 06-May-1951 27-Jul-1953 814 1 60 DGADEN RAIDS 14-Aug-1969 02-Jan-1964 09-Apr-1969 3 30 OGADEN SKIRMISHES 16-Aug-1977 01-Jan-1986 2696 3 30			7061-A0N-70	12-May-1907	200		5	2.5	J	
COLUBALL WARF COLUBALL WARF COLUBALL WARF COLUBALL WARF COLUBALC COLUBACT		YEMENI CIVIL WAR	04-Oct-1962	16-Uct-196/	1839	-	0001	0.5		a de la compansión de l
SALVADORAN RAIDS (Sazalpa Raids) 14-Jul-1976 31-Jul-1976 18 2 2 KOREAN WAR 06-May-1951 27-Jul-1953 814 1 60 KOREAN WAR 19-Aug-1951 27-Jul-1953 709 1 60 GGADEN BAIDS 12-Jan-1964 02-Jan-1964 3 30 GGADEN WAR 16-Aug-1977 01-Jan-1985 2698 3 100	J.	FOOI BALL WAR	08-Jul-1969	29-Jul-1969	23	2	88	9.1	1.6	
KOREAN WAR 06-May-1951 27-Jul-1953 814 1 60 KOREAN WAR 19-Aug-1951 27-Jul-1953 709 1 60 OGADEN RAIDS 14-Aug-1960 02-Jan-1961 142 2 20 12-Jan-1964 02-Jan-1964 3 3 30 OGADEN WAR 16-Aug-1977 01-Jan-1965 2696 3 100		SALVADORAN RAIDS (Sazalpa Raids)	14-Jul-1976	31-Jul-1976	18	2	2	0.1	1.5	
KOREAN WAR 19-Aug-1951 27-Jul-1953 709 1 60 OGADEN RAIDS 14-Aug-1960 02-Jan-1961 142 2 20 OGADEN SKIRMISHES 12-Jan-1964 89 3 30 OGADEN WAR 16-Aug-1977 01-Jan-1985 2696 3 100		KOREAN WAR	06-May-1951	27~Jul-1953	814	7	. 09	0.1		
OGADEN RAIDS 14-Aug-1960 02-Jan-1961 142 2 20 OGADEN SKIRMISHES 12-Jan-1964 09-Apr-1964 89 3 30 OGADEN WAR		KOREAN WAR	19-Aug-1951	27-Jul-1953	709	-	09	0.1		
OGADEN SKIRMISHES 12-Jan-1964 09-Apr-1964 89 3 30 OGADEN WAR 16-Aug-1977 01:Jan-1865 2686 3 100		E	14-Aug-1960	02-Jan-1961	142	2	8	0.1	0.2	
OGADEN WAR	_		12-Jan-1964	09-Apr-1964	89	9	30	0.3	0.3	or a constant to the constant
	100	OGADEN WAD	16 Aug 1077	04 lan 400E	5050		100			
	N.		//si-finy-oi	UI-Jail-1805	0807		3	2.5	25	
	-					J	•	;		

Probability	NUM INTERVEN		ILIT ILITSO I	ICOUP IC.	SO ICULT	TARGET		SO ICCOL	5	T.	1000
Figures 10 3 1 6 126 Apprint (FLM) 61 2 1 6 133 32 143 33 143 1	- 7				\$	Yemen People's Republic (4JI Factio 76.4 4	*		9:0	N O
Trianger 10 2 1 6 128 128 128 1 6 138 138 138 1 6 138 138		•	ო	1 6	126	Algeria (FLN)	81.2 1	80		-3.2	-0.3
Figures		The second secon	က	1	126	Algeria (FLN)	81,2	8	143	-3.2	-0.3
Figures 1 1 5 1 2 Camboid 11 5 1 6 132 Camboid 11 5 1 5 1 6 132 Camboid 11 5 1 5 1 6 132 Camboid 11 5 1		Control State of the Control of the	3	1 6	126	Algeria (FLN)		4	143	-3.2	-0.3
Figure 1.0 5 1.0 6 1.25 Camprobial 917 5 1.0 6 1.55 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 6 1.25 Camprobial 917 5 1.0 6 1.55 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 6 1.25 Camprobial 917 5 1.0 7 1.45 2.7 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 6 1.25 Camprobial 917 6 1.5 1.45 2.7 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 6 1.25 Camprobial 917 6 1.5 1.45 3.1 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 917 6 1.5 1.45 3.1 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 917 6 1.5 1.45 3.1 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 917 6 1.5 1.45 3.1 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 926 2 0 0 0 0 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 927 6 1.5 1.45 3.1 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 927 6 1.5 1.45 3.1 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 927 1.0 1.45 3.1 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 927 1.0 1.45 3.1 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 927 1.0 1.45 3.1 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 927 1.0 1.45 3.1 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 927 1.0 1.45 3.1 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 927 1.0 1.45 3.1 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 927 1.0 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 1.45 Figure 1.0 5 1.0 1.25 Camprobial 927 1.0 1.45			3	9	128	Algeria (FLN)			143	-3,2	-0.3
Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 2 143 2.5 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 3 143 3.5 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 3 143 3.5 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 3 143 3.1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 3 143 3.1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 3 143 3.1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 3 143 3.1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 3 143 3.1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 2 143 3.1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1770 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Particle 1.0 3 1 6 126 Califordion 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		placetores of the second parameter of the manager of the control o	တ	1 6	126	Cambodia	Statement St.		entretton observations between	-3.3	-0.6
Figure 1	18			1 A	126	Camermon (LIPC)		8		-3.5	-0.4
Particular 10 2 1 6 12 12 13 14 15 15 15 15 15 15 15	4	AND BUILDING TO THE WAR TO SEE THE	3		126	Chad (FAN)		8.1. (S. 2.1. (S. 1.1. (S. 1.1	eddiethille chilled	-2.7	-0.3
Function 1	80	Line Landing Special Control of C	*		361	Chad (FROI NAT)		,		-3.6	-03
Figures (10 2 2 1 1 2 2 Cheri (GNNT) T70 1 1 2 5 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	-	Medical Control of the Control of th		200	100	Charles Colling	200			-2.1	
Figure 1	Įr.	Contract of Landson Contract of the Contract o	٥ -	9	071	Chad (GINT)		- 6		. 6	0.0
Particle 1	4)	9	200		27.0			1.	
Figure F	17		,	۰	971	Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam	3,72	- 6		6.1-	-0.0
Trance 1.0 3 0 126 DPHK France 1.0 3 0 126 DPHK France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Monocon(POL) 862 1 1 1 6 143 1.15 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Monocon(POL) 862 1 1 1 6 143 1.15 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Monocon(POL) 862 1 1 1 1 6 143 1.15 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Monocon(POL) 862 1 1 1 1 6 143 1.15 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Monocon(POL) 862 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	42		7		87	Dilbouil	08.0	5 0		7.77	
France 1.0 3 0 1268 DPPK France 1.0 3 1 6 1268 Gabon 89.1 4 3 3 1.1 143 3.1 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Gabon 89.3 1 1 143 3.1 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Instance 1.0 3 1 6 128 1.0 40.3 1 1 6 143 3.1 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Madogascar (MDH) 462 5 6 6 136 143 3.1 13 14 14 3.3 3.4 14 14 3.3 14 6 126 Madogascar (MDH) 462 5 6 6 16 143 3.1 6 14 3.2 14 3.2 14 3.2 14 3.2 14	- 1		3	0	126	DPRK	CAN PERSON AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON ADDRESS OF THE PERSON AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON ADDRESS OF THE PERSON ADDRESS OF THE PERSON ADDRESS OF THE PERS	6	160		-0.6
France 10 3 1 6 126 Egypt 76.9 5 1 1 43 3.1 France 10 3 1 6 126 Gabon 80.1 4 1 1 43 1.5 France 10 3 1 6 126 Gabon 80.1 1 6 143 1.5 France 10 3 1 6 126 Gabon 80.2 1 6 143 1.6 France 10 3 1 6 126 Lado 1 6 143 1.6 France 10 3 1 6 126 126 140 1.9 1.43 3.1 France 10 3 1 6 126 126 1.0 6 143 1.6 France 10 3 1 6 126 126 1.4 3.3 <	N/A		တ	0	126	DPRK		တ			9.0-
Fance 1,0 3 1 6 126 Gabon 99,1 4 3 3 1 5 15 Fance 1,0 3 1 6 126 Gabon 99,1 4 3 3 1 5 Fance 1,0 3 1 6 126 Indq 40,3 1 1 6 143 1.16 Fance 1,0 3 1 6 126 Indq 40,3 1 1 6 143 1.16 Fance 1,0 3 1 6 126 Indq 40,3 1 1 6 143 1.16 Fance 1,0 3 1 6 126 Indq 40,3 1 1 6 143 1.16 Fance 1,0 3 1 6 126 Indq 40,3 1 1 6 1.13 Fance 1,0 3 1 6 126 Indq 40,3 1 1 6 1.13 Fance 1,0 3 1 6 126 Indq I			က	1 6	126	Egypt	76.9 5	-		-3.1	-0.3
France 10 3 1 6 126 Gabon 99.3 1 2 4 143 -15 France 10 3 1 6 126 Inq 40.3 1 6 148 -16 France 10 3 1 6 126 Inq 40.3 1 6 148 -16 France 10 3 1 6 126 Ind 40.3 1 6 149 -16 France 10 3 1 6 126 Morecon(ACI) 66 1 1 6 169 143 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 Morecon(ACI) 66 1 1 6 143 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 Morecon(ACI) 66 1 6 163 3.4 4 3.3 France 10			n	9	126	Gabon	80.1	တ		-3.2	-0.3
Figures 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Idaq 40.3 1 1 6 14.3 1.16 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Idaq 40.3 1 1 6 14.3 1.16 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Idaq 40.3 1 1 6 1.43 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (AD) 86.2 1 1 1 4 4.3 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (AD) 86.2 1 1 1 4 4.3 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (AD) 86.2 1 1 1 4 4.3 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (AD) 86.2 1 1 1 4 4.3 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (AD) 86.2 1 1 1 4 4.3 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (AD) 86.2 1 1 1 4 4.3 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (AD) 86.2 1 1 1 4 4.3 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (ADD) 86.2 1 1 1 4 4.3 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (ADD) 86.2 1 1 1 4 4.3 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (ADD) 86.2 1 1 1 4 4.3 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (ADD) 86.2 1 1 1 4 4.3 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (ADD) 86.2 1 1 1 4 4.3 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (ADD) 86.2 1 1 1 2 4 4.3 3.14 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (ADD) 86.2 1 1 1 2 4 4.3 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (ADD) 86.2 1 1 1 2 4 4.3 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (ADD) 86.2 1 1 1 2 4 4.3 Finance 1.0 3 1 6 1.26 Monocoo (ADD) 87.2 1 1 1 2 1.17 Finance 1.0 2 1 2 1.19 Monocoo (ADD) 87.2 1 1 2 1.11 1 2 1.11 1 2 1.11 1 2 1.11 1 2 1.11 1 2 1.11 1 2 1.11 1 2 1.11 1 2 1.11 1 2 1.11 1 2 1.11 1 3 4 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4.3 4			3	1 6	126	Gabon	39.3	0		1.5	6.3
France 10 3 1 6 126 Lace Accordance 40.3 1 6 126 Lace Lace 6 126 Lace Lace 6 126 Lace Lace 6 126 Lace Lace 6 126 Lace Macagascar (MDRM) 88.2 1 1 6 143 3.4 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Monocoo (AOU) 86.2 1 1 6 143 3.4 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Monocoo (AOU) 86.2 1 1 43 3.4 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Monocoo (AOU) 86.2 1 1 4 3.3 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Monocoo (AOU) 86.2 1 1 4 43.3 4 France 1.0 3 1 6 1	-		9	1 6		Iraq	40.3			-1.6	-0.3
France 10 3 1 6 126 Madegasea (MDRM) 482 5 0 6 160 8.5 France 10 3 1 6 126 Madegasea (MDRM) 482 5 0 6 149 1.19 France 10 3 1 6 126 Manocco (AOL) 862 1 1 6 143 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 Manocco (AOL) 862 1 1 1 43 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 Manocco (Polsarlo) 786 1 1 1 43 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 Manocco (Polsarlo) 786 1 1 1 43 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 Manocco (Polsarlo) 786 1 1 1 4 3.3 France 10 3 1 6 126 Manocco (Polsarlo) 786 1 1 4 4.43 3.4 France 10 3 1 6 126 France 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1			3	1 6		Iraq		-		-1.6	-0.3
France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Madagascare (MDHM) 48.2 5 8 -1.9 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Morcoco (AGL) 86.2 1 1 4.3 -3.4 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Morcoco (AGL) 86.2 1 1 4.43 -3.4 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Morcoco (AGL) 86.2 1 1 4.43 -3.4 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Morcoco (AGL) 86.2 1 1 4.43 -3.4 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Morcoco (AGL) 7.8 5 1 4.43 3.3 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Provided (Morror) (Morror) 4.07 5 1 4.43 3.3 France 1.0 3 1 6	wate A co		ه ا	1		Laos		0	3 160	-3.5	-0.6
Finnee 10 3 1 6 126 Morrocco (AOL) 86.2 1 1 6 134 3.4 France 1,0 3 1 6 126 Morrocco (AOL) 86.2 1 1 143 3.4 France 1,0 3 1 6 126 Morrocco (AOL) 86.2 1 1 143 3.3 France 1,0 3 1 6 126 Morrocco (Pollsario) 78.6 1 4 143 3.4 France 1,0 3 1 6 126 Morrocco (Pollsario) 78.6 1 4 143 3.1 France 1,0 3 1 6 126 Charles 78.6 1 4 143 3.3 France 1,0 3 1 6 126 Order (Morring) 71.7 3 1 4 143 1.3 France 1,0 3 </td <td></td> <td></td> <td>3</td> <td>1 6</td> <td></td> <td>Madagascar (MDRM)</td> <td></td> <td>8</td> <td></td> <td>-1.9</td> <td></td>			3	1 6		Madagascar (MDRM)		8		-1.9	
France 10 3 1 6 126 Morocoo (AOL) 86.2 1 1 143 :3.4 France 1,0 3 1 6 126 Morocoo (Pollsano) 786 1 1 143 :3.4 France 1,0 3 1 6 126 Navoco (Pollsano) 786 1 1 43 :3.4 France 1,0 3 1 6 126 Navoco (Pollsano) 786 1 6 16 10 -6 16 10 3 1 6 126 Navoco (Pollsano) 786 1 6 16 10 3 1 6 126 Navoco (Pollsano) 786 1 6 16 16 Navoco (Pollsano) 786 1 6 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16	567		8	1 6		Marocco (AOL)			3 143	-3.4	-0.3
France 10 3 1 6 126 Monocoo (AOL) 66.2 1 1 43 334 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Nanccio (AOL) 16.2 1 9 1.43 33.1 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Navical and Marcial and Malmin (Velimin) 37.8 5 1 6 160 -1.5 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Fixed control (Velimin) 37.8 5 1 6 160 -1.5 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Thisland (Velimin) 37.8 5 1 6 136 143 -3.3 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Trinial (Velicinin) 37.8 5 1 6 143 -3.3 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Trinial (Velicinin) 37.8 5 1 4 <td></td> <td>an enforcement of the state of places are considered from the state of the the</td> <td>9</td> <td>1 6</td> <td></td> <td>Morocco (AOL)</td> <td></td> <td>·</td> <td>143</td> <td>-3.4</td> <td>-0.3</td>		an enforcement of the state of places are considered from the state of the the	9	1 6		Morocco (AOL)		·	143	-3.4	-0.3
France 10 3 1 6 126 Morocool Polisario) 78.6 1 1 143 -3.1 France 10 3 1 6 126 New Calculous (FLNS) 78.6 1 9 6 100 -15 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Pownfall (FLCS) 8.31 1 4 4.43 -2.0 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Townfall (FLCS) 8.31 1 1 4 4.43 -2.0 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Townfall (Flower) (Flower) 9.83 5 0 6 143 -3.9 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Townfall (Flower) (Flower) 9.83 5 0 6 143 -3.7 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Valuation (Flower) (Flower) (Flower) 9.83 5 1 4	#1455			1 6		Morecco (AOL)	86.2 1	Ļ	143	-3.4	-0.3
France 10 3 1 6 126 New Caledonia (FLNKS) 162 1 9 -0.6 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Houndard 831 1 4 143 2.0 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Somalia (FLCS) 831 1 1 4 143 2.0 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Theiland (Vigeninin) 463 5 0 6 143 3.3 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Theiland (Vigeninin) 463 5 0 6 143 3.3 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Theiland (Vigeninin) 463 5 0 6 148 3.7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	_	1.0		1 6		Morocco (Polisario)	78.6 1	-	143	-3.1	-0.3
France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Rep. Of Vietnam (Vietnam) 37.8 5 1 6 156 176 1.0 3 1 6 126 Remone 1 4 143 2.0 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Somala (FLCS) 83.1 1 4 143 2.0 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Thisland (Vietnam) (Vietnam) 40.7 5 1 6 143 3.3 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Tunisa (Vieores Seessionists) 47.1 1 4 143 -1.1 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Amuatu (Severs Seessionists) 47.1 1 4 143 -1.1 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Amuatu (Severs Seessionists) 47.1 1 4 143 -1.1 France 1.0 6	F.		8	1 6		New Caledonia (FLNKS)	16.2	6		9.0-	
France 10 3 1 6 126 Rwanda 49.8 1 1 4 143 2.0 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Thailaid (Vec-Destour) 88.3 5 1 6 160 16 143 3.9 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Tunisia (Neo-Destour) 98.3 5 0 6 143 3.9 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Tunisia (Neo-Destour) 98.3 5 0 6 143 3.9 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Tunisia (Neo-Destour) 98.3 6 6 143 3.7 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Tunisia (Neo-Destour) 98.3 4 143 11.3 3.7 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Tunisia (Neo-Destour) 98.3 4 143			က	1 6		Rep. Of Vietnam (Vietminh)	37.8 5	-		-1.5	-0.6
France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Somalia (FLCS) 83.1 1 6 126 This indicator (Viginnin) 83.1 1 6 126 This indicator (Viginnin) 83.1 1 6 126 This indicator (Viginnin) 88.3 5 0 6 143 3.9 1 6 126 Tunisia (ViginseDission) 98.3 5 0 6 143 3.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 3 1 6 126 Vanuatu (Stevens SecessionIsts) 47.1 1 9 6 143 3.7 1 1 9 1.0 6 143 3.7 1 1 9 1.0 1 <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td>6</td><td>9</td><td></td><td>Rwanda</td><td>49.8</td><td>1</td><td></td><td>-20</td><td>-0.3</td></t<>			6	9		Rwanda	49.8	1		-20	-0.3
France 10 9 1 6 126 Theiland (Vietnminh) 40.7 5 1 6 126 Theiland (Vietnminh) 40.7 5 1 6 126 Tunisia (Noo-Destour) 98.3 5 0 6 143 -3.9 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Tunisia (Noo-Destour) 98.3 5 6 143 -3.9 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Vanisia (Noo-Destour) 9 6 143 -1.9 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Vanisia (Noo-Destour) 9 6 143 -1.3 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Zaire 7 1 2 3 4 143 -1.3 France 1.0 6 166 DPRK 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 <td< td=""><td></td><td></td><td>ო</td><td>1 6</td><td></td><td>Somalia (FLCS)</td><td></td><td>-</td><td>Section Control of the Control of th</td><td>-3.3</td><td>-0.1</td></td<>			ო	1 6		Somalia (FLCS)		-	Section Control of the Control of th	-3.3	-0.1
France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Tunisia (Nev-Destour) 98.3 5 0 6 143 -3.9 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Tunisia (Nev-Destour) 98.3 5 0 6 143 -3.9 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Zaire Zaire Conservations 28.0 2 3 4 143 -1.13 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Zaire Fance 28.0 2 3 4 4 143 -1.13 Greece 1.0 3 1 6 DPRK 2 3 4 4 143 -1.13 Greece 1.0 6 1.06 1.0 1.0 6 1.0 6 1.0 6 1.0 6 1.0 6 1.0 7 1.0 7 1.0 7 1.0 7 1.0	Mar.		9	9 +		Thailand (Vietminh)		1		-1.6	-0.6
France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Tunisia (Yousselists) 91.8 5 0 6 143 3.7 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Zaire 1 2 3 4 143 -1.3 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Zaire (FNLC) 34.1 1 2 3 143 -1.3 Greece 19.6 1 6 DPRK 6 166 DPRK 9 160 1 <td></td> <td></td> <td>ဗ</td> <td>1 6</td> <td></td> <td>Tunisia (Neo-Destour)</td> <td>000000000000000000000000000000000000000</td> <td>0</td> <td></td> <td>-3.9</td> <td>-0.3</td>			ဗ	1 6		Tunisia (Neo-Destour)	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	0		-3.9	-0.3
France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Vanuatu (Stevens Secessionnists) 47.1 1 9 -1.3 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Zaire 28.0 2 3 4 14.3 -1.1 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Zaire 28.0 2 3 4 14.3 -1.1 Greece 19.6 1 9 166 DPRK 6 167 1 9 160 17.1 160 17.1 17	lisd		3	1		Tunisia (Youssefists)		0		7.5.	-0.3
France 1.0 3 1 6 120 Zaire (FNLC) 34.1 1 2 3 143 -11.1 France 1.0 3 1 6 126 23i 2 3 143 -11.3 Greece 19.6 1 9 166 DPRK 9 160 Greece 19.6 1 9 166 DPRK 9 160 Greece 19.6 1 4 6 166 Turkey 39.7 1 4 151 Guinea 63.5 1 4 6 166 Turkey 39.7 1 4 151 Seriegal 61.7 1 4 151 O.2 1 A 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	- 20		က၊	1 6		Vanuatu (Stevens Secession	onists) 47.1 1	5		9. I-	60
France 1.0 3 1 6 126 Calle (FMLC) 34.1 1 2 3 143 1.1 Greece 19.6 1 6 DPRK 9 166 DPRK 9 160 Greece 19.6 1 0 6 166 Turkey 61.7 1 4 150 170 Greece 15.6 1 4 161 Senegal 61.7 1 4 151 0.2 Guinea 8.4 1 9 158 Surinante 61.7 1 4 151 0.2 Guyana 8.4 1 2 179 El Salvador 1 2 187 0.3 Honduras 57.8 5 0 1 179 Nicaragua 1 1	ψÃ.		3	9		Zaire	2800 2	n		-:	200
Guinea Bissau 63.5 1 2 17.0 Fig. DPRK 61.9 1 3 165 1.7 Greece 19.6 1 6 166 Turkey 61.9 1 3 155 1.7 Greece 15.6 1 4 16.1 Senegal 61.7 1 4 151 30.1 1 4 151 30.1 1 4 151 30.1 1 4 151 30.1 1 4 151 30.1 1 4 151 50.1 1 4 151 30.1 1 4 151 30.1 1 4 151 30.1 1 4 151 30.1 1 4 151 30.1 4 151 0.2 1 1 1 4 151 0.2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 <td>\$2</td> <td></td> <td>5</td> <td>1 6</td> <td></td> <td>Zaire (FNLC)</td> <td>34.1</td> <td>2</td> <td></td> <td>ა.1-</td> <td></td>	\$2		5	1 6		Zaire (FNLC)	34.1	2		ა.1-	
Guinea-Bissau 63.5 1 4 6 Turkey 61.9 1 3 155 1.7 Greece 15.6 1 4 166 Turkey 39.7 1 6 155 -1.0 Guinea-Bissau 63.5 1 4 66 Turkey 32.7 1 4 151 50.1 1 4 151 50.1 1 4 151 50.1 1 4 151 50.1 1 4 151 50.1 1 4 151 50.1 1 4 151 50.1 1 4 151 50.1 1 4 151 50.1 1 4 151 60.3 1 <td< td=""><td>oşij</td><td></td><td>•</td><td>n c</td><td>186</td><td>DODY</td><td></td><td>5 0</td><td>160</td><td></td><td></td></td<>	oşij		•	n c	186	DODY		5 0	160		
Guinea-Bissau 635 1 4 66 Turkey 39.7 1 6 155 -1.0 Guinea-Bissau 635 1 4 151 Senegal 61.7 1 4 151 0.0 Guinea-Bissau 635 1 4 151 Senegal 61.7 1 4 151 0.0 Guinea-Bissau 63.5 1 4 151 Senegal 61.7 1 4 151 0.1 Guinea 63.0 2 1 5 15 Sierra Lone 73.1 2 1 4 151 0.2 Honduras 32.0 1 1 2 179 Nicaragua 47.2 5 1 1 1 1 Honduras 32.0 1 2 179 Nicaragua 13.0 1 1 2 171 0.2 Honduras 32.0 1 2 179 Nicaragua 37.5 </td <td>Ĭ,</td> <td></td> <td>-</td> <td>9 0</td> <td></td> <td>Drnn</td> <td>, 019</td> <td>, ,</td> <td>155</td> <td>-17</td> <td>0.2</td>	Ĭ,		-	9 0		Drnn	, 019	, ,	155	-17	0.2
Guinea-Bissau 63.5 1 4 151 Sanegal 61.7 1 4 151 0.1 Guinea-Bissau 63.6 2 1 5 151 Serregal 73.1 2 1 4 151 -0.2 Guinea 69.0 2 1 5 151 Sierra Leone 73.1 2 1 4 151 -0.2 Guiyana 47.4 4 1 2 179 El Salvador 42.9 1 2 187 0.0 Horduras 57.8 5 0 1 179 Nicaragua 47.2 5 1	1		-)		Turkey	30.7	-	155	-10	0.2
Guinea 69 151 Siera Leone 73.1 2 1 4 151 -0.2 Guyana 8.4 1 9 5 158 Sumame 16.4 1 8 158 0.3 Honduras 47.4 4 1 2 179 El Salvador (FMLN) 32.7 1 1 2 187 0.0 Honduras 57.8 5 0 1 179 Nicaragua 47.2 5 1 1 17 0.4 Honduras 37.7 2 1 2 179 Nicaragua 13.0 1		Discon	- •	t t		i diney Senodal	61.7	-	151	0.1	7.0
Guyana 69.0 2 158 Sumame 73.1 2 158 Sumame 73.1 2 158 20.3 Honduras 47.4 4 1 2 179 El Salvador 1 1 2 187 0.2 Honduras 57.8 5 0 1 179 Nicaragua 47.2 5 1 1 171 0.4 Honduras 37.7 2 1 2 179 Nicaragua 13.0 1 1 2 171 1.0 Honduras 32.0 1 2 179 Nicaragua 13.0 1 2 171 0.2 Honduras 32.0 1 2 179 Nicaragua 37.5 2 1 2 171 0.2 Honduras 32.0 1 2 179 Nicaragua 37.5 2 1 2 171 0.2 Honduras 32.0 1	id	Dissau			Section of the section of	Sound Come	723.1	•	151	. C-)) (
Honduras 47.4 4 2 179 El Salvador (FMLN) 42.9 1 1 2 187 0.0 Honduras 57.8 5 0 1 179 Nicaragua 47.2 5 1 1 2 171 0.4 Honduras 37.7 2 1 2 179 Nicaragua 13.0 1 1 2 171 0.8 Honduras 32.0 1 1 2 179 Nicaragua 37.5 2 1 2 171 0.2 Honduras 32.0 1 1 2 179 Nicaragua 37.5 2 1 2 171 0.2 Honduras 32.0 1 2 179 Nicaragua 37.5 2 1 2 171 0.2	87		7 +	c - o		Siriname	164 1			-03	0.0
Honduras 32.7 1 2 179 E Salvador (FMLN) 32.7 1 2 180 0.0 Honduras 57.8 5 0 1 179 Nicaragua 47.2 5 1 1 171 0.4 Honduras 37.7 2 1 2 179 Nicaragua 13.0 1 2 171 0.8 Honduras 32.0 1 1 2 179 Nicaragua 37.5 2 1 2 171 -0.2 Honduras 37.0 1 2 179 Nicaragua 37.5 2 1 2 171 -0.2	% **		4	1 2		El Salvador	1 6.27	Section of the sectio		0.2	-0.1
Honduras 57.8 5 0 1 179 Nicaragua 47.2 5 1 1 171 0.4 Honduras 32.0 1 1 2 179 Nicaragua 13.0 1 1 2 171 0.8 Honduras 32.0 1 1 2 179 Nicaragua 37.5 2 1 2 171 -0.2 Honduras 37.5 2 1 2 171 -0.2	ig.					El Salvador (FMLN)				0'0	-0.1
Honduras 37.7 2 179 Nicaragua 13.0 1 2 171 1.0 Honduras 32.0 1 1 2 179 Nicaragua 37.5 2 1 2 171 9.2 Honduras 37.5 2 1 2 171 -0.2	1		5	0		Nicaragua		-	STRIP STORY CONTRACTOR	0.4	0.1
Honduras 32.0 1 2 179 Nicaragua 13.0 1 2 171 0.8 Honduras 32.0 1 1 2 171 0.2 Honduras 37.5 2 1 2 171 -0.2 Honduras 37.5 2 1 2 171 -0.2	B47		2	1		Nicaragua		1		1.0	0.1
Honduras 32.0 1 2 179 Nicaragua 37.5 2 171 -0.2 Honduras 37.5 2 171 -0.2	Tree I	peratual de la contrata del contrata de la contrata de la contrata del contrata de la contrata del la contrata del la contrata de la contrata del la contrata de la contrata del la contrata	-	1 2		Nicaragua		-	Attitudence of the property of	0.8	0.1
Microsinia (1988) 1985 1985 1985 1985 1985 1985 1985 1985	100			1		Nicaraciua	37.5	+		-0.2	0.1
	3		estantant.	**************************************	170	Nicorocus	97.5		171	-0.0	ASSESSED AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY OF THE PAR

				こうとの 野野の 日本ので	おしたの言語のもでき これになるこ	していることというとうないので	A SECTION OF PARTY OF THE PARTY	The second second
ALGERIAN WAR (in Algeria)	02-Nov-1954	30-Jun-1962	2798	1	15000	5.4	5.1	3
103 ALGERIAN WAR (in Libva)	15-Oct-1957	15-Oct-1957		2	0	.00	4.6	3
-	15-Sen-1958	15-Mar-1962	1278	,	40	0.0	46	3
A GERIAN WAR (in Morocco)	16-Anr-1960	26-Jan-1962	651	3	0	0.0	3.4	
FIRST INDO-CHINESE WAR	12-Oct-1945	17-Oct-1953	2928		100	0.0	and the second second second second second	and the Carrie of them a visit bear
BAMILEKE REVOLT	19-Dec-1956	10~Jun-1960	1270		30	0.0		
CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II)	28-Apr-1978	17-May-1980	751	an district of the Abbreviation of	0	0.0	18.0	
CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (I)	28-Aug-1968	15-Jun-1972	1388	Ł	- 99	0.0	12.7	L
LIBYAN-CHADIAN WAR	13-Aug-1983	10-Nov-1984	456	-	6	0.0	39.8	-
LIBYAN-CHADIAN WAR	16-Feb-1986	04-Jan-1987	323	3	0	0'0	32.3	
FIRST INDO-CHINESE WAR	15-Mar-1946	11-Aug-1954	3072	-	00009	19.5		
DUBOUTI CONFLICT	04-Feb-1976	30-Dec-1977	969	1	0	0.0	6.5	1
-	19-Jan-1951	27-Jul-1953	921	-	100	0.1	ellen handenser i i dat er hal hyddonoo deedd	A CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY O
KOREAN WAR	27-May-1951	27-Jul-1953	793	, L	100	0.1		
SUEZ WAR	31-Oct-1956	16-Nov-1956	17	3	10	9.0	7.1	1
AUBAME'S COUP	18-Feb-1964	15-Apr-1964	- 28		2	0.0	2.9	1
GABONESE RIOTS	24-Mav-1990	31-Mav-1990	00	1	0	0.0	3.5	ingereignen in der
GIII FWAR	17, lan-1991	28-Feh-1991	57	8	0	00	20.5	6
SI II F WAR	24-Jan-1991	28-Feh-1991	36	3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3. 3	2	0.1	20.5	0
FIRST INDO-CHINESE WAR	14-Sep-1945	23-111-1954	3235		2000	15		
MADAGASCAN WAR	20-Mar-1047	07-Dec-1947	254		400	16. 20. 20. 20. 20. 20. 20. 20. 20. 20. 20	Santania de managantos	eriorational and a
193 MOBOCCAN WAR	07.Dec-1059	22-May-1058	1007	Marie Committee	500	0.4	7 E	
	(400) 10 10 10E7	01 Mor 1050	1554 A1A	Action and Comment		-) i	-
WESTERN SAHARAN DEVOLT (III MAU	iah Sai 20, Eah. 1957	01-Mar-1930	+ 14	- 0	6	0.0	0.0	
	1911 901 FOT 1907	05 May 1070	100		And the Control of the Laborators	2.0		abskillatelitelistiken. •
POLISARIO WAR (In Mauntania)	77-Dec-1976	05-May-1978	133	2	0	0.0	2.0	
TOOL HOUSE WAS	20 Oct 1900	00-Way-1500	0000		10000	2.5		And the second second second
THAT INDO-CHINESE WAR	20-Sep-1945	23-Jul-1954	3229	-	00001	0.0		
	25-DG-1836				Ò	0.0	4.00	7
LOYODA RAID	04-Feb-1976	04-Feb-1976	-	2	0	0.0	14.3	-
131 FIRST INDO-CHINESE WAR	24-May-1946	10-0ct-1946	6	2		0.0		
	20-Jan-1952	01-Dec-1954	1047	 -	100	0.1		
133 YOUSSEFIST REBELLION	01-Jan-1956	17-Jul-1958			8	0.0		
VEMARANA SECESSION	24-Jul-1980	18-Aug-1980	26	-	0	0.0		
KINSHASA RIOTS	24-Sep-1991	30-Oct-1991	37		0	0.0	113.1	2
KOLWEZI RESCUE	20-May-1978	15-Jun-1978	27	-	4	0.1	21.9	-
KOREAN WAR	09-Dec-1950	27-Jul-1953	. 962	1	8	0.1		
KOREAN WAR	01-Jun-1951	27-Jul-1953	788	-	8	0.1		
CYPRIOT CIVIL WAR (Cyprus)	25-Dec-1963	09-Aug-1964	229	, T	2	0.0	1.4	1
TURCO-CYPRIOT WAR	20-Jul-1974	30-Jul-1974	11	-	0	0.0	1.9	-
141 CASHEU DISPUTE	18-Mav-1990	21-Mav-1990	4	. 4	0	0'0	9.0	.
3-	12-Anr-1991	01-Dec-1991	234	1	0	0.0	0.8	-
NEW RIVER TRIANGLE	19-Aun-1969	19-Aug-1969		- 5	0	0.0	9'0	1
FOOTBALL WAR	14-Jul-1969	18-Jul-1969	5	3	0	0.0	0.6	-
SALVADORAN CIVIL WAR	01-Jul-1982	10-Jul-1982	10	1	6	6.0	9.0	1
MOCORAN SEIZURE	04-Mav-1957	05-Mav-1957	2	3	0	0.0	0.6	-
CONTRAWAR	03-May-1981	05-May-1981	3	4	0	0.0	0.8	
CONTRA WAR	03-Jun-1983	14-Jun-1983	12	4	0	0.0	0.7	
COLORS CONTROL								Christian appropriate
CONTROL WAD	12 Can 1085	10 CA-108E		C	U	VV	υo	

3	INTERVEN	LT	ILITSO	ICOUP	OSOI	ICULT	TARGET	111	TLITSO	TCOUP	TCSO	TCULT	LOF	CUDIF
151	Honduras	32.0		•	N	179	Nicaragua	36.0	ď		N	7	0.2	0.1
152	India	72.2	-	0	9	66	China	59.4	5	-	9	151	0.5	-0.9
-53	India	72.2		0	9	66	China	55.8	. 2	H. H.		151	7.0	6.0
154	India	68.5	4	0	9	66	China	53.4	5	d to Substitute No Credition	The state of the s	151	9.0	-0.9
155	India	59.2	2		9	66	China	34.0	2	T.		121	1.0	6.0-
156	India	82.7	5	0	9	66	Kashmir (Azad Kashmir)	e mak (SS) i s'o department de post (Dipplemente)	and private confidence of the confidence of the	6	shopping or the paper	. 66	a had all before money, a whole or	0.0
157	India	82.0	2	0	9	66	Pakistan	95.2	2	0	T.	147	-0.5	-0.8
158	India	72.2	-	0	9	66	Pakistan	84.6	-	-	9	147	-0.5	-0.8
159	India	72.2		0	9	- 66	Pakistan	84.6			9	147	-0.5	-0.8
160	India	72.2	-	0	9	66	Pakistan	84.6	-	-	-	147	-0.5	-0.8
161	India	72.2		0	9	66	Pakistan	84.6			L. L	147	-0.5	-0.8
162	India	68.5	4	0	9	66	Pakistan	82.0	5	-	-	147	-0.5	-0.8
163	India	62.9		0	9	- 66	Pakistan	79.3		Ţ		147	-0.5	-0.8
164	India	59.2	-	0	9	66	Pakistan	69.0	-	_	9	147	-0.4	-0.8
165	India	72.2		0		66	Portugal	38.1	1			195	1.4	-1.6
166	Indonesia	61.0	A STATE OF THE PERSON OF THE P	d Shares and American	n and Calestothan backware	152	Malaysia	48.4	5		CONTRACTOR OF THE	150	0.5	0.0
167	Indonesia	61.0				152	Netherlands	1.0	3	0			2.4	1.2
168	Iran	69.7	4	-	5	119	Irad	65.9	4			143	0.2	-0.4
169	lran	63.5		L.	. 8	119		59.6	۰	3	. 8	143	0.2	-0.4
170	Iran	63.5		-	9	119	Kuwait	32.5	٠,		9	143	1.3	-0.4
171	20	52.3		- 1		410	Kiwait	7 0C) C		271	0.0	-0.4
175	Francisco) () ()	Constanting	A STATE OF THE STA)	110	I bited Arch Emirates	70.4) (1/13) }	Z Z Z
7/-	Jan	4.07	- •		9 0	8-1	United Arab Emiliates	187	-	· •		54.	4.5	‡.Ö.
	ומל	8.03 -	4	•	0	?	lan	7.80			o	2 ·		# ·
1/4	Iraq	59.6	7		9	143	Iran	63.5	- '	-	9	119	-0.z	0.4
100	lrag	95.4	o	0		143	Israel	21.2	S	1		6/	90	
176	Iraq	75.8	-	4	9	143	srae	13.0	4	-	SCHOOL STANSFERS	79	2.5	1.1
22	lrag	6 7 .0	4	9	9	143	Israel	12.1	-	-		79	2.1	
178	Iraq	64.6	4	3	9	143	Israel	12.1	-	-		62	2.1	1.1
179	lrag 💮	40.3		-	9	143	srael	ල ල	4	-		13	1.5	-
180	Iraq	64.6	4	-	9	143	Kuwait	40.4	-	0	9	143	1.0	0.0
181	lraq	40.3	1		ဖ	143	Kuwait	27.0	-	0	9	143	0.5	0.0
182	Iraq	40.3	-	-	9	143	Saudi Arabia	37.6	-	0	9	143	0.1	0.0
183	Israel	21.2	ဟ	0		79	Egypt	82.8	2	0	-	143	-2.5	τ. Υ
184	Israel	20.7	5	0		79	Egypt	81.3	5	0	-	143	-2.4	-1.1
185	Srael	19,5	υC	0		79	Egypt	79.1	c)	4	-	5	-2.4	
186	Israel	12.1	1	0		79	Egypt	68.8	5	_	-	143	-2.3	-1.1
) Q.	Israel	12.1		0		79	Egypt	68.8	5	_		3	, , ,	
188	Israel	12.1	1	0		7.6	Egypt	65.8	5	3	9	143	-2.2	-1.1
188	Israel	12.1		0		79	Egypt	61.8	1		9	3	O.2-	
190	Srael	8.2	-	0		23	Iraq	59.6	2	3	100000000000000000000000000000000000000	143	-2.1	-1.1- **********************************
.	[srae]	21.2	വ	0		79	Jordan	83.2	ιΩ	0	9	143	-2.5	
192	Israel	21.2	2	0		79	Jordan	80.1	5	0		143	-2.4	-1.1
183	Israel	15.8		0		7.9	Jordan	67.6		0	9	143	Ç	7.7
194	Israel	15.8	-	0		79	Jordan	67.6	-	2		143	-2.1	-1.1
92	Israel	15.8		0		79	Jordan	9.79	_	_	9	143	 	7
196	Israel	12.1		0		73	Jordan	53.5	4	-		143	-2.2	-1.1
62	Israel	21.5	in ı	0		79	Lebanon	88	ın ı	- 0		143	-1.3	
198	Srae	21.2	ည	0	THE PERSON NAMED IN POST OF TH	79	Syria	85.3	5	0		143	-2.6	-1.1
199	Israel	20.0	ιΩ	0		79	Syria	81.8	ın	4	-	143	-2.5	
200	Israel	18.8	D.	0		62	Syria	78.2	ည	4	-	143	-2.4	-

150 STRICK WARFA STANDARD	45			は、「は、ないして対け、これになって	大い名がためなどがかっている。	が、大学のでは、大学のでは、	Control of the Contro		とない いのがらかいたがいてい
SINCHIANA WAR TO CALL 1982 128 A 2 2000 15.9 17. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CALL 1982 128 A 3 0.0 0 11. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CACCHISTS 20 20 0.0 0 11. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CACCHISTS 20 0.0 0 11. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CACCHISTS 20 0.0 0 11. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CACCHISTS 20 0.0 0 11. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CACHISTS 20 0.0 0 11. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CACCHISTS 20 0.0 0 11. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CACCHISTS 20 0.0 0 11. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CACCHISTS 20 0.0 0 11. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CACCHISTS 20 0.0 0 11. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CACCHISTS 20 0.0 0 11. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CACCHISTS 20 0.0 0 11. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CACCHISTS 20 0.0 0 11. A MATCH CONCLING WAR TO CACCHISTS 20 0.0 0 10. A MATCH CONCLING WAS TO CACCHISTS 20 0.0 0 10. A MATCH CONCLING	7	1/-Mai-1800				THE STATE OF THE S	が 一方 できる		
INDO-PARSIZAM WARNER	SINO-INDIAN WAR	20-Jul-1962	22-Nov-1962	126	α	2000	15.9	1.7	_
MATU ACHO LA DUELS	INDO-PAKISTANI WAR	21-Sep-1965	11-Dec-1965	82	4	3	0.0	.3	
AMENIACHAL PRACESH 20-Oct 1975 11 12 11 11 11 11 11 1	NATU LA-CHO LA DUELS	11-Sep-1967	02-Oct-1967	22	2	99	3.6	1.2	
KASHMIRI WART SP-OCI-1947 COL-1947 COL-1947 COL-1947 COL-1947 COL-1947 COL-1947 COL-1947 COL-1947 COL-1948	ARUNACHAL PRADESH	20-Oct-1975	20-Oct-1975		7	1	4.0		
MACHINITY 19-Pe-19-19-9-19-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9-9	KASHMIRI WAR	26-Oct-1947	01-Jan-1949	434	-	2000	4.6		
STATE STAT	KASHMIRI WAR	20-Aug-1948	13-Nov-1948	. 98	3	0	0.0		
TUMB AINTERS RICHARISTERS Oct-Juni 1989 Text Publication 12 2 0 0 11 TRIPLIA AINTERS RICHARISTERS 77-Sep-1987 17-Obe-1986 22 0 0 0 11 KASHURI MARR 27-Sep-1987 19-May-1986 22.66 2 2000 6.1 1.1 KASHURI MARR 19-May-1987 19-May-1987 19-May-1987 19-May-1987 19-May-1980 0 0.0 0.0 BENGALICIVAL WAR 25-Apr-1987 19-May-1986 104 2 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 <td></td> <td>19-Feb-1956</td> <td>19-Mar-1956</td> <td>30</td> <td>2</td> <td>₩.</td> <td>0.1</td> <td>1.1</td> <td>_</td>		19-Feb-1956	19-Mar-1956	30	2	₩.	0.1	1.1	_
Indicates 277-66-1962 21 2 0 0 0 11 Indicates 277-66-1962 328 2 200 0 0 11 Indicates 277-66-1963 19-May-1967 19-		04-Jun-1958	26-Aug-1958	84			0.1	Z:	
INDO_RKISTAMI WAR 12-0c-1684 91-Nov-1685 328 22 2000 6.1 1.1 CASHMIST RAID 12-0c-1684 91-Nov-1697 1.2 2.0 0.8 ENGQAL CIVIL WAR 25-40r-1697 17-Nov-1597 1.2 2.0 0.8 SACCHENEE (IR Portagese India) 17-Dec-1681 2.1 1.0 0.0 0.0 SACCHENEE (IR Portagese India) 17-Dec-1681 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 SACCHENEE (IR Portagese India) 17-Dec-1681 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 SACCHENEE (IR Portagese India) 17-Dec-1681 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SACCHENEE (IR Portagese India) 17-Dec-1681 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SACCHENEE (IR Portagese India) 17-Dec-1682 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SACCHENEE (IR Portagese India) 17-Dec-1682 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SACCHENEE (IR Portagese India) 17-Dec-1682 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SACCHENEE (IR Portagese India) 17-Dec-1682 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SACCHENEE (IR Portagese India) 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SACCHENEE (IR Portagese India) 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 SACCHENEE (IR Portagese India) 1.0 0		27-Sep-1962	17-Oct-1962	21	2	0	0.0	1.1	_
Mainting NADE 1944-1967 1944-1972 566 4 2000 61 61 61 61 61 61 61	INDO-PAKISTANI WAR	27-Dec-1964	19-Nov-1965	328		2000	6.1		
BENGALL ONLI WART 2294-1971 1740o-1972 2669 4 2000 3.5 0.8	KASHMIRI RAID	19-May-1967	19-May-1967	-		2	2.0	0.8	_
SANCHEN CLACIER COLUMINIST		29-Apr-1971	17-Nov-1972	. 269		2000	3.5	0.8	
CONTRICTOR CON	SIACHEN GLACIER	08-Jun-1984	21-Aug-1990	2266	2	901	0.0	0.8	
COMPRONTATION (in Sarawak) 28-Sep 1963 06-Aug 1965 1044 2 600 0.6 0.4 WEST FIRM COMPLICT (in West Irlan) 21-Abor 1960 16-Aug 1962 2 100 0.2 0.1 1 0.1 0.0 0.1 1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 </td <td>GOA DEFENSE (in Portugese India)</td> <td>17-Dec-1961</td> <td>18-Dec-1961</td> <td>2</td> <td></td> <td>8</td> <td>10.0</td> <td>0.4</td> <td></td>	GOA DEFENSE (in Portugese India)	17-Dec-1961	18-Dec-1961	2		8	10.0	0.4	
WEST IRIAN CONFLICT (in west frein) 21-Nov-1860 15-Aug-1962 563 2 500 0.1 RANT EL-ARAB CONFLICT 14-Jan 172 10-Fabr-1968 283 3 0 0.2 RANT EL-ARAB CONFLICT 22-Sab-1980 10-Cat-1981 223 3 0 0.2 RANI-FRAZI WAR 0-Sab-1980 10-Cat-1981 223 3 0 0.2 RANI-FRAZI WAR 0-Sab-1987 18-Apr-1984 227 4 0 0.0 0.2 TUNIS ISLANDS SEIZURE 22-Abr-1972 16-Abr-1973 34-Abr-1984 27-Abr-1984 27-Abr-1984 27-Abr-1984 27-Abr-1984 27-Abr-1984 0 0.1 0 0 TUNIS ISLANDS SEIZURE 22-Abr-1984 27-Abr-1984 27-Abr-1984 27-Abr-1984 27-Abr-1984 0 0.1 0	CONFRONTATION (in Sarawak)		06-Aug-1966	1044	2	300	9.0	0.4	
SHATT EL-ARAB CONFLICT		21-Nov-1960	15-Aug-1962	633	2		0.5	0.1	
HANI-HAĞI WAR HAĞI MAĞI HAĞI HAĞI HAĞI HAĞI HAĞI HAĞI HAĞI H		14-Jan-1972	10-Feb-1975	1124	2	50	0.0	1.2	or and an action of the real contracts of
HANI-FIACI WART 13-Nov-1990 11-Oct-1981 2227 4 0 0.0 0.2 HANI-FIACI WART 15-Nov-1990 11-Oct-1981 2277 4 0 0.0 0.3 HANI-FIACI WART 25-Nov-1971 1 3 3.0 0.3 SHATI-RE SIZURE 25-Nov-1972 10-Fab-1978 3366 4 60000 17.8 1.9 HANI-FIACI WART 25-Nov-1971 1 3 3.0 0.1 HANI-FIACI WART 15-Nov-1971 1 3.0 0.1 HANI-FIACI WART 15-Nov-1971 1 3.0 0.1 HANI-FIACI WART 15-Nov-1971 1 3.0 0.1 HANI-FIACI WART 15-Nov-1973 10-Fab-1981 3756 1.0 0.1 HANI-FIACI WART 15-Nov-1973 10-Fab-1981 1.0 0.1 HANI-FIACI WART 15-Nov-1973 10-Fab-1981 1.0 0.1 WAR OF ATTRITION 0.2 -Aug-1982 24-Cact-1973 10 1 2 0.0 SCUD ATTACKS 16-Nov-1973 16 1 2 0.0 0.1 SCUD ATTACKS 16-Nov-1973 16-Fab-1991 2.0 3.0 0.1 SCUD ATTACKS 15-Nov-1973 16-Fab-1991 2.0 3.0 0.1 SCUD ATTACKS 15-Nov-1973 15-Fab-1991 2.0 3.0 0.1 SCUD ATTACKS 15-Nov-1973 15-Fab-1991 2.0 0.0 0.0 SCUD ATTACKS 15-Nov-1973 10-Nov-1973 1.0 0.0 0.0 SCUD ATTACKS 15-Nov-1973 10-Nov-1973 1.0 0.0 0.0 SCUD ATTACKS 15-Nov-1974 1.0 0.0 0.0 SCOND ATTACKS 15-Nov-1974 1.0 0.0 SCOND ATTACKS 15-Nov-1974 1.0 0.0 0.0 SCOND ATTACKS 15-Nov-1974 1.0 0.0 0.0 SCOND ATTACKS 15-Nov-197			20-Aug-1988	2889	3.34.4.5.5	50000	51.9	0.5	
HANN-HAGN WART Coc-Sep-1967 16-Apri-1968 227 4 0 0 0 0 TUMES ISLANDS SELZURE		13-Nov-1980		323	3	1.00 marine 1.12 de 1.13 de 1.	0.0	0.2	
TUNIS SELANDS SELACHE COLOR 120 12	IDANI IDACI WAD	06. Cen. 1087	18. Anr. 1089	202	Land Land	Samuel S	0.0	0.4	Haran Condition of
SUMINA DELIGITATION CRAME (1978) SCHOLOF (1978) SCHO	_	00 No. 1071	10701-1000		A CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF	Constant Links			
March Land		1 /61-AONI-67	1 /6 I -AOAI-67	-	-		0.0		
Introduction Internation Introduction Internation Introduction Internation Introduction Introduction Internation Internat		7,41-un0	10-rep-1975	488			9.2		A CARLO DE COMO DE CARLO DE CA
VAMENTINGN 19-May-1948 27-May-1948 2		04-Jun-1979	20-Aug-1988	3366	4	20000	17.8	J.9	
WAR OF ATTRITION 03-Dec-1968 10-Dec-1969 373 4 20 0.1 0.9 YOM KIPULIA WAR 06-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 17 3 10 0.6 0.0 0.0 SOLD ATTACKS Chan-1973 24-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 14 1 30 2.1 0.6 SAMETAH SEIZURE Chan-1973 24-Oct-1973 14 1 2 0.0 0.1 SAMETAH SEIZURE Chan-1973 24-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 1 2 0.0 0.1 SCUD ATTACKS Chan-1967 27-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 25-Oct-1973 25-Oct-1974 25-Oct-1974 25-Oct-1974 25-Oct-1974 25-Oct-1974 25-Oct-1974 25-Oct-1974	PALES INE WAR	15-May-1948	27-Mar-1949	317		3	1.0		
YOM KIPPUR WARE You ware You kippur WARE	WAR OF ATTRITION	03-Dec-1968	10-Dec-1969	373	4	20	0.1	6.0	
YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Syria) 11-Oct-1973 24-Oct-1973 14 1 30 2.1 0.6 SCUD ATTACKS 19-Jan-1991 26-Fab-1991 40 3 0 0.0 0.1 SCUD ATTACKS 18-Jan-1991 26-Fab-1991 210 1 20000 96-2 0.1 SCUD ATTACKS 18-Jan-1991 27-Fab-1991 20 3 0 0.0 0.1 SCUD ATTACKS 18-Jan-1991 26-Fab-1991 40 3 30 0.8 0.1 SCUD ATTACKS 18-Jan-1991 26-Jan-1991 26-Jan-1991 26-Jan-1991 20 0 0 0 SUEZ WAR (AZA RAIDS) 22-Jan-1967 16-Jan-1967 17-Jan-1967		08-Oct-1973	24-Oct-1973	T_{i}	3		90	0.0	
SCUD ATTACKS 18-Jan-1991 26-Feb-1991 40 3 0 0.0 0.1 0.1 SAMETAH SEIZURE 20-Mar-1933 16 1 2000 9.0 0.1 0.1 KUNATIONASION 22-May-1949 27-Feb-1991 4.0 3 30 0.8 0.1 SCUD ATTACKS 18-Jan-1991 27-Feb-1991 4.0 3 30 0.8 0.1 SCUD ATTACKS 18-Jan-1991 27-Feb-1991 4.0 3 30 0.8 0.1 ALALAGKS 18-Jan-1992 27-Feb-1991 2.0 0 0 0 0 RAFAH RAID 30-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 1 4 0	YOM KIPPUR WAH (in Syria)	11-Oct-1973	24-Oct-1973	14		90	2.1	di kina kanan da Polisi ka	ik idazile, edakotzka dake.
SAMETAH SEIZURE 20-Mar-1973 04-Apr-1973 16 1 2 0.1 0.1 CUUMATI INVASION 02-Aug-1990 27-Feb-1991 210 1 20000 95.2 0.1 RUUMATI INVASION 22-Aug-1990 27-Feb-1991 20 3 0 0.1 RAFAH RAID 22-Aug-1953 30-Jun-1950 30-Jun-1950 1 2 0 0.0 SUEZ WAR (GAZA RAIDS) 22-Aug-1953 30-Jun-1967 12-1 2 0 0.0 4.4 SIX DAY WAR 05-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 6 1 200 0.2 4.4 SIX DAY WAR 05-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 11-2 200 0.2 4.4 SIX DAY WAR 05-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 <t< td=""><td>SCUD AT LACKS</td><td>18-Jan-1991</td><td>26-Feb-1991</td><td>40</td><td>3</td><td></td><td>0.0</td><td></td><td></td></t<>	SCUD AT LACKS	18-Jan-1991	26-Feb-1991	40	3		0.0		
KUWANT INVASION 02-Aug-1990 27-Feb-1991 210 1 20000 96.2 0.1 SCUD ATTACKS 18-Jan-1991 26-Feb-1991 40 3 30 0.8 0.1 SCUD ATTACKS 22-May-1948 06-Jan-1949 23 30 0.9 0.9 0.0 PALESTINE WAR 30-Jun-1950 30-Jun-1967 12.8 2 200 0.2 3.4 SUEZ WAR (GAZA RAIDS) 22-Aug-1953 06-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 6 1 300 0.2 3.4 SIX DAY WAR 05-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 1121 4 0 0 2.4 5 4 4 4 </td <td></td> <td>20-Mar-1973</td> <td>04-Apr-1973</td> <td>16</td> <td>-</td> <td>0</td> <td>0.1</td> <td>And by the second second second second</td> <td>3 ·</td>		20-Mar-1973	04-Apr-1973	16	-	0	0.1	And by the second second second second	3 ·
SCUID ATTACKS 18-Jan-1991 26-Feb-1991 40 3 30 0.8 PALESTINE WAR 22-May-1948 26-Jan-1949 230 3 30 0.8 PALESTINE WAR 22-May-1953 06-Jan-1960 1 2 0 0 SUEZ WAR (GAZA RAIDS) 29-Aug-1953 08-Mar-1967 1 2 0 0 SIX DAY WAR 05-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 6 1 300 50.0 SIX DAY WAR 05-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 6 1 200 0.2 CANA COPILICIT 18-Sep-1971 18-Sep-1974 139 3 0 0 CANA KIPPUR WAR 07-Jun-1981 07-Jun-1981 170 2 00 0 SIX DAY WAR 20-Mar-1956 07-Jun-1981 170 2 4 4 ALESTINE WAR 20-Mar-1956 07-Jun-1958 10-Jun-1958 10-Jun-1958 10-Jun-1958 10-Jun-1958 10-Jun-1958 10-Jun-1958 10-Jun-1958 10-Jun-1958 10-Jun-1958			27-Feb-1991	210		888	95.2		•
PALESTINE WAR 22-May-1948 06-Jan-1949 230 3 200 0.9 RAFAH RAID 30-Jun-1950 30-Jun-1950 1 2 0 0.0 SUEZ WAR (GAZA RAIDS) 29-Aug-1953 08-Mar-1967 12.188 2 200 0.2 SIX DAY WAR 06-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 6 1 300 0.2 SIX DAY WAR 06-Jun-1967 1121 4 200 0.2 CANA OF OF ATTRITION 06-Jun-1967 17-Jun-1981 1 4 200 0.2 CANA KIPPUR WAR 06-Oct-1973 21-Feb-1974 139 3 60 0.0 SIX DAY WAR 07-Jun-1981 1 3 0 0.0 0.0 SIX DAY WAR 20-Mar-1956 03-Apr-1959 16 4 40 0.5 MOLNIT SCOPUS II 26-May-1956 10-Jun-1967 74 4 0 0 SIX DAY WAR 27-May-1956 10-Jun-1967 1019 4 4.0 0		18-Jan-1991		40	_හ	e	8.0	0.1	٥.
RAFAH RAID 30-Jun-1950 30-Jun-1950 30-Jun-1950 10-Jun-1950 112.1 4 200 0.2 SIX DAY WAR WAR OF ATTRITION 14-Jul-1967 07-Aug-1970 112.1 4 0 0.2 CANAL CONFLICT 18-Sep-1971 18-Sep-1971 18-Sep-1971 14 0 0.0 CANAL CONFLICT 06-Oct-1977 21-Feb-1974 139 3 0 0.0 CANAR REACTOR RAID 07-Jun-1981 07-Jun-1981 170 2 100 0.0 PALESTINE WAR 15-Dec-1948 03-Apr-1949 110 2 100 0.0 SIX DAY WAR 27-Jul-1956 10-Oct-1956 76 4 40 0.5 SIX DAY WAR 27-Jul-1956 10-Jun-1958 10-Jun-1958 2 4 4.0 SIX DAY WAR 27-May-1968 10-Jun-1969 24 4.0 0.0		22-May-1948	06-Jan-1949	230	3	900	6.0		
SUEZ WAR (GAZA RAIDS) 29-Aug-1953 08-Mar-1957 128B 2 200 0.2 SIX DAY WAR O5-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 6 1 300 50.0 WAR OF ATTRITION 14-Jul-1967 07-Aug-1970 1121 4 200 6.2 CANAL CONFLICT 18-Sep-1971 18-Sep-1971 14 0 0.0 0.0 CANAL CONFLICT 18-Sep-1971 18-Sep-1974 139 3 0 0.0 CANAR K REACTOR RAID 07-Jun-1881 07-Jun-1981 10 2 160 0.0 PALESTINE WAR 15-Dec-1948 03-Apr-1949 110 2 160 0.0 SIX DAY WAR 20-ALOUNT SCOPUS II 26-May-1956 10-Oct-1956 76 4 40 0.5 SIX DAY WAR 27-May-1956 10-Jun-1967 746 2 4 4.0 SIX DAY WAR 27-May-1956 10-Jun-1967 24 4.0 0.1 SALESTINE WAR 27-May-1948 16-Jan-1949 240	RAFAH RAID	30-Jun-1950	30-Jun-1950	-	2		0.0		
SIX DAY WAR 05-Jun-1967 10-Jun-1967 6 1 300 50.0 WAR OF ATTRITION 14-Jul-1967 07-Aug-1970 1121 4 200 0.2 CANAL CONFLICT 18-Sep-1971 18-Sep-1971 1 4 0 0.0 YOM KIPPUR WAR 06-Oct-1973 21-Feb-1974 139 3 500 3.6 SIRAK REACTOR RAID 07-Jun-1981 07-Jun-1981 10 2 100 0.0 PALESTINE WAR 15-Dec-1948 03-Apr-1949 110 2 160 0.0 PALESTINE WAR 20-Mar-1956 10-Oct-1956 16-Oct-1956 16-Oct-1957 1745 2 300 0.1 SIX DAY WAR 22-May-1965 13-Aug-1949 12-Aug-1949 12-Aug-1949 16-Aug-1949 16-Aug-1949 16-Aug-1949 16-Aug-1949	SUEZ WAR (GAZA RAIDS)	29-Aug-1953	08-Mar-1957	1288		8	0.2	3.4	
WAR OF ATTRITION 14-Jul-1967 07-Aug-1970 1121 4 200 0.2 CANAL CONFLICT 18-Sep-1971 18-Sep-1971 1 4 0 0.0 YOM KIPPUR WAR 06-Oct-1973 21-Feb-1974 139 3 60 0.0 OSIRAK REACTOR RAID 07-Jun-1981 1 3 0 0 0 PALESTINE WAR 15-Dec-1948 03-Apr-1949 110 2 160 0.0 ISPAELI REPRISALS 20-Mar-1956 10-Cer1956 76 4 40 0.0 ISPAELINE WAR 20-Mar-1956 10-Cer1956 76 4 4.0 0.5 SIX DAY WAR 27-May-1956 10-Unr-1967 1745 2 30 0.4 PALESTINE WAR 22-May-1946 13-Aug-1949 3240 3 0 0 PALESTINE WAR 25-May-1948 13-Apr-1949 324 3 0 0 SYRIA-ISBAEL CONFLICT 05-May-1957 05-May-1951 31 30 1.0 </td <td>SIX DAY WAR</td> <td>05-Jun-1967</td> <td>10-Jun-1967</td> <td>9</td> <td>Charles of the second control of the second</td> <td>300</td> <td>50.0</td> <td>4.4</td> <td></td>	SIX DAY WAR	05-Jun-1967	10-Jun-1967	9	Charles of the second control of the second	300	50.0	4.4	
CANAL CONFLICT 18-Sep-1971 18-Sep-1971 1 - 6 0.0 0.0 YOM KIPPUH WAR 06-Oct-1973 21-Feb-1974 139 3 500 3.6	WAR OF ATTRITION	14-Jul-1967		1121	3 7		0.2	4.4	
YOM KIPPUR WAR 06-Oct-1973 21-Feb-1974 139 3 500 3.6 OSIRAK REACTOR RAID 07-Jun-1981 07-Jun-1981 1 3 0 0.0 PALESTINE WAR 15-Dec-1948 03-Apr-1949 110 2 100 0.3 ISRAELI REPRISALS 20-Mar-1950 02-Sep-1954 1628 2 30 0.0 OALQILYA RAID 27-Mar-1956 10-Oct:1956 76 4 40 0.5 MOUNT SCOPUS II 26-May-1958 26-May-1958 15-May-1958 1 2 4 4.0 SIX DAY WAR 27-May-1965 10-Jun-1967 745 2 300 0.4 PALESTINE WAR 22-May-1948 13-Apr-1949 324 3 0 0.0 SYRIA-ISBAEL CONFLICT 05-Apr-1967 05-May-1967 13-1967 3 0 0.0	CANAL CONFLICT	18-Sep-1971		1	4)	0.0	5.4	Control of the first state of the state of t
OSIRAK REACTOR RAID 07-Jun-1981 07-Jun-1981 1 3 0 0.0 PALESTINE WAR 15-Dec-1948 03-Apr.1949 110 2 100 0.9 ISRAELI REPRISALS 20-Mar-1950 02-Sep-1954 162 2 30 0.0 QALQILYA RAID 27-May-1956 10-Oci-1956 76 4 40 0.5 MOLNT SCOPUS II 26-May-1958 26-May-1958 1 2 4 4.0 SIX DAY WAR 05-May-1958 10-Jun-1967 745 2 300 0.4 WAR OF ATTRITION 05-Nov-1967 19-Aug-1970 1019 4 100 0.1 PALESTINE WAR 22-May-1948 13-Apr-1949 240 3 200 0.6 SYRIA-ISBAEL CONFLICT 05-Apr-1967 05-May-1967 05-May-1967 13-4 30 1.0		06-Oct-1973	21-Feb-1974	139	3	8	3.6	6.1	
PALESTINE WAR 15-Dec-1948 03-Apr-1949 110 2 160 0.9 ISRAELI REPRISALS 20-Mar-1950 02-Sep-1954 1628 2 30 0.0 GALQILIYA RAID 27-May-1956 10-Oct-1956 76 4 40 0.5 SIX DAY WAR 27-May-1956 10-Jun-1967 745 2 4 4.0 WAR OF ATTRITION 05-Nov-1967 10-Jun-1949 24 4 100 0.1 PALESTINE WAR 22-May-1948 13-Apr-1949 3240 3 200 0.8 PALESTINE WAR 25-May-1957 05-May-1951 31-30 10 0.0 0.0 SYRIA-ISPAEL CONFLICT 05-Apr-1951 05-May-1951 31 30 1.0			07lun-1981	1	3)	0.0	1.7	THE PERSON OF TH
ISRAELI REPRISALS 20-Mar-1950 02-Sep-1954 162B 2 30 0.0 CALQILYA RAID 27-Jul-1956 10-Oct-1956 76 4 40 0.5 MOUNT SCOPUS II 26-May-1958 1 2 4 4.0 0.5 SIX DAY WAR 27-May-1956 10-Jun-1967 745 2 300 0.4 WAR OF ATTRITION 05-Nov-1967 19-Aug-1970 1019 4 100 0.1 PALESTINE WAR 22-May-1948 13-Apr-1949 324 3 200 0.0 SYRIA-ISRAEL CONFLICT 05-Apr-1951 05-May-1951 31 30 1.0		15-Dec-1948	03-Anr-1949	110	2	00	6.0		A STATE OF THE STA
CALESTINE WAR 22-May-1948 13-Apr-1949 32-40 32-30 32		00 100 1000	00 Con 1054	1600		2	2.0		
MOUNT SCOPIUS II 26-May-1958 26-May-1958 1 2 4 4.0 SIX DAY WAR WAR OF ATTRITION 05-Nov-1967 19-Aug-1970 1019 4 100 0.1 PALESTINE WAR 25-May-1948 13-Apr-1949 324 3 0 0.0 SYRIA-ISRAEL CONFLICT 05-Apr-1951 05-May-1951 31 31 30 1.0	ISNAELI NEFNISALS	20-Wal-1930	10-0ep-1956	1020	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	2 9	0.0	8.4	
MICTAIN SOCIATION 27-May-1950 20-May-1950 20-May-1950 1-7-0 2-7-0 1-7-0	MOUNT CODING	56-May, 1058	26-May-1058		, Telesconic (2 _	۲ د د ۲ د	7.7	
WA CHATRITION 05-Nov-1967 19-Aug-1970 1019 4 100 0.1 PALESTINE WAR 22-May-1948 16-Jan-1949 240 3 200 0.8 PALESTINE WAR 25-May-1948 13-Apr-1949 324 3 0 0.0 SYRIA-ISRAEL CONFLICT 05-Apr-1951 05-May-1951 31 30 1.0	SIX DAY WAB	27-May-1956	10. 10. 1067	7.45		.00	0.4	- 56	
MALESTINE WAR 22-May-1948 15-Jan-1949 240 3 200 0.8 PALESTINE WAR 25-May-1948 13-Apr-1949 324 3 0 0.0 SYRIA-ISRAEL CONFLICT 05-Apr-1951 05-May-1951 31 3 30 1.0	WAS OF ATTRIBUN	05 Alov: 1067	10-01-010-01	0101		8 0	X	2.6	Control and the second
PALESTINE WAR 25-May-1948 13-Apr-1949 324 3 SYRIA-ISRAEL CONFLICT 05-Apr-1951 05-May-1951 31 3		00-1-004 00-1-004	0/61-000-61	610	- 0	200	- o	2.3	
PALES INE WAR SYRIA-ISRAEL CONFLICT 05-Apr-1951 05-May-1951 31 3		25 May 1340	10 001 1010	540	9 0	8			
		25-May-194d	13-Apr-1949	324	2		0.0		
		05-Anr-1951	- 105-105-	いたいないないというできない	いったことの人のでは、	V 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10	いたのでのありている。		A CARLO SECRETARIO

						CCF	在一下 打骨 计分类的数据表示 法人的 人名英西西			
11	18.4	•	Conference and design of the Conference			n O	1	2		-1-1
202 Israel	15.8	0			Syria	70.5 1	-	143	-2.2	-1.1
3 Israel	15.8	0			Syna	70.5		143	.2.2	
204 Israel	15.8	0	and and the second second section is a second secon	3	son Kening to the beautiful that is a demand the both that the constitutional Syria. Syria	70.5	4 6	143	-2.2	
205 Israel	15.8	0	SALES THE PROPERTY OF		Syria	70.5		143	-2.2	
1	15.8	1 0	AND STATE STATE AND THE STATE OF THE STATE O	ē e	Syria	66.3 5	4 1	143	-2.0	indirection in the state of the
207 Israel	12.1	0 1	into a series in the series of		Syria		3 6	143	-1.9	H. T.F.
3	12.1	1 0	Tree Chambers the skill title.	79	Syria	60.0 1	4 6	143	-1.9	: ::-:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::
209 Israel	12.1	0			Svna	1 0.09	91	143	-1.9	
-	8.2	0 1	ne Sen och til Seneskaltades	Sex School o	Syria	40.9	1 6	143	-1.3	-1.1
to de	121	0			Uganda	57.2	3	143	-1.8	
5	2.9	4		St. State	is entracement and an area of the second sec	40.3	1 6	143	-1.5	-1.3
*1	88.2	2	8		Israel			62	2.5	
-	73.9	5 1	9		Israel		derektiven austrandar kooleksistadeksis.	62	2.2	
8,50	67.6	1	9		Israel	17.9		. 79	2.0	11
216 Jordan	67.6		9	Cost. (E. Sa	Israel	And the Control of th		79	2.0	1.1
146	53.5		. 9		Israel			. 79	1.6	
-	32.4	1	9	(\$1.50 kg)	Oman (PFLOAG)		1 6	143	Company of the second	0.0
60	67.6	1	9		Svria	70.5		143	-0.1	0.0
1	49.2	4 1	9	9	Svria	60.0	3 6	143	-0.4	0.0
221 Kuwait	40.4	1	9		Israel	12.1	-	79	1.1	1.1
222 Kuwait	40.4	0	9	district of the	Israel	12.1	-	79	1.1	1.1
223 Laos	65.0		9		Cambodia		9 8	160	0.3	0.0
_	65.0	. 3	9		Thailand		1 6	160	2.1	0.0
225 Laos	65.0	1	9		Thailand		1 6	. 160	2.1	0.0
_	56.0	-	9		Thailand	9.3	1 6	160	1.9	0.0
227 Lebanon	53.8	5	1		Israel			62	1.3	17
_	1	4	-		Israel	2000	1	79	1.0	1.1
XI-V	13.9	2	9		Israel		1 6	79	0.1	
=		2	9	2000	Chad		1	143	-0.9	0.0
601	43.5	-	9		Chad			143	-1.4	00
Ť	Specification	3	9		Chad (FAN)	***************************************	-	143	-1.2	0.0
2	46.1	3	9		Chad (Habre Militia)	67.3 2	1 3	143	6.0-	0:0
- 8	0.00	2 3	9	SECURIO DE	Egypt	61.8 1	1 6	143	-0.6	0.0
200	46.1	2	9		lanzania	53.7	1	143	۲. ۲.	0.0
236 Libya	552460		9		Tunisia	49.3 1	9 0	143	-0.2	0.0
10.0	1.0	5			UFHK		ĵ.	36		
238 Luxembourg	200,000,000	G 8		000	DPRK			160		-0.7
12	37.7	-	4		Mozambique (Renamo)	72.4		143	4.1 -	0:0
	90.6	-	ო		Burkina Faso			151	0.0	0.0
1 Malí	77.3)	m		Burkina Faso		2	151	-0.3	0.0
242 Mauritania		1 2	4		Senegal	61.7 1	1 4	151	0.2	0.0
3 Mauritania		2 1	m		Spain		1 8	136	2.5	0.3
	27.7	5			China		1 6	151	-2.1	0.0
135	86.2		9		Algeria		1	143	0.2	0:0
-	86.2		9		Algeria		1 6	143	0.2	0.0
	78.6	6	9		Israel			79	2.7	Ţ
248 Morocco	78.6	1	9		Spain		1 6	143	2.9	0.0
9 Morocco	7.1	,	ď		Zaita (EMI O)	F FO	c ·	143	u .	00
	The state of the s	San Charles and the Control of the C		2			7	2	?	公は はない はいけん

202 BORDER SHELLING 09-Jul-1957 203 BEIT KATZIR CONFLICT 09-Jul-1967 204 KINNERET CONFLICT 31-Jan-1962 205 EL DOUGA RAID 09-Jul-1964 206 SIX DAY WAR 06-Jul-1964 207 WAR OF ATTRITION 24-Feb-1965 208 YOM KIPPUR WAR 06-Jul-1967 210 BEIRUT OFFENSIVE 09-Jul-1976 211 ENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID 03-Jul-1976 212 GULF WAR 18-Jan-1997 213 PALESTINE WAR 26-Apr-1946 214 BATTIR INCIDENT 28-Nov-1957 215 DAOFAR REBELLION 27-Feb-1976 216 UAR UNION CONFLICT 27-Feb-1976 217 WAR OF ATTRITION 27-Feb-1976 220 PLO-JORDANIAN WAR 37-Auj-1956 221 YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Syria) 11-Apr-1976 222 YOM KIPPUR WAR ARKON CINIESE WAR 15-May-1976 223 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 17-Mor-1976 224 MESTINE	1957 03-Dec-1958 1960 12-Feb-1960 1962 17-Mar-1962 1963 09-Jun 1963 1964 10-Jun 1967 1969 27-Jun 1973 1973 06-Jun 1974 1982 09-Jun 1982 1976 03-Jun 1974 1984 03-Apr 1949 1957 22-Apr 1957 1959 23-Apr 1957 1975 21-Sep 1975 1975 21-Sep 1977 1975 21-Sep 1977 1976 20-Sep 1970 1977 17-Nov-1978 1978 15-Apr 1978	8 513 2 2 2 2 2 2 3 11070 4 244 4 244 4 244 4 244 7 1 1 7 1 1 7 1 1 809 9 1 1 9	4 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 7 1 1 0 0 4 1 1 1 4 0 0 0	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.8.2.8.1.2.2.8.2.8.0.3.0.3.0.3.0.3.0.3.0.3.0.3.0.3.0.3.0	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
BEIT KATZIR CONFLICT KINNERET CONFLICT KINNERET CONFLICT SIX DAY WAR SIX DAY SIX D			67 07 64 4 60 60 60 60 60 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	5. 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	2.5 4.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	2.2.1 2.1.2.2.8 2.2.8.8 1.2.2.8 1.2.2.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 4.0 0.3	
KINNERET CONFLICT (II) SIX DAY WAR GO-Jul- GO-J			2 8 4 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 8 4 7 7 4 7 7 7 8 8 8 8	2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	2.5 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0	2.1 2.2 2.4 2.4 1.8 1.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 0.6	
SECONDEST SECO			2 0 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	50 100 100 1100 1000 1000 1000 1000 100	2.5 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0	2.1 2.2 2.4 2.4 2.8 1.8 1.8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3	2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
EL DOUGA RAID SIX DAY WAR WAR OF ATTRITION GOLOU- GOLOU- GOLON- GOLON-			0.4 0.8 0 8 0.0 0 2 0.0 4 1. 4 0.0 0	100 100 280 280 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 1	0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	2.56 2.1 2.56 2.88 1.2.2 1.2.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.6 0.6 0.6 4.0 0.6	2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
SIX DAY WAR WAR OF ATTRITION GOLULI GOLAN CONFLICT YOU KIPPURAN ENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID GULF WAR GOLUF WAR WAR OF ATTRITION DHOFAR REBELLION UAR UNION CONFLICT THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THEN THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR			4	100 55 5 5 0 0 0 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0	2.5 2.4 2.4 1.8 1.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 4.0 6.6	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
WAR OF ATTRITION 24-Feb GOLAN CONFLICT 01-Mar YOM KIPPUR WAR 05-Oct BEIRUT OFFENSIVE 09-Un- GULF WAR 18-Jan- GULF WAR 28-Jul- MOUNT SCOPUS I 22-Aug- WAR OF ATTRITION 22-Aug- WAR OF ATTRITION 22-Aug- WAR OF ATTRITION 22-Aug- PLO-JORDANIAN WAR 22-Sep YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egypt) 11-Oct YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egypt) 16-Oct YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egypt) 16-Oct YOM KIPPUR SE WAR 15-Mar MEKONG RIVER SHELLING 15-Mar MEKONG RIVER SHELLING 02-Jan- LEBANESE SHELLING 02-Jan- CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (ii) (in Sudan) 10-Sep CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (ii) (in Sudan) 10-Sep CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (ii) (in Sudan) 10-Sep CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (ii) (in Sudan) <t< td=""><td></td><td></td><td>ω ω ω ω ω ω τ α α α 4 - α α 4 - τ 4 α α</td><td>5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5</td><td>0.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0</td><td>2.5 2.4 1.8 1.2 18.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 4.0 6.4</td><td>1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2</td></t<>			ω ω ω ω ω ω τ α α α 4 - α α 4 - τ 4 α α	5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5	0.1 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0	2.5 2.4 1.8 1.2 18.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 4.0 6.4	1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
GOLAN CONFLICT O1-Mar- YOM KIPPUR WAR O6-Og- BEIRUT OFFENSIVE O9-Jun- ENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID O9-Jun- PALESTINE WAR S-Ap- BATTIRI INCIDENT 22-Aug- WAR OF ATTRITION 22-Aug- COM KIPPUR WAR (In Egypt) 1-Og- YOM KIPPUR WAR (IN Egypt) 1-Og- YOM KIPPUR WAR 1-Og- YOU KIPPUR WAR 1-Og- YOM KIPPUR WAR 1-Og- YOU KI			2 2 2 3 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	5 2 2 0 1 1000 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0.0 2.0 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	2.4 1.8 1.8 1.8.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 4.0 4.0	1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1
YOM KIPPUR WAR 06-Oct-Oct-OFENSIVE 09-Jun-OFENSIVE 09-Jun-OFENSIVE 09-Jun-OFENSIVE 09-Jun-OFENSIVE 09-Jun-OFENSIVE 09-Jun-OFENSIVE 09-Jun-OFENSIVE 09-Jun-OFENSIVE 18-Jun-OFENSIVE 18-Jun-OFENSIVE 26-Apr-OFENSIVE 26-Apr-OFENSIVE 26-Apr-OFENSIVE 26-Aug-OFENSIVE 27-Aug-OFENSIVE 27-Aug-			2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	3000 0 0 0 1 000 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	28 1.8 1.22 18.7 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 4.0 4.0	2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1
ENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID GULF WAR GULF	7 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9		2 6 6 6 7 2 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7	2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	12.2 18.7 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.6 4.0	1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BEINUI OFFENSIVE GOLENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID GOLENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID GOLENTE WAR RATTRI INCIDENT CALQILYA RAID MOUNT SCOPUS I WAR OF ATTRITION DHOFAR REBELLION UAR UNION CONFLICT PLO-JORDANIAN WAR PLO-JORDANIAN WAR WEDPUR WAR (IN EGypt) THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR CHEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II)	2 - 4 4 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6		2 2 2 4 - 2 2 3 - 1 4 4 2 2 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3	2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	200 200 200 4.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	1.8 11.2.2 18.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 4.0 6.4	1 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
ENTEBBE AIRPORT RAID GULF WAR PALESTINE WAR BATTIR INCIDENT GOLOUT SCOPUS I MOUNT SCOPUS I MOUNT SCOPUS I WAR OF ATTRITION UAR UNION CONFLICT PLO-JORDANIAN WAR YOM KIPPUR WAR (In Egypt) THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (I) (I) SUGAN) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (I) (I) SUGAN) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (I) SUGAN) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (II) SUGAN)	- 4 × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × × ×		2 2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	2.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	122 18.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 4.0	2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
GULF WAR PALESTINE WAR BATTINE WAR BATTINE INCIDENT GALGILYA RAIDEN MOUNT SCOPUS I THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE	2 2 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5		2 2 2 2 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1000 4 4 4 4 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0.0 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	18.7 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 4.0	2
PALESTINE WAR BATTIR INCIDENT OALGILYA RAID MOUNT SCOPUS I MOUNT SCOPUS I MOUNT SCOPUS I MOUNT SCOPUS I MAR OF ATTRITION UNAR OF REBELLION UNAR KIPPUR WAR (IN SYGN) YOM KIPPUR WAR (IN SYGN) THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR MEKONG RIVER SHELLING THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR PALESTINE WAR ILLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (IN SUGAN)	2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3		2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 1 1 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	10000 4 4 40 100 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	2.9 4.0 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.6 0.6 4.0 6.0	1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
BATTIR INCIDENT OALGILYA RAID MOUNT SCOPUS I WAR OF ATTRITION DHOFAR REBELLION UAR UNION CONFLICT PLO-JORDANIAN WAR YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Synt) THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR T	6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0		2 2 - 4 - 7 4 2 2 2 - 1 4 2 2 2 2 2 - 1 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	46 100 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0.3 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.6 4.0 6.6	2 2 2 2 1
MOUNT SCOPUS I MOUNT SCOPUS I WAR OF ATTRITION DHOFAR REBELLION UAR UNDU CONFLICT FIG. SYRA) YOM KIPPUR WAR (In SYRA) YOM KIPPUR WAR (In SYRA) YOM KIPPUR WAR (In SYRA) THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THEBANESE SHELLING CEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (In SUGAN) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (IN SUGAN) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (IN SUGAN)	20000		2004-004-1400	4.0 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.6 4.0	1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1
WAR OF ATTRITION DHOFAR REBELLION UAR UNION CONFLOT THIND INDO-CHINESE WAR THEN IN	2000		704-757	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0.3 0.3 0.6 4.0	2.2.2.1
MOUNT SCOPUS I WAR OF ATTRITION DHOFAR REBELLION UAR UNION CONFLICT TO AN KIPPUR WAR (in Syria) TO AN KIPPUR WAR (in Syria) TO WAR KIPPUR WAR (in Syria) THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD I	2000		2 2 2 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0.3 0.3 0.6 4.0	1 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1
WAR OF ATTRITION DHOFAR REBELLION UAR UNION CONFLICT PLO-JORDANIAN WAR PLO-JORDANIAN WAR YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Synt) THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	- 10 C - 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10		2 2 2 - 1 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	0.4 0.5 0.6 4.0	1 2 2 2 1
DHOFAR REBELLION UAR UNION CONFLOT PLO-JOANIAN WAR YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Syria) YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egyri) YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egyri) YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egyri) THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (I) SURANIAN CIVIL WAR (I) (In Sudan) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) CHADIAN WAR CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (In Sudan)	10 - 0 0 10 99 - 99		- S S + - 1 + 4 S C	0 0 0 0 0 0	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0	0.3 0.6 4.0	2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
UAR UNION CONFLICT PLO-JORDANIAN WAR YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Syria) YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egypt) THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR HITHID INDO-CHINESE WAR PALESTINE WAR ITHIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR FALESTINE WAR CEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) LIBYAN-CHADIAN WAR CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan)			2 2 2 1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	0 0 10 0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	6.6 4.0 4.0	2.2.2.2.1
PLO-JORDANIAN WAR PLO-JORDANIAN WAR YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egypt) THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR MEKONG RIVER SHELLING THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR PALESTINE WAR LEBANESE SHELLING CHEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan)	0 - 7 10 10 10		104-74 Q	0 0 0 0 0	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	6.6 4.0 4.0	
PLO-JOHOANIAN WAH YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egyat) THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THERD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR T			1 1 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	0 10 0	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	6.6 4.0 4.0	2 2 2 1
YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Syria) YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egypt) THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR LEBANESE SHELLING CEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) LIBYAN-CHADIAN WAR CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan)			4 4	.0 .0 .0	0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0	4.0	2 2 2
YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Egypt) THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR MEKONG RIVER SHELLING THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR PALESTINE WAR LEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (IN SUGAN)			1 4 4	10 0	0.8 0.0	4.0	1
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR MEKONG RIVER SHELLING THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR FALESTINE WAR LEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) LIBYAN-CHADIAN WAR CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan)			2	0	0.0		-
MEKONG RIVER SHELLING THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR LEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) LIBYAN-CHADIAN WAR CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan)			2		0.0		-
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR FALESTINE WAR LEBANESE SHELLING CHEANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) in Sudan) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) in Sudan) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) in Sudan)			4 2		0.0		1
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR PALESTINE WAR LEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II)			2	0			1
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR PALESTINE WAR LEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) LIBYAN-CHADIAN WAR CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan)		a constant	c	0	2. N. S.	The feet of the fall the same	-
PALESTINE WAR LEBANESE SHELLING LEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (IN SUdan)		200	V	100	0.1	0.5	
LEBANESE SHELLING LEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) LIBYAN-CHADIAN WAR CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan)				200	3.0		
LEBANESE SHELLING CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) LIBYAN-CHADIAN WAR CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan)			4	0	0.0	0.4	က
CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) LIBYAN-CHADIAN WAR CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan)	in Constitution		.	0	0.0		
LIBYAN-CHADIAN WAR CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan) CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan)	Section 2		And the second of the second s	60	17	Mark School Services	Mandaloren (1923)
CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan)	0 / C - 10 C C C C C C C C C	district to	-	0000	/	50.4	
CHADIAN CIVIL WAR (II) (in Sudan)	7061-de0-11			200	2.	E STORY	
	_		တ	0	0.0		2
	80 15-Nov-198	1 569	-	900	0.5	103.5	2
LIBYAN BORDER CLASH 16-Jul-1977	25-Jul-1		2	30	3.0		2
TANZANIAN-UGANDAN WAR (in Uganda) 09-N	- Tue 6	AND SOLE		200	6.7		
Constitution And constitution of the first c	084 15 May 1084	A BRITANTANDONAL		0		6.4	0
	504 13- 144 40E9	1000	7	0	0.0		
			A CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF TH				Same and the Land
KOMEAN WAH	,	***************************************	-	0	0.0		
239 FENAMO INSURGENCY 15-Apr-1987				4	0.0	0.7	
AGACHER RAIDS		გ დ	c۷	0	0.0	1.1	
241 AGACHER BATTLE	30-Dec-198	2	1	8	5.0	-	-
MAURITANIA-SENEGAL		-	4	0	0.0	1 0.7	_
anish Sahara)	2			1000	0.7	0.1	
PEITASHAN AFFAIR	47 15-Jul-1948			30	0.1		
				0	0.0	1.0	3
.5		3	-	100	4.5	0.8	3
15		77		En		60	, k
	7.0 CO 000 100	17	1	3000			
	vo cep-188	08/6		0000	+.4	7.0	- 1
249 FIRST SHABA INVASION 08-Apr-19	77 22-May-197	7 45	_	0	0.0	3.2	

251 Netherlands	0,			ô			たいでなる。 ではいい はいない はいない はいかい ないかい はいかい はいかい はいかい は	400	7
_	10 10 10 10 10		-	3		· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	Action Comments of the Comment	3	2.
_		က	0	83	DPRK		6		ج. ن.
253 Netherlands		0	0	88	Indonesia	61.0			4 -1.2
			0	83	Indonesia (Republicans)	61.0 1	0	152 -2.4	
100 3	2.0			8	DPRK		6		
	2.0		9 0	20	DPRK		6		-2.4
6	2.0		9 0	20	Indonesia	91.0			
_	2.0		9 0	20	Malaysia (MPABA)	56.4 5	9 0		
259 New Zealand	2.0	9	9 0	8	Rep. Of Vietnam (VC & DRV)	25.9 4	4		
	52.6	5	4	171	Costa Rica (National Liberation	4rm; 20.3 5	œ		(Special services
1	47.2	2	-	171	Honduras	57.8	T 0		-0.1
	50.4 1	_	-	171	Honduras	55.0 1	-		-0.2 -0.1
263 Nigeria	57.3		2	151	Chad	77.0 1	1 3		
	49.3	-	2 5	151	Sierra Leone	79.3	1 4	Vincent and and and	
2.3.4			9 1	143	lraq	40.3	1 6	143	0.0
Oman			1 6	143	Saudi Arabia	69.8 5	9 0	143	0.0
Oman			4 6	143	Yemen People's Republic	83.8 5	1		
	. 0.69	-	1 6	147	Afghanistan	75.9 1	1 6		
			7	147	Burma (Myanmar)	36.6 5			
		5	2 6	147	India	79.9 5	9 0	ATATOMETIC:222	CARPOLICA CONTRACTOR
i i	84.6		9	147	India	722 1	9 0		
- 5	84.6	1	1 6	147	India	72.2 1	9 0	arii (Carlanda)	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000
273 Pakistan	84.6		-	147	India	72.2	9 0		
-	84.6	+	-	147	India	72.2 1	9 0	Catholic Handle	the state of
275 Pakistan	79.3			147	India	68.5 4	9 0		
-	79.3	-	1 6	147	India	65.9 1	9 0	200000000000000000000000000000000000000	0.5 0.8
277 Pakistan	0:69		9	147	India	55.9	9 0		
		5	0	147	Kashmir		6		
×19		φ.		179	Ecuador	40.7			0,2 0,4
	. 18.1	1	1 2	179	Ecuador	19.8	1 2	Application of the Park	SERVICE
	28.1		80 (128	DPRK		5	091	ر د د
	. 28.1	1	φ.	128	DPRK :		6	TO SECURE	27.000
2774 92545	29.0			195	MPLA)	64.3			
284 Porugai	38.1	_	ا 6	195	Angola (MPLA, FNLA, UPA)	64.3	ا ع		
	20. U		- C	185		715			
ä.	29.0		- *-	195	Cimia	77.5 4			6.0
7	38.1		1 6	195	Guinea (PAIGC)	91.4	1	-decis sketchen	and the state of t
289 Portugal	38.1		9	195	Guinea (PAIGC)	91.4	-		ă.
	29.0	-	1 6	195	Guinea (PAIGC)	91.4	2 3		
	38.1	_	9 -	195	Mozambique (FRELIMO)	92.3 1	0 3		
87	29.0	-	1 6	195	Mozambique (FRELIMO)	92.3 1	0	143 -2	-2.6 0.9
22			9	195	Mozambique (FHELIMU)	92.3	5		
294 Galar Sociological	20.5	4	o •		banrain Necessity	40.27	٥		
W.		.		2	Compedie	70.0	9		
230 Nep. Of Victors		o u	- -	180	Cambodia O/C & Cambodian B	7.20 J	9 -		
eri		- C	- u	3 5		44 0 A	- r		, t
8.	0.00		0	200	Ormia Dem Den Of Vietnem	t 6.44	·	200	 0.0
ď	COLON	Control of the Contro	とのなっていまない。 とくている	The second secon	merial III (latham	The County of th	CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY OF		Contract of the Contract of th

251 KOREAN WAR 24-Oct-18 252 KOREAN WAR 27-May-1 253 KOREAN WAR 25-May-1 254 INDONESIAN WAR 25-Oct-18 255 KOREAN WAR 25-Jan-16 256 CONFRONTATION 04-Sep-11 257 CONFRONTATION 04-Sep-11 259 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 21-Jun-19 260 QUESADA OCCUPATION 17-Apr-19 261 MOCOBAN SEIZURE 25-Apr-19 262 CIFUENTES INCIDENT 14-Apr-19 263 LAKE CHAID SKIRMISHES 22-Apr-19 264 NPFL INVASION 12-Apr-19 265 GULE WAR 12-Apr-19 266 GULE WAR 22-Apr-19 267 DHOFAR REBELLION 22-Apr-19 268 TAUNGERO RAID 22-Apr-19 270 KASHMIRI RAID 25-Jun-16 271 RASHMIRI RAID 25-Apr-19 272 SUBMA RIVER SKIRMISHES 07-Aug-11 273 SUBMA RIVER SKIRMISHES<	1950 1962 1962 1961 1951 1955 1965 1965 1965 1965 1965	27-Jul-1953 27-Jul-1953 (5-Aug-1962 02-Nov-1949 02-Jul-1953 27-Jul-1960 30-Jul-1960 08-Dec-1971 21-Apr-1948 05-May-1957 11-Jul-1983 05-May-1957 11-Jul-1983 06-Coct-1991 28-Coct-1991	1008 1 793 1 140 1 1470 1 291 1 708 1 735 1	60 60 0 400 20	0.1 0.0 0.3 0.0	9.8
KOREAN WAR WEST IRIAN CONFLICT (in West Inan) INDONESIAN WAR KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR CONFAN INSURGENCY SECOND INDO CHINESE WAR QUESADA OCCUPATION MOCORAN SEIZURE CIFUENTES INCIDENT LAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES CIFUENTES INCIDENT CAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES CIFUENTES INCIDENT CANINGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KÜTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES TÄÜNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KÜTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES TÄÜNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KÜTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES TÄÜNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KÜTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES TÄÜNGBRO LÄUNG TÄÜNG KASHMIRI SHELLING TÄÄNG KÄSHMIRI SHELLING TÄÄNGALI CIVIL WAR	1962 1962 1945 1951 1954 1956 1965 1991 1991 1991 1995 1995 1956 1959 1959	5-Aug 1962 22-Nov-1949 22-Nov-1949 77-Jul-1966 90-Jul-1960 90-Jul-1960 90-Jul-1960 11-Apr-1948 5-May-1962 1-Jul-1963 1-Dec-1991 18-Dec-1991 18-Dec-1991 18-Dec-1991	793 1 140 1 1470 1 911 1 788 1 1735 1	60 0 400 20	0.1 0.3 0.3	9.8
WEST IRIAN CONFLICT (in West Irian) INDONESIAN WAR KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR CONFRONTATION MALAYAN INSURGENCY SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR GUESADA OCCUPATION MOCORAN SEIZURE CIFLENTES INCIDENT CIFLENTES INCIDENT CIFLENTES INCIDENT CIFLENTES INCIDENT CAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES CIFLENTINASION MOCORAN SEIZURE DHOFAR REBELLION RASHMIRI RAID KASHMIRI RAID KASHMIRI RAID KASHMIRI RAID RAIN KÜTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES INDO-PAKISTANI WAR INDO-PAKISTANI WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING	1962 1945 1951 1951 1966 1965 1983 1991 1991 1991 1995 1956 1956 1956	5-Aug 1962 22-Nov-1949 77-Jul-1953 77-Jul-1963 77-Jul-1960 60-Jul-1960 60-Jul-1962 7-Jul-1963 7-Jul-1963 1-Dec-1991 81-Dec-1964 81-Dec-1991 81-Dec-1991	140 1 1470 1 911 1 788 1 707 1	0 400 2 0	0.0 0.3 0.0	9.8
KÖREAN WAR KÖREAN WAR KÖREAN WAR KOREAN WAR CONFRON WAR MALAYAN INSURGENCY SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR OUESADA OCCUPATION MOCOBAN SEIZURE CIFUENTES INCIDENT CAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES NPFL INVASION OULE WAR OULE WAR CHURAIMI GASIS SEIZURE DHOFAR GASIS SEIZURE DHOFAR GASIS SEIZURE CHAN WAR TAUNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES INDO-PAKISTANI WAR INDO-PAKISTANI WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING BROALI CIVIL WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING BROALI CIVIL WAR	445 551 551 555 555 557 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562 562	2-Nov-1949 7-Jul-1953 7-Jul-1953 7-Jul-1960 17-Jul-1960 18-Dec-1971 17-Aug-1966 17-Jul-1967 17-Jul-1965 17-Jul-1965 17-Jul-1965 17-Jul-1965 17-Jul-1965 17-Jul-1965 17-Jul-1965 17-Jul-1965 17-Jul-1965 18-Feb-1991	911 1 788 1 707 1	400	0.3	
KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR CONFRONTATION MALAYAN INSURGENCY SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR QUESADA OCCUPATION MOCORAN SEIZURE CIFUENTES INCIDENT LAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES NPFL INVASION GULE WAR BURAIMI OASIS SEIZURE BURAIMI OASIS SEIZURE BURAIMI AAID KASHMIRI RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES INDO-PAKISTANI WAR INDO-PAKISTANI WAR INDO-PAKISTANI WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING BENGALI CIVIL WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING	551 551 551 555 555 557 557 551 551 552 558 558 558 558 558 558	7.7.ul.1963 7.7.ul-1963 1.7.ul-1960 10.0.ul-1960 8.Dec-1971 11. Apr-1948 15.May-1957 4.Aug-1962 11. Dec-1991 8.Feb-1991 8.Feb-1995	911 788 707 1735	8	0.0	
KOREAN WAR CONFRONTATION MALAYAN INSURGENCY SECOND INDO CHINESE WAR SECOND INDO CHINESE WAR MOCOBAN SEIZURE CIFUENTES INCIDENT LAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES NPFL INVASION GULE WAR BURAIMI OASIS SEIZURE BURAIMI OASIS SEIZURE BURAIMI OASIS SEIZURE TAUNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES IRIPURA SKIRMISHES INDO-PAKISTANI WAR INDO-PAKISTANI WAR INDO-PAKISTANI WAR INDO-PAKISTANI WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING	551 564 565 565 567 607 607 608 608 608 608 608 608 608 608 608 608	77-Jul-1953 17-Jul-1966 10-Jul-1960 18-Dec-1971 11-Apr-1948 15-May-1957 17-Jul-1993 11-Dec-1991 18-Feb-1991 18-Feb-1991	707 1	The state of the s	The state of the s	AND THE LOCAL TONIANT WITH THE STATE STATE OF THE STATE OF
CONFRONTATION MALAYAN INSURGENCY SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR QUESADA OCCUPATION MOCORAN SEIZURE CIFLENTES INCIDENT CASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES THIPURA SKIRMISH	264 265 265 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267 267	1-Aug-1966 10-Jul-1960 18-Dec-1971 11-Apr-1948 15-May-1957 1-Jul-1993 11-Dec-1991 10-Dec-1991 18-Feb-1991	707 1	20	0.0	
MALAYAN INSURGENCY SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR QUESADA OCCUPATION MOCORAN SEIZURE CIFUENTES INCIDENT VAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES NUCLE WAR BURAIMI OASIS SEIZURE DHOFAR REBELLION AFGHAN WAR TÄUNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES THIPURA SKIRMISHES TIMIPURA SKIRMISHES THIPURA SK	555 567 567 567 567 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 568 568	00-Jul-1960 00-Jul-1960 00-Jul-1948 00-Jul-1962 1-Jul-1963 11-Dec-1991 10-Dec-1991 10-Dec-1991 10-Dec-1991 10-Dec-1991 10-Dec-1991 10-Dec-1991 10-Dec-1991	1735 1	0	0.0	14.0
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR QUESADA OCCUPATION MOCORAN SEIZURE CIFUENTES INCIDENT LAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES GULE WAR BURAIMI OASIS SEIZURE DHOFAR REBELLION AFGHAN WAR TAUNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES	55 448 657 667 683 683 672 672 672 673 673 674 674 674 674 674 674 674 674 674 674	6 Dec 1971 11 - Apr - 1948 5 May - 1957 5 May - 1962 1-Jul - 1963 11 - Dec - 1991 10 - Be - 1991 8 - Feb - 1995 6 - Cet - 1955	3	20	0.0	5.4
QUESADA OCCUPATION MOCOBAN SEIZURE CIFUENTES INCIDENT LAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES NOFEL INVASION NPFL INVASION TAUNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES THIPURA SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES T	448 895 895 991 991 995 559 559 559 559 559 559 5	11-Apr-1948 15-May-1957 4-Aug-1962 1-Jul-1983 11-Dec-1991 18-Feb-1991 6-Oct-1955	2332	40	0'0	
MOCORAN SEIZURE CIFUENTES INCIDENT LAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES NOPEL INVASION NPFL INVITED NPFL	607 962 962 991 993 995 995 995 995 995 995 995 995 995	6-May-1957 4-Aug-1962 1-Jul-1983 11-Dec-1991 8-Feb-1991 6-Oct-1955	5 1	0	0.0	
CIFLENTES INCIDENT LAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES NPFL INVASION NPFL INVASION NPFL INVASION GULE WAR GULE WAR FRIELLION FRAMINI RAID FRAN WAR TAUNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES INDO-PAKISTANI WAR INDO-PAKISTANI WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING	962 883 991 972 972 955 956 962	4-Aug-1962 1-Jul-1983 11-Dec-1991 8-Feb-1991 6-Oct-1955		. 40	3.6	
LAKE CHAD SKIRMISHES NPFL INVASION GULE WAR TAUNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES INDO-PAKISTANI WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING	823 191 191 195 195 195 195 195 195 195 195	1-Jul-1983 11-Dec-1991 8-Feb-1991 6-Oct-1955 4-May-1972	1 2	4	4.0	1.7 1
ACHE WASION GULE WAR GULE WAR GULE WAR BURAINI OASIS SEIZURE BUPOTAR REBELLION AFGHAN WAR TAUNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES INDO-PAKISTANI WAR INDO-PAKISTANI WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING RASHMIRI SHELLING BENGALI CIVIL WAR	991 5991 555 972 985 956 958	11-Dec-1991 8-Feb-1991 6-Oct-1955 4-May-1972	40	6	0.2	4.2
GULE WAR BURAIMI OASIS SEIZURE DHOFAR REBELLION AFGHAN WAR TAUNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RAINI KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES	991 555 985 985 985 986 962	8-Feb-1991 6-Oct-1955 4-May-1972	234 1	0	0.0	1.1
BURAIMI OASIS SEIZURE DHOFAR REBELLION AFGHAN WAR TAUNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RAINI KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES ITRIPURA SKIRMISH SHELLING	155 972 985 959 959 958 962	6-Oct-1955 4-May-1972	5	0	0.0	6.6
DHOFAR REBELLION AFGHAN WAR TAUNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES ITRIPURA SKIRMISHES INDO-PASTANI WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING BROGALI CIVIL WAR	972 985 959 956 958	4-May-1972	-	0	0.0	
AFGHAN WAR TÄÜNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURWA RIVER SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES KÄSHMIRI SHELLING BENGALI CIVIL WAR	985 959 951 958 962	The second secon	20 3	0	0.0	
TÁUNGBRO RAID KASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES INDO-PAKISTANI WAR KÁSHMIRI SHELLING BENGALI CIVIL WAR		04-Oct-1985	5	0	0.0	ard an arrand abradamente abadre est anna 20-mail adulacionida
KASHMIRI RAID RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES INDO-PAKISTANI WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING BENGALI CIVIL WAR	951 956 958 962	21-Aug-1959	1	0	0.0	2.0
RANN KUTCH CONFLICT SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES (TRIPURA SKIRMISHES INDO-PAKISTANI WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING BENGALI CIVIL WAR	956 958 962	25-Jun-1951	1		0.0	1.0
SURMA RIVER SKIRMISHES TRIPURA SKIRMISHES INDO-PAKISTANI WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING BENGALI CIVIL WAR	958 962 964	18-Mar-1956	4	101	10,0	6.0
TRIPURA SKIRMISHES INDO-PAKISTANI WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING BENGALI CIVIL WAR	962 964	26-Aug-1958	20 2		0.3	0.8
INDO-PAKISTANI WAR KASHMIRI SHELLING BENGALI CIVIL WAR	h-1964	17-Oct-1962	22	0	0.0	0.9
KASHMIRI SHELLING BENGALI CIVIL WAR		9-Nov-1965	638 2	2000	3.1	0.9
BENGALI CIVIL WAR	9-May-1967	9-May-1967	1	0	0.0	1.8
		7-Nov-1972	571 2	2000	3.5	1.2
SIACHEN GLACIER	38-Jun-1984	21-Aug-1990	2266 2	8	0.0	1.2
KASHMIRI WAR	_	01-Jan-1949	293 1	0	0.0	
GUALINGO RAIDS	39-Aug-1951	14-Aug-1951	9	0	0.0	1.3
PAQUISHA INCIDENT	_	02-Feb-1981	6 3	-	0.2	1.0
KOREAN WAR		27-Jul-1953	1043	8	0.0	
KOREAN WAR	36-Nov-1950	27-Jul-1953	995 1	20	0.1	
∵ 1	n-1968	5-Nov-1969	508	0	0:0	2.7
ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR		0-Nov-1975	5627 1	4000	0.7	2.0 1
18.44		25-Apr-1974	2837 2	- 10	0.0	2.3
MACAO BORDER DUELS		30-Jul-1952	2	5	2.5	
ANGOLAN INSURGENCY		08-Jun-1966	13	0	0.0	2.2
PAIGC INSURGENCY (in Senegal)		08-Apr-1963	1	0	0.0	3.7 1
(in Senegal)	0-Feb-1965	12-Oct-1972	2802	0	0'0	4.4
	ıy-1969 (04-Jun-1969	12 3	0	0.0	5.8 1
	1-1964	25-Jun-1975	3900	4000	1.0	1.8
MOZAMBIQUE INSURGENCY (in Malawi)	C Constitution of the Cons	25-Apr-1974	2736 2	5	0.0	1.9
MOZAMBIQUE INSURGENCY (In Tanzania)		14-Apr-1972	9		1.0	2.5
AL-DIBAL INCIDENI	986	26-Apr-1986	1 2	0	0.0	1.8
DESERT STORM		31-Jan-1991	2		0.5	20.8
STRUNG TRENG	5-Jun-1958 (1-Jul-1958	7	0	0.0	
4.0	y-1960	0-Jun-1976	5517 2	2000	6.0	
	1-1974	9-Jan-1974	1 2	က	3.0	
299 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR 30-Jun	i-1961	0-Apr-1975	5053	8	0'0	

NON	NUM INTERVEN	1	ILITSO	ICOUP IC	Thoi os:	r Target			SO TCOUP	TCSO	TCULT	DIF	YOUF
င္တ	POK	29.4		• •	174	A A	Control of the Contro		O		160	0	CJ.
302	ROK	12.4	_	-	174	DPRK			6	`	160	0	.2
303	POK	6.2	2	1	174	DPRK			6				7
9	ROK	21.5	4	1	174	Rep. Of Vietna	am (VC & DRV)	25.9 4	4	-	10 m		8
92	Saudi Arabia	37.6		9 0	143	Iraq		40.3		9			0
306	Saudi Arabia	75.8	2	9 0	143	Israel	a internal reference dans de discourse des des des designados de la composição de la compos	15.8		entragement of the state of the state of the	Sold and the second second	Total Allen	
202	Saudi Arabia	54.3	*	9 0	143	Israel		12.1		CAMPAGE AND STREET			
308	Saudi Arabia	56.9	4	0	143	Yemen Arab Repub	Sepublic	86.3 5	PostOverASA to hear shows all and the second		Opening January Commen	The state of the s	0.
60	Senegal	94.4		1	151	Gambia		94.0					0
310	Senegal	94.4	-	1 3	151	Gambia	N. Ordered for antimetra specific broaded and controlled and contr	94.0	-				0:
311	Senegal	67.9		1	151	Gambia (San)	ang Rebels)	79.9	3				0
312	Senegal	61.7	-	1 4	151	Guinea-Bissat	I	63.5 1	-				0.
313	Senegal	219		1	151	Mauntania		0.99	2				0
314	Somalia	83.1	-	3 3	134	Ethiopia	n antipologicoscopies (20) (filtred VVV deconsections on title	95.8 1	-				0:
315	Somalia	83.1	1	1	134	Ethiopia		37.6	3				0
316	Somalia	83.1	-	1 3	134	Ethiopia		37.6 1	-				0.
317	Somalia	83.1	_	1	<u>\$</u>	Kenya		52.9 1	-				0
318		75.9	-	2 4	134	Kenya		31.0 1	-	4	CALLY CO. W. SERVING	1.8 0	0.
6	-	24.3	2	9 0	99	Angola		64.3	1				9.
20		43.0	-	9 0	26	DPRK			6			COCCUPATION AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON ADDRESS OF THE PERSON AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON ADDRESS OF THE PERSON ADDRESS OF THE PERSON AND ADDRESS OF THE	1.8
321	South Africa	43.0		9 0	56	DPRK			6				8
322	South Africa	24.3	2	9 0	56	Namibia (SW/	\PO)	61.6 1	6		200420000000000000000000000000000000000		1.5
eg eg	South Africa	24.3	2	9 0	99	Namibia (SW/	VPO)	61.6	6				1.5
24	South Africa	24.3	2 0	9 0	56	Namibia (ZANU)	u)	61.6 1	6			AND CARRY	1.5
325	South Africa	24.3	2	9 0	99	Zimbabwe (Z/	(NC)	24.7	0	e,			ro.
326	Spain	13.3	-	9 0	136	Morocco		86.2 1	-	9		HONGO HANDE	0.1
327	Spain	7.6	_	9 0	136	Morocco		78.6	ဇ				3
328	Spain	13.3	-	9 0	136	Morocco (AOI	(-	86.2 1	-			Market S	0.1
3	Spain	13.3		9	136	Morocco (AC)			1	י מ			3
330	Sudan	70.1	5	e .	134	Ethiopia		37.6 2	က	Z Szillaki Kataliki			0.0
3 3 8	Sugan	8.7 		* (45.	Uganda		51.7	•	.			7
332	Syria	35.5		۰ م -	143	iraq		40.3	-	0 (
3	Syria	35.5 0		9	143	raq		40.3		9			2 -
+ C	Sylid	03.0 04 p	o a	- *	54. 64.	Israel		2.1.2	- •				
ှ ၁ ဗ ၁ ဗ	Syrie	01.0 70.7	n u	+ · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	247	Israel		188 5	-				
337	Syria	70.5	, ·	- - -	₹ 148	Srael		15.8	- -				
338	Syria	70.5	animodelineate CVCC	1	143	Israel		15.8 1	-		C September 1	TO PERSONAL PROPERTY OF THE PERSONAL PROPERTY	-
339	Syria	70.5		4 1	143	Israel		15,8 1	+				Į.
340	Syria	70.5	-	4	143	Israel		15.8 1	-				.
¥	Syria	. 60.0		3 6	143	Israel		12,1	-				Ψ.
342	Syria	0.09	-	4 6	143	Israel		12.1 1	-		THE STREET	274000	1.1
323	Syria	0.09		. 4	143	Israel		12.1	-				-
344	Syria	60.0	-	3 6	143	Israel		12.1 1	-		79 1.	1.9	1.1
8	Syria	90.0		3	143	Jordan		49.2 4	-	9			0.
346	Syria	70.5		4 1	143	Lebanon		41.5 4	8		20,000	SEAR OF	0.0
8	Syria	46.2	ς,	9	143	Lebanon (Ret	oel Groups)	13.9 2	3	9			9.
348	Tanzania	63.8	4	1	143	Burundi		100.0 5	-				0.0
349	Tanzania	1:4	2	7	143	Mozambique	(Renamo)	72.4		4			01
320	Tanzania	65.2	4	2	143	Uganda		61.2 4	က	က			0.0

以上一次中心一次中心一次是一次一次的一次一次一次一次一次一次一次一次一次一次一次一次一次一次一次一次						The second secon	
KOREAN CONFLICT	13-Apr-1967	05-Dec-1970	1333	5	10	0.0	
KOREAN CONFLICT	05-Aug-1976	05-Aug-1976		7	0	0.0	
	10-Oct-1965	27-Jan-1973	2667		4000	1.5	The parties for the parties of the p
305 GULF WAR	17-Jan-1991	28-Feb-1991	43	3		0.2	7.8
	19-Oct-1948	20-Oct-1948	2	-	0	0.0	and a that deed a booken door door to be the factor of the
YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Syna)	12-Oct-1973	24-Oct-1973	13		2	0.2	1.6
NAJRAN AIR RAIDS	14-Jan-1970	14-Jan-1970	-	က	0	0.0	
SENEGALESE RAID	31-Jan-1971	31-Jan-1971	_	2	0	0.0	1.3
SENEGALESE RAIDS	10-Jul-1974	24-Jul-1974	15	7	0	0.0	1.2
SANYANG COUP	31-Jul-1981	07-Aug-1981	8		10	1.3	1.3
CASHEU DISPUTE	18-May-1990	21-May-1990	4	4	0	0.0	1.7
MAURITANIA-SENEGAL	09-Jan-1990	02-Mar-1991	418	,	0	0.0	1.4
314 OGADEN SKIRMISHES	20-Nov-1963	09-Apr-1964	142	2	50	9.0	4.5
OGADEN WAR	27-Jun-1977	14-Mar-1978	261	2	8000	30.7	3.1
OGADEN RAIDS	27-May-1980	17-Jul-1980	52	2	10	0.2	2.3
OGADEN WAR	27-Jun-1977	27-Jun-1977		2	7	7.0	
HARE-HARE INCIDENT	20-Sep-1989	20-Sep-1989	A Committee Control of the Control o	2	0	0.0	0.8
ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR	10-Jun-1975	31-Aug-1988	4832	2	200	0.1	4.9
KOREAN WAR	26-Nov-1950	27-Jul-1953	975	3	10	0.0	main a democratica de maior de describir de describir de describer de describer de describer de describer de d Se se
321 KOREAN WAR	09-Mav-1951	27-Jul-1953	811	.3	10	0.0	
ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR (in Angola)	11-Jul-1976	11-Jul-1976		2	AGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGGG	0.0	0.9
323 ANGOLAN CIVII WAR (In Zambia)	25-Allo-1978	27-Anr-1980	612	_	0	0.0	0.8
NAMIBIAN CONFLICT	04-Feb-1972	26-Anr-1989	6292		500	0.1	
325 BHODESIAN CIVII WAR	30-Nov-1979	30- lan-1980	62	Constitution and Constitution of the Constitut		0.0	The second secon
WESTERN SAHABAN REVOLT (in Morocco)	26-Nov-1957	28-Nov-1957		3	C C	2.00	37 1
POLISARIO REVOLT (in Spanish Sahara)	26-Jan-1974	08-Jan-1976	713	·	20	0.0	5.1
WESTERN SAHARAN REVOLT (in Ifni)	10-Aug-1957	01-Mar-1958	204	1	09	0.3	3.7
WESTERN SAHARAN REVOLT (in Spanish Sa	. 26-Nov-1957	01-Mar-1958	. 96		. 20	0.5	3.7
ERITREAN WAR (II)	10-Apr-1977	30-Jun-1977	82	4	0	0.0	24.3
MOYO RAIDS	15-Nov-1989	03-Feb-1990	81	3	0	0.0	1.5
GULF WAR (Saudi Arabia)	04-Feb-1991	04-Feb-1991	-	2	0	0.0	AURICO Mineral Decidera come
GULFWAR	24-Feb-1991	28-Feb-1991	Q		0	0.0	1.4
PALESTINE WAR	15-May-1948	13-Apr-1949	334	-	1000	3.0	dandadd addrin cine centr Y Froix (II) collection for Anna and Anna Anna and Anna Anna Anna A
335 SYRIA-ISRAEL CONFLICT	04-Apr-1951	09-May-1951	36	2	20	9.0	
KINNERET CONFLICT (I)	15-Mar-1954	11-Dec-1955	637	4	20	0.0	Najisho pospinjaga na injenjena di Oroki, an mata na indra moneya, na indrancarens e
BORDER SHELLING	09-Jul-1957	03-Dec-1958	513	4	0	0.0	
BEIT KATZIR CONFLICT	24-Jan-1960	12-Feb-1960	20	4	4	0.2	0.5
KINNERET CONFLICT (II)	01-Feb-1962	17-Mar-1962	45	4	38	- 2.0	0.5
SIX DAY WAR	07-Jun-1963	10-Jun-1967	1465	4	90	0.0	0.4
WAR OF ATTRITION	08-Dec-1969	27-Jun-1970	202	4	100	0.5	0.4
	02-Mar-1972	02-Mar-1972	-	က	0	0.0	0.4
GOLAN CONFLICT	10-Nov-1972	08-Jan-1973	09	4	2	0.1	0.4
YOM KIPPUR WAR	06-Oct-1973	24-Oct-1973	19	-	2000	105.3	0.4
345 PLOJORDANIAN WAR	19-Sep-1970	23-Sep-1970	5	-	82	20:0	1.6
UAR AGENTS CRISIS	18-Oct-1963	18-Oct-1963	, -	0	0	0.0	
LEBANESE CIVIL WAR	09-Apr-1976	22-May-1991	5522	1	2000	0.4	
TUTSI-HUTU VIOLENCE	12-Jul-1973	12-Jul-1973	-	2	0	0.0	1.0
	TO THE PARTY AND	A CONTRACTOR OF THE PROPERTY O	CONTRACTOR AND ACCORDING TO SECURITY AND ACCORDING TO SECURITY ACC		***************************************	***************************************	
BENAMO NSI BEENOX	DK.Mar-1987	11. lan_1088	404		Ş	T. U.	1

							22 min 20			The state of the s	The state of the s			
351	Tanzania	53.7		10 1 10 T	က	43	Uganda	57.2		က				0
_	Thailand	32.3	-	4		160	Cambodia	63.9		1		160	-1.3 0	0
353	Thalland	32.3				160	Camhodia	63.0		9				
e i	The less	71.5		An office of the A	1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1	3		30.00					d d	
1	en in Charles and a State of the Control of the Con	4.12	Allikostatianististeries Tomatik		۰٥	001	Cambodia	ADDRESS OF	Zerrijen en selent	4		Michigan	Character and the second	
င္သ		120			9		Cambodia		4	1				9
Į.	Thailand	9.3	-	3	9	160	Cambodia	71.2	_	1		Cambideen Park See	direct Code	0.
	Thailand	32.3				160	OPRK			O				0
	Thailand	32.3	-		-	160	DPRK			6				0.
329	Thalland	12.0	2		9	160	Laos	58.3	2	3				0:
360	Thailand	12.0	-	4	9	160	Laos	65.0	-	1 6				0.
361	Thailand	12.0		*	9	991	Laos	65.0		9				0
362	Thailand	12.0	-	-	9	160	Laos	58.3	2	1				0.0
363	Thailand	9.3		1	9	160	Laos	56.0	1	1	1			0'
364	Thailand	21.4	-		9	160	Laos (Pathet Lao)	. 2.79	4	-	9	To the first find the control of the	-1.9	0.0
	Thailand	21.4			9	160	Laos (Pathet Lao)	6.99	7	9				01
-	Thailand	21.4	-	-	Anthon industries in the	160	Rep. Of Vietnam (VC & DRV)	24.7	4		AND PROPERTY OF THE PARTY OF TH	Addenii Series (Ser	0	0.0
100	Tunisia	62.0			9	143	Israel	12.1	1	1				
	Turkey	61.9	1	0	-	155	OPRK		A SAMONE CHESTON CONTRACTOR	6	Andrew Control of Cont	A CONTRACTOR OF THE CONTRACTOR	400000000000000000000000000000000000000	0.1
369	Turkey	61.9		0	+	155	DPRK			6				0.1
	Turkey	54.0	1	3		155	Greece	19.6	-	-	3	The Mark is consecutive to		0.2
PET.	Turkey	39.7			9	155	Greece	15.6	1	,	3			0.2
ŝ	Uganda	53.6	2	2	3	143	Kenya	41.9	2	1	3	or scand post of the	protection of the control of the con	.2
	Uganda	61.2	4	3	3	143	Tanzania	65.2	Ŧ	2	3		-0.2	0.0
	Uganda	56.4	4	3	ဗ	143	Tanzania	53.7	_	-	•			0.0
, i	Uganda	65.1	_	0	9	143	Zaire	34.1	_	2				0.0
376	United Arab Emirates	23.3	4	0	မ	143	Iraq	40.3	_	٦	.			0.0
377	United Kingdom	2.0	ø	0	9	_	Aden Protectorate			o				2.4
378	United Kingdom	1.0	ဇ	0	9	-	Argentina		2	-	2		-	2.0
379	United Kingdom	2.0	3	0	ဖ	_	Belize (Belize Liberation Army)	13.4	-	6				3.0
380	United Kingdom	2.0	3	0	9	-	Cambodia	81.7	5	1	9	7	000000000000000000000000000000000000000	2.7
89	United Kingdom	3.0	က	0			Cyprus	24.1	_					27
382	United Kingdom	1.0	ဇ	0		-	Cyprus	11.0	-	4		2000	- Constanting	2.7
88	United Kingdom	3.0	ဗ	0			DPRK			6				2.7
384	United Kingdom	3.0	ဇ	0		-	DPRK		Electronic control of the control of	6		100	Necessary (2.7
ဋ	United Kingdom	2.0	8	•	9	-	Egypt	76.9	C)	_				2.4
386	United Kingdom	2.0	က	0	9	-	Indonesia	61.0	1	0		152	-2.4	-2.6
28	United Kingdom	7.O		o .			Indonesia	61.0						9
888	United Kingdom	2.0	დ .	0	9	1	Indonesia	61.0	-	-	-	Cart State Control	atta de de la constante de la	2.6
3	United Kingdom	0.1	8		9	_	Iraq	40.3	_		0			4.
390	United Kingdom	1.0	3	0	9		Iraq	40.3	1	-	9		CHECKLERIC	2.4
391	United Kingdom	2.0	8	0	ဖ	•	Israel (Arab Liberation Army, Z.	onist/22.5	ιO					 თ
392	United Kingdom	2.0	က	0	9	-	Jamaica (Henry Guerillas)	18.1	-					-0.6
283 3	United Kingdom	2.0	3	•	9	1	Kenya	80.5		0	9			, K
394	United Kingdom	2.0	က	0	9	-	Malaysia (MPABA)	63.3	5		9		127411111111111111111111111111111111111	2.5
395	United Kingdom	2.0	9	0	9		Malaysia (SUPP, SAYA, TNKU) 48.4	O	0	9	ŭ.		2.5
96 39	United Kingdom	2.0	3	0	9	-	Malaysia (TNKU)	48.4	5	outlications Steam to account	9		XXXXXXXXXX	2.5
397	United Kingdom	20	ဇ	0	9		Malaysia (TNKU)	48.4	2	0	9		6.	.25
398	United Kingdom	3.0	တ	0	9	-	Oman (DLF, NDF)			-	9	143	•	-2.4
399	United Kingdom	2.0	တ	0	9		Oman (Omani Imamate)					Ł7)		24
6	11-12-11 10-1-1			THE REPORT OF THE PARTY OF THE PERSON OF THE	A County Street and Associated assessment	一方 神道 間に 湯に 一時で	TO STATE STORE TO SEE AN ENGINEERING STATE OF THE STREET STATE STA	Action and the Park and Line and Land	Sales of the second second		The interest of the last the second	ARTHUR SECTION SECTIONS	STREET, STREET	SE SUBSEQUENCION DE SELECTION D

352 PREAH VIHEAR RAIDS 353 PREAH VIHEAR CLASHES 354 SECOND INDOCHINESE WAR 355 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 356 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR 357 KOREAN WAR 358 KOREAN WAR 359 MEKONG RIVER AID	11-Aug-1962 17-Nov-1965	15-Aug-1962	ı,	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			and Therefore, and could defend by the " of publication that had defended and	The second secon
PREALL VIHEAR CLASHES SECOND INDOCHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR MEKONG RIVER ARID	17-Nov-1965	,	,	N	>	9		
SECOND INDOCHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR	The second district of the second sec	27-Aor-1966	162	- 2	. 0	0.0		
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR MEKONG RIVER AIR RAID	0/8[- 10-[0	23-Jul-1970	23	3	0	0.0	nakobala standitonan ilikoloka kaliforta into 100 ti strollara	George enjetraçõe, australia es
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR MEKONG RIVER AIR RAID	20-Jul-1977	27-Jun-1979	708	3	. 2	0.0	A DOLLAR SECTION AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY OF	
KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR WEKONG BIVER AIR RAID	01-Apr-1983	15-Oct-1987	1659	4	20	0.0		da dise el eccolomagn un
KOREAN WAR MEKONG RIVER AIR RAID	07-Dec-1950	27-Jul-1953	964			0.1		
MEKONG RIVER AIR RAID	01-Jun-1951	27-Jul-1953	788	-	90	0.1		
	17-Nov-1975	17-Nov-1975		3	0	0.0		
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	03-Jan-1977	09-Feb-1977	38	4	0	0.0		
361 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	23-Dec-1978	24-Dec-1978	2	3	0	0.0		
THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	08-Feb-1981	08-Feb-1981	-	4	0	0.0		
363 THIRD INDO-CHINESE WAR	15-May-1984	19-Feb-1988	1376	2	100	0.1	1.9	
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR	23-Jun-1969	28-Jun-1969	9	-	0	0.0		
365 SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR	20-Mar-1970	27-Jan-1973	1045		8	0.1		
SECOND INDO-CHINESE V	19-Sep-1967	15-Apr-1972	1671	-	400	0.2		
YOM KIPPUR WAR (in Eavot)	18-Oct-1973	28-Oct-1973			0	0.0	0.3	
KOREAN WAR	12-Oct-1950	27-Jul-1953	1020	-	400	0.4		
KOREANWAR	29-Nov-1950	27~Jul-1953	972		8	0.4		
370 CYPRIOT CIVIL WAR (in Cyprus)	25-Dec-1963	09-Aug-1964	229	-	-	0.0	0.7	
371 TURCO-CYPRIOT WAR	20-Jul-1974	25-Oct-1974	- 88		1000	10.2	0.5	
MOMBASSA PORT BOYCOTT	01-Apr-1976	18-Apr-1976	18	2	0	0.0	0.8	
373 OBOTE'S RESISTANCE	23-Aug-1971	09-Nov-1971	79	2	99	9.0	1,5	
TANZANIAN-UGANDAN WAR	09-Oct-1978	30-Mar-1979	173	2	200	1.2	1.1	
375 CONGOLESE CIVIL WAR	15-Feb-1965	15-Feb-1965		2	1	1.0		
GULFWAR	24-Feb-1991	28-Feb-1991	5	-	9	1.2	20.3	
SOUTH ARABIAN REVOLT	15-Jun-1953	16-Oct-1959	2315		40	0'0		
FALKLANDS WAR (MALVINAS WAR)	25-Apr-1982	20-Jun-1982	57	-	300	5.3	1.9	
379 GUATEMALAN "INVASION"	21-Jan-1962	23-Jan-1962	3	2	0	0.0		
FIRST INDO-CHINESE WAR	11-Oct-1945	07-Jan-1946	88	-	0	0.0		
381 ENOSIS MOVEMENT	10-Sep-1955	20-Feb-1959	1260	-	8	0.1	3.2	
TURCO-CYPRIOT WAR	15-Jul-1974	30-Jul-1974	16	-	0	0.0	2.4	
383 KOREAN WAR	28-Jun-1950	27-Jul-1953	1126	5	8 8	0.3		
KOREAN WAR	06-Jul-1950	27-Jul-1953	1118	ო	300	0.3		
385 SUEZ WAR	31-Oct-1956	16-Nov-1956	- 17	6	8	1.2	8.7	
	30-Sep-1945	29-Nov-1946	426	-	009	1.4		
387 CONFRONTATION	30-Jul-1964	21-Nov-1965	480	2	. 2	0.0	12.2	
	11-Sep-1964	11-Aug-1966	700	-	0	0.0	12.2	
389 GULFWAR	17-Jan-1991	15-Jul-1991	180	3	. 10	0.T	16.0	
	17-Jan-1991	28-Feb-1991	43	က	10	0.2	16.0	
391 PALESTINE WAR	28-Sep-1945	15-May-1948	961	14	200	0.2		
	21-Jun-1960	27-Jun-1960	7	2	2	0.3	3.8	Hillian debits and some
393 KENYAN ARMY MUTINY	24-Jan-1964	15-Apr-1964	83		0	0.0	12.2	
	18-Jun-1948	30-Jul-1960	4426	-	200	0.1		SECTION SECTIONS
395 CONFRONTATION	15-Aug-1963	11-Aug-1966	1093	1	8	. 01	4.6	
	10-Dec-1962	20-Dec-1962	1	-	8	0.7	4.5	
397 CONFRONTATION (in Sarawak)	12-Dec-1962	11-Aug-1966	1339	Ī	75	1:0	4.5	
DHOFAR REBELLION	11-Jun-1970	17-Oct-1975	1955	α	8	0.0	1.3	
900 MAMIS DEBELLION	94- hil-1957	00.Feb.1050	566	4	- 4	0.0		

N	NUM INTERVEN		ILITSO	COUP	CSO	ICULT	TARGET		O TCOUP	TCSO T	SULT ILDIF	CUDIF
401	United Kingdom	2.0	ဇာ	0	9		Tanzania	71.9	Ø			-2.4
402	United Kingdom	2.0		0	9	-	Uganda		0	3 14	143 -2.5	-2.4
403	United Kingdom	1.0	3 0	. 0	9	And the Control of	Vanuatu (Stevens Secessionists		6			
404	United Kingdom	2.0	9	0	9	-	Yemen Arab Republic	100.0 5	7	7	3 -4.0	-2.4
405	United Kingdom	2.0	3	0	9		Yemen Arab Republic		3			-2.4
406	United Kingdom	2.0	က	0	9	-	Yemen Arab Republic		-	6 14	And with chair area	-2.4
407	United Kingdom	2.0	က	0	9		Yemen Arab Republic		and the Land			-2.4
408	United States	1.0	-	0	9	19	Cambodia			on the second of	**************************************	-2.4
409	United States	1.0	-	0	9	61	Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam	7.17		91		-2,4
410	United States	1.0	-	0	9	19		26.5 4	-	16		-2.4
411	United States	1.0		0	မ	19	Dem. Rep. Of Vietnam	63.9	-	1		-2.4
412	United States	1.0	_		9	19	Dominican Rep. (Constitutionali:	sts) 35.5 1	4	1 16		-2.3
413	United States	1.0		6		19	DPAK THE THE PARTY OF THE PARTY		6	1	9	-2.4
414	United States	1.0	-	0	9	19	DPRK	DOSPOJNICA I DIR DOSPOJNICA DE PROBLEMANTOS DO ROBRA E PROBLEMANTOS DE LA COSTA DEL COSTA DE LA COSTA DE LA COSTA DEL COSTA DE LA COSTA DEL COSTA DE LA COSTA DEL COSTA DE LA COSTA DEL COSTA DE LA CO	6	16	0	-2.4
415	United States	1.0		0	9	19	DPAK		G	16	0	-2.4
416	United States	1.0	-	0	9	19	DPRK	a zwy skier wpiek piłektei E.(/ 100). Kolak ter skudoskiemokielo, 2000.	6	16	o contractor of	-2.4
417	United States	1.0	1	0	9	19	Grenada	2.7	0	9.		6.0
418	United States	1.0	-	0	9	19	Iran	63.5 1	6	-		-1.7
419	United States	1.0		0	. 9	19	Iraq	40.3	1			2.1
420	United States	1.0	1	0	9	19	Iraq	40.3	-	A CONTRACTOR AND CONT	O Co coronariado	-2.1
421	United States	1.0		0	9	19	Iraq	40.3		6 14	3 -1,6	.21
422	United States	1.0	,	0	9	19	Liberia	60.5 1	3			-2.2
423	United States	1.0		0	9	. 61	Libya	43.5	3			-2.1
424	United States		-	0	9	19	Panama	11.2 2	-			-3.3
425	United States		-	0	8	. 61	etnam	16.6	1			-2.4
426	United States	1.0	-	0	9	19	Rep. Of Vietnam (VC & DRV)	27.7 4	0			-2.4
427	United States	1.0		0		- 19	Somalia	75.9 1	4			-1.9
428	United States	1.0	-	0		19			0	6 151	-	-2.2
429	USSR			0	9		Afghanistan	81.8	4		2	
430	USSR		And the State of t	0	1	and the control of th		CHECKING	-		-	
ا ا	USSH			0				3.1	6			
432	USSK				1		Republic (Al	Cardon	4 -	9		
3	Venezuela	22.5			2	8			6			0.0
434		87.5	4		9	143			0	9	143 1.2	0.0
455 267	Yemen Arab Republic	0.000	0 1		ه د	343	United Kingdom		0 0	•		4.7
757		0.00.0	က	Y	0 8	143	- 6	5.0 40	0 0		က လ	4.7 9.4
438		83.8	5	1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1) (C	143	People's Republic			6 14		rio
439		75.1	2	3	9	143	People's Republic		4	Marie Marie Marie		0.0
440	Yemen People's Republic	No. of Control of Cont	5	1	6	143		4 4 200 200	-	6 1	economic description of the control	0.0
44	Yemen People's Republic	87.5	9	4	9	143	Saudi Arabia	57.8 4	0			0.0
442	. 3	Silver of Charge	2	-	9	143	Saudi Arabia	54.3 4	0		143 1.1	0.0
153	200		ו מו		.	143	Somalia	83.1	+			0.2
444		CHICAGO	5		9	143	Yemen Arab Republic		- 1			0.0
? :	CALC	/5.1	o .	4	9	143	Yemen Arab Hepublic		,			D.O.
446	avia	30.1	4 6	1	9	202	Greece		-	6 10		9.6
} } •		40.7	X 0	7 (א מ	34.	Angola	64.3	-,			
448	Zaire ≢∷	28.0	7.	თ ,	9 -	143	Rwanda E	45.7 2	-	, 1.		0.0
443 1	Zaire	34.1			6	143	Zambia	32.6	2	e e	 0.1	0.0
420	Zambia	27.2	-	N	4	143	Mozambique (Renamo)	67.1 1		4	13 -1.6	0.0

NNS (in Aden Protectors) NS (in Aden Protectors) E WAR (in Cambodia) E WAR E WAR E WAR E WAR I (in Aden Protectors den Protectors den Protectors den Protectors	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	\$5. 20.00	100	3	and the second second	明念の研究では、これの意		The state of the s	- CO
LANDAM NATIONAL CALIFORNIAN CALIFORNIAN CALIFORNIAN CONTRICATOR IN AGEN 1940 11 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	UGANDAN ARMY MUTINY VEMARANA SECESSION SOI ITH ABABIAN ACTIONS (In Aden Profes		Commence of the Commence of th		•	alitakist obsistenti marm		ional loyeller second and the contract of the	
SOUTH ARABIAN ACTIONS Cachul-1990 Cachul-1990<	VEMARANA SECESSION SOLITH ABARIAN ACTIONS (In Aden Profes	25-Jan-1964	01-Aug-1964	190	_	O	0.0	12.5	_
SOUTH ARABIAN MOTONS (in Adein Protection 15-April 1997 OEAMIG 1980 1210 3 40 0.0 SOUTH ARABIAN MOTONS (in Adein Protection 15-April 1995 Colon 400 2 1.0 0.0 SOUTH ARABIAN PERVOLT Colon 1992 2 0 0.0 0.0 SOUTH ARABIAN PERVOLT Colon 1992 2 0 0.0 0.0 SCONDI INDO-CHINESE WAR (in Lada) Colon 1992 3 2 2 0 0.0 SCONDI INDO-CHINESE WAR (in Lada) Colon 1992 3 3 3 0 0.0 0 SCONDI INDO-CHINESE WAR (in Lada) Colon 1992 2 1 3 0 </td <td>SOLITH ARABIAN ACTIONS (in Aden Profes</td> <td>24~Jul-1980</td> <td>18-Aug-1980</td> <td>8</td> <td>Ţ</td> <td>0</td> <td>0.0</td> <td></td> <td></td>	SOLITH ARABIAN ACTIONS (in Aden Profes	24~Jul-1980	18-Aug-1980	8	Ţ	0	0.0		
SOUTH ARABIAN ACTIONS Co-Mari 1949 G-Mari 1949 G-Mari 1949 G-Mari 1949 Till <		the 15-Apr-1947	06-Aug-1950	1210	3	40	00	nabolesti, dentarktalistation vanca Conformino	A Miles of All Management
SOUTH ARABINIA REVOLT SP Mar 1955 SP Mar 1957 SP MAR 1957<	SOLITH ARABIAN ACTIONS	05-Mar-1940	05-Mar-1049		4		10		San
SOUTH FANDIAN REVOLT COLUMITISES COLUMITISES 761 3 0 0 0 SECONDI NOC-CHINESE WAR (In Lase) COLUMITISES 14444-1975 15444-1975 3886 3 700 0.2 SECONDI NOC-CHINESE WAR (In Lase) COLUMITISES 250 3 300 0.1 SECONDI NOC-CHINESE WAR (In Lase) CALMITISES 27-Jun 1590 3 300 0.1 SECONDI NOC-CHINESE WAR (In Lase) CALMITISES 27-Jun 1590 27-Jun 1590 0.0 0.2 KOREAN WAR 27-Jun 1590 27-Jun 1590 27-Jun 1590 0.0 0.0 COREAN CONFLICT 27-Jun 1590 27-Jun 1590 25-Jun 1590 0.0 0.0 GRENDAR, INXSION 27-Jun 1590 27-Jun 1590 25-Jun 1590 25-Jun 1590 0.0 0.0 GULF WAR CONFLICT 27-Jun 1590 27-Jun 1590 25-Jun 1590 25-Jun 1590 0.0 0.0 GULF WAR CONFLICT 27-Jun 1590 27-Jun 1590 25-Jun 1590 25-Jun 1590 0.0 0.0 GULF WAR CONFL		OS Mar 1055	26.Mar. 1055	o San La Carlo Car	C			New Sections	
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR (In Lass)	SOUTH APPLIANTED OF	20-Mai-1505	20-IMBI-1333		7	o de la composición dela composición de la composición dela composición de la compos	0.0		
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR (in Lase) 14-May-1975 15-May-1975 15-May-1	SOCIET PREMIUM DEVOLUTION OF THE PROPERTY OF T	0051-Un7-00	2051-In-00	10)	2		2.7		
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR (in Lack) SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR (in Lack) SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR (in Cambodia) SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR (i	:	14-May-1975	15-May-1975	N	7	50	10.0		
SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR (In Camboida) 20-640-1964 27-Jun-1953 2620-2 3 30000 0.2 2 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5		08-Jun-1964	15-Aug-1973	3356	3	200	0,1		
SECOND INDOCHINESE WAR (in Cambodia) 20/56pt 1666 15-Aug/1973 3222 3 600 0.2 CORENI WAR 28-Apr/1966 21/24br/1963 1127 3 300000 28.6 KOREAN WAR 28-Apr/1966 27/24br/1963 1127 3 300000 28.6 KOREAN CONFLICIT 28-Apr/1960 27/24br/1963 1127 3 300000 28.7 KOREAN CONFLICIT 28-Apr/1963 18-Apr/1960 2 2 0.0 0.0 ROPEAN CONFLICIT 28-Apr/1963 18-Apr/1960 2 2 0 0.0 RESERT STORM 17/24br/1961 18-Apr/1961 2 2 2 0 0.0 GULF WAR 17/24br/1967 25-Apr/1960 2 2 2 0 <t< td=""><td>SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR</td><td>04-Aug-1964</td><td>27-Jan-1973</td><td>3099</td><td>က</td><td>700</td><td>0.2</td><td></td><td></td></t<>	SECOND INDO-CHINESE WAR	04-Aug-1964	27-Jan-1973	3099	က	700	0.2		
COMENTION CAN COMENT 28-Apri 956 21-Sep 166 512 1 3 300000 28.6	5	ia) 20-Sep-1966	15-Aug-1973	2522	3	909			
KOREAN WART 27 Jun 1950	ž.	28-Apr-1965	21-Sep-1966	512	1	30	0.1	9.2	-
KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR KOREAN WAR KOREAN CONFLICT 29-Jul-1950 16	KOBEANWAB	27. lin-1950	27. Int-1053	1127	4	30000	26.6		
KOREAN CONFLICT 29-Juni-1982 27-Juni-1982 17-Juni-1983 27-Juni-1983 17-Juni-1983 27-Juni-1983 28-Juni-1983 28-Juni-1981 15-Juni-1981 18-Juni-1983 28-Juni-1983 28-Juni-19	The control of the co					20000	7 00	Saltania att Cartonia deliktor delata	Salar Sa
Comparison		nca I-IInn-no	27 -IDC- /2	+711	0	20000	7.07		
KORRENADA INVASION 22-Obr-1980 1431 1 40 0.0 RENAVA INVASION 22-Obr-1980 15-Dbe-1983 25 1 20 0.4 TEHRAN RESCUE MISSION 24-Apr-1980 25-Apr-1980 25-Apr-1980 25 2 2 0.4 QUEU WAR 17-Apr-1981 15-Apr-1991 2 1 1 0 0.5 QUEU WAR 17-Apr-1991 28-Apr-1991 2 1 1 0 0.5 QUEU WAR 20-Apr-1997 28-Apr-1997 2 1 1 0 0.5 QUEU WAR 20-Apr-1997 28-Apr-1990 25 1 1 0 0.0 QUEU WAR 20-Apr-1997 28-Apr-1990 13 3 3 3 0 0 0 QUEU WAR 20-Apr-1997 28-Apr-1990 13 3 3 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 <	KOREAN CONFLICT	29-Jui-1963	03-Nov-1963	88	Account to the second state of	2	00		
Charles Char	KOREAN CONFLICT	18-Nov-1965	18-Oct-1969	1431	-	4	0.0		
TEHRAN RESCUE MISSION 24-Apr-1990 25-Apr-1990 25-Apr-1990 25-Apr-1990 4.0 DESERT STORM 17-Jan-1991 17-Jan-1991 17-Jan-1991 190 3 100 0.6 GULF WAR 17-Jan-1991 28-Dan-1991 2 1 1 0 0.0 GULF WAR (in Saudi Arabia) 29-Jan-1991 29-Jan-1990 2 1 1 0 0.0 GULF WAR (in Saudi Arabia) 29-Jan-1990 19-Apr-1990 29-Jan-1990 1 2 0 0.0 BUDAMESTON 20-Dac-1999 19-Apr-1997 27-Apr-1990 132 2 0 0.0 SECOND INDO-CHINESE 22-Apr-1997 27-Apr-1996 3 3 0	GRENADA INVASION	25-Oct-1983	15-Dec-1983	52	1	ୡ	0.4	13.7	2
17-Jan-1991 15-Jui-1991 43 1 100 0.2 17-Jan-1991 28-Feb-1991 43 1 10 0.2 17-Jan-1991 28-Feb-1991 43 1 10 0.2 19-Jan-1991 3-Jan-1-1990 15 1 1 1 0 0.0 24-Mar-1995 15-Jan-1-1990 132 1 26 0.1 20-Dec-1989 30-Apr-1990 132 1 26 0.1 22-Mar-1-1991 0.5-Jan-1-1991 1 2 0 0.0 0.5-Jan-1992 22-Jan-1-1991 1 2 0 0.0 0.5-Jan-1993 1-Feb-1955 5 1 0 0 0.0 0.5-Jan-1993 1-Feb-1995 1-Feb-1995 1-Feb-1995 1-Feb-1995 1-Feb-1995 1-Feb-1995 1-Feb-1995 1-Feb-1997	TEHRAN RESCUE MISSION	24-Apr-1980	25-Apr-1980	2	2	8	4.0	4.5	_
17.Jan-1991 28.Feb-1991 43 1 10 0.2 29.Jan-1991 29.Jan-1991 2 1 12 6.0 4	DESERT STORM	17-Jan-1991	15-Jul-1991	180	3	100	0.6	24.9	2
19	mention of the second control of the form of the control of the co	17-Jan-1991	28-Feh-1991	43	Security of the second security of the second secon	10	0.0	24.9	2
Variable 19-Aug-1990 15-Aug-1990 15-Aug-1990 15-Aug-1990 15-Aug-1990 15-Aug-1990 15-Aug-1990 15-Aug-1990 13-Aug-1990 13-Aug-1990 13-Aug-1990 13-Aug-1990 13-Aug-1990 13-Aug-1990 13-Aug-1990 13-Aug-1990 13-Aug-1990 12-Bu-1991 13-Aug-1990 13-A	27	90 Jan 1001	40-190-1001	9.1	1	10	80	0.76	6
VANDELIGIES 19-Aug-1990 15-Aug-1990	T.		Serial 33				2	2	
24-Mar-1986 15-Apr/1986 233 3 2 0.1 20-Dec-1989 30-Apr/1990 132 1 26 0.2 20-Dec-1989 30-Apr/1975 26 0.0 0.0 WAR 22-Mar-1976 27-Jan-1971 1 2 0.0 0.0 05-Jan-1991 05-Jan-1997 05-Jan-1997 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 07-Feb-1955 11-Feb-1955 5 1 0 0.0 0.0 07-Abr-1969 15-Feb-1989 3339 1 1500 0.0 0.0 07-Abr-1978 27-Abr-1969 15-Abr-1969 15-Abr-1978 0 0.0 0.0 22-Feb-1970 22-Feb-1970 22-Feb-1970 22-Feb-1970 1 4 0 0.0 1(In Adan Protectora 15-Dec-1970 13-Aug-1989 25 1 0 0.0 22-Feb-1979 13-Aug-1986 38 3 0 0.0 0.0 22-Feb-1979 25-Bo-1972 18-Oct-1976	MONHOVIA EVACUALION	05-Aug-1990	19-Aug-1990	15	-	0	0.0		
20-Dec-1989 30-Apr-1990 132 1 26 0.2 WAR 22-Mar-1975 29-Apr-1976 2 1 0 0.0 WAR 22-Mar-1981 05-Jan-1985 5 1 0 0.0 07-Feb-1955 11-Feb-1955 5 1 0 0.0 07-Feb-1956 11-Feb-1958 5339 1 15000 4.5 27-Dec-1979 15-Feb-1958 217 1 0 0.0 22-Mar-1969 27-May-1969 155 217 1 500 6.6 22-Oct-1976 27-May-1969 13-Creb-1978 1 5 0 0.0 22-Oct-1966 27-May-1969 1377 3 0 0.0 10-Nov-1978 12-Sep-1964 88 2 10 0.0 10-Nov-1972 22-Apr-1956 23 1 10 0.1 22-Sep-1972 18-Oct-1972 18-Oct-1976 18-Oct-1976 18-Oct-1977 18-Oct-1977 22-Feb-19	LIBYA RAIDS	24-Mar-1986	15-Apr-1986	X	က	C)	0.1	2.9	N
WAR 28-Apr-1975 29-Apr-1975 29-Apr-1975 29-Apr-1975 29-Apr-1970 29-Apr-1970 29-Apr-1970 12-6 WAR 22-Mar-1962 27-Jan-1973 3965 3 50000 12.6 05-Jan-1991 05-Jan-1992 1 0 0 0 0 07-Feb-1955 13-Aug-1969 165 2 100 0.6 0 27-Dec-1979 13-Aug-1969 165 2 100 0.6 0 27-Dec-1979 27-Mar-1969 13-Aug-1969 165 2 100 0.6 28-Jun-1978 25-Teb-1970 217 1 500 2.3 0 26-Jun-1978 25-Teb-1974 38 2 10 0.0 0 1 (In Aden Protectora 10-Jun-1966 1377 3 0 0.1 0.0 0 1 (In Aden Protectora 25-Dec-1972 18-Oct-1972 18-Oct-1972 18-Oct-1973 18-Oct-1973 1 0 0.0 25-Feb-1979 19-Mar-1976 25-Feb-197	PANAMA INVASION	20-Dec-1989	30-Apr-1990	132	-	56	0.2	6.5	_
WAR 22-Mar-1962 27-Jan-1973 3965 3 50000 12.6 0.5-Jan-1991 0.5-Jan-1991 1 2 0 0.0 0.7-Feb-1955 11-Feb-1955 5 1 0 0.0 27-Dec-1979 15-Feb-1989 155 1 0 0.0 0.2-Mar-1969 27-Mar-1978 25-Jun-1978 1 0 0 23-Oct-1979 22-Feb-1970 22-Feb-1970 1 4 0 0 1 O-Nov-1969 13-Oct-1970 338 3 0 0 0 1 O-Nov-1969 13-Oct-1970 338 3 0 0 0 1 (in Aden Protectora: 10-Juin-1954 05-Sep-1954 88 2 10 0 0 1 (in Aden Protectora: 10-Juin-1954 05-Sep-1972 23-Mar-1976 25-Jui-1968 25-Jui-1968 25-Jui-1968 25-Jui-1968 25-Jui-1968 25-Jui-1968 25-Jui-1968 25-Jui-1968 25-Juin-1968 25-Juin-1968 25-Juin-1968 25-Juin-1968 25-Juin-1968	SAIGON EVACUATIONS	28-Apr-1975	29-Apr-1975	2		0	0.0		
OS-Jan-1991 O5-Jan-1991 O5-Jan-1991 O5-Jan-1991 O7-Feb-1955 Feb-1955 Feb-1955 Feb-1955 Feb-1955 Feb-1955 Feb-1965 Feb-1968 GO O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O		22-Mar-1962	27-Jan-1973	3965	က	50000	12.6		
O7-Feb-1955 11-Feb-1965 5 1 0 0 Z7-Dec-1979 15-Feb-1989 3339 1 15000 4.5 02-Mar-1969 13-Aug-1969 165 2 100 0.6 22-Mar-1969 13-Aug-1969 165 217 1 500 2.3 22-Mar-1969 22-May-1967 22-Feb-1970 1 4 0 0.0 22-Feb-1970 22-Feb-1970 1 4 0 0.0 10-Nov-1969 22-Feb-1970 338 2 10 0.1 10-Nov-1969 22-Dec-1956 29-Dr-1958 491 2 0 0.0 1 (In Aden Protectorate) 22-Dec-1956 29-Dr-1956 491 2 0 0.0 2 (Sep-1972 22-Dec-1956 1377 3 0 0.1 2 (Sep-1972 22-Dec-1979 1406 4 5 0.0 2 (Sep-1972 23-Feb-1978 24 1 10 0.0 2 (Mar-1973	SOMALIA EVACUATION	05-Jan-1991	05-Jan-1991		2	0	0.0		
27-Dec-1979 15-Feb-1989 5339 1 1500 4.5 02-Mar-1969 13-Aug-1969 165 2 100 0.6 22-Cun-1978 23-Oct-1956 27-May-1957 217 1 500 23 22-Leb.:1970 22-Feb.:1970 1 4 0 0.0 0 22-Feb.:1970 22-Feb.:1970 1 4 0 0.0 0 1 (In Aden Protectora 10-Jun-1954 05-Sep-1954 338 3 0 0.0 1 (In Aden Protectora 25-Dec-1956 22-Apr-1956 491 2 0 0.0 1 (In Aden Protectora 25-Dec-1962 23-Apr-1958 491 2 0 0.0 2 (Sep-1972 22-Oct-1966 29-Apr-1966 23-Apr-1966 23 1 0 0.0 2 (Sep-1972 18-Oct-1979 19-Mar-1976 25-Apr-1978 1406 4 5 0 0 2 (Mar-1973 18-Oct-1978 18-Oct-1978 18-Oct-1978 18-Oct-1978 18-Oct-1978 18-Oct	TACHENS EVACUATION	07-Feb-1955	11-Feb-1955	5	-	0	0.0	8.7	-
02-Mar-1969 13-Aug-1969 165 2 100 0.6 23-Oct-1966 27-May-1957 217 1 500 23 26-Jun-1978 22-Feb-1970 22-Feb-1970 1 5 0 0.0 10-Nov-1969 13-Oct-1970 338 3 0 0.0 0 T (In Aden Protectora 10-Jun-1964 1377 3 0 0.0 0 T (In Aden Protectora 10-Jun-1964 1377 3 0 0.0 0 T (In Aden Protectora 25-Dec-1962 29-Apr-1966 1377 3 0 0.1 T (In Aden Protectora 25-Dec-1962 29-Apr-1966 1377 3 0 0.1 Amplitude 1972 29-Apr-1966 1377 2 1 0 0 Amplitude 1973 19-Mar-1976 1406 4 5 0 0 28-Nov-1969 03-Mar-1978 12 1 0 0 0 28-Nov-1973 16-Mar-1978 18-Oct-1972 22 0	AFGHAN WAR	27-Dec-1979	15-Feb-1989	3339		15000	4.5		and the same
23-Oct-1956 27-May-1957 217 1 500 2.3 22-Fab-1970 22-Fab-1970 1 4 0 0 0.0 22-Fab-1970 22-Fab-1970 1 4 0 0 0.0 10-Nov-1969 13-Oct-1970 338 3 0 0.0 1 (In Aden Protectora: 10-Jun-1954 88 2 10 0.0 1 (In Aden Protectora: 22-Jun-1956 1377 3 0 0.1 1 (In Aden Protectora: 10-Jun-1954 88 2 10 0.0 22-Jun-1954 05-Sap-1954 88 2 10 0.0 22-Jun-1954 25-Jun-1966 1377 3 0 0.1 26-Sap-1979 19-Mar-1979 255 1 10 0.4 26-Sap-1979 19-Mar-1979 255 1 0.0 26-Sap-1979 03-Jun-1976 1406 4 5 0.0 26-Nov-1969 03-Dec-1959 8 1 10 0.0 26-Nov-1969 03-Dec-1959 8 1 10 0.0 26-Nov-1969 03-Dec-1959 8 1 0.0 26-Sap-1978 12-Sap-1978 24 1 0 0.0 27-Fab-1979 19-Mar-1979 24 1 0.0 28-Sap-1948 08-Sap-1948 1 2 2.0 20-Ct-1979 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 28-Jun-1975 28-Fab-1982 28-Fab-1982 28-Fab-1982 28-Fab-1982 28-Fab-1982 38-Fab-1982 28-Fab-1982 38-Fab-1982 28-Fab-1982 28-Fab-19	SINO-SOVIET CONFILCT	02.Mar.1969	13-Ann-1969	165		100	0.6	62	-
22-Fab-1970 22-Fab-1970 1 5 000 10-Nov-1969 13-Oct-1970 388 3 0 0.0 10-Nov-1969 13-Oct-1970 388 3 0 0.0 10-Nov-1969 13-Oct-1970 388 3 0 0.0 11-Nov-1969 13-Oct-1970 388 3 0 0.0 10-Nov-1969 13-Oct-1970 22-Fab-1979 22-Oct-1962 29-Apr-1968 491 2 30 0.1 15-Sap-1972 18-Oct-1972 23 1 10 0.4 15-Sap-1972 18-Oct-1972 23 1 10 0.4 15-Sap-1979 19-Mar-1979 25 1 10 0.0 15-Sap-1979 19-Mar-1979 241 1 5 0.0 15-Oct-1971 18-Oct-1948 1 2 20 20.0 15-Oct-1971 18-Oct-1948 1 2 20 20.0 15-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0	BI IN A DEST I IDDISING	93-Oct-1958	97-May-1057	517		500			
22-Feb-1970 22-Feb-1970 1 4 0 0 0.0 10-Nov-1969 13-Oct-1970 338 3 0 0.0 10-Nov-1969 13-Oct-1970 338 3 0 0.0 1 (in Aden Protectora: 10-Jun-1954 05-Sep-1984 88 2 10 0.0 1 (in Aden Protectora: 22-Oct-1962 29-Apr-1958 491 2 30 0.1 22-Oct-1962 29-Apr-1958 491 2 30 0.1 22-Oct-1962 29-Apr-1958 491 2 30 0.1 22-Oct-1972 18-Oct-1972 23 1 10 0.4 23-Feb-1979 19-Mar-1979 25 1 10 0.4 26-Sep-1979 03-Dec-1969 8 1 10 0.0 3) 15-Apr-1979 12-Sep-1978 11 5 0.0 3) 15-Apr-1979 14-Apr-1979 24 1 0.0 30 06-Sep-1948 08-Sep-1948 1 2 20 200 31 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 28-Feb-1992 28-Feb-1982 1 3 3 3.0	Section 1997 To Control of the Contr		4070 L. 4070			200)		
To Nov-1969 13-cc-1970 1 4 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9	ISMAILS COUP	26-Jun-1978	26-Jun-1978	-	٥.	0	0.0		and the second
10-Nov-1969 13-Oct-1970 338 3 0 0.0 10-Nov-1969 13-Oct-1970 338 3 0 0.0 11 10-Lin-1954 05-Sep-1954 88 2 10 0.1 12 12 12 12 13 10 0.1 13 14 15 12 13 10 0.1 14 15 14 15 10 0.4 15 15 17 17 17 17 17 17	ESSEQUIBO SHELLING	22-Feb-1970	22-Feb-1970	The second second	4	0	0.0	4.3	
T (in Aden Protectora 10-Jun-1954 05-Sep-1954 98 2 10 0.1 T (in Aden Protectora 25-Dec-1956 29-Apr-1958 491 2 30 0.1 fen Protectora 25-Dec-1966 29-Apr-1958 1377 3 0 0.1 fen Protectora 25-Dec-1962 29-Jul-1966 1377 3 0 0.0 26-Sep-1972 18-Oct-1972 18-Oct-1976 23 1 10 0.4 26-Roy-1972 03-May-1972 08-Mar-1976 241 1 1 13 0 0 3) 15-Jan-1978 12-Sep-1978 241 1 10 0.0 0 4 5 0.2-Anar-1972 370 2 10 0.0 0 5 15-Jan-1978 18-Oct-1972 370 2 10 0.0 0 6 24-Feb-1979 18-Mar-1972 22-Feb-1948 1 10 0.0 0 6 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0	NAJRAN AIR RAIDS	10-Nov-1969	13-Oct-1970	338	က	0	0.0		
The Aden Protectoral 25-Dec-1956 29-Apr-1958 491 2 30 0.1	SOUTH ARABIAN REVOLT (in Aden Protect	ora 10-Jun-1954	05-Sep-1954	88	.2	- 10	0.1		
den Protectorate) 22-Oct-1962 29-Jul-1966 1377 3 0 0.0 26-Sep-1972 18-Oct-1972 23 1 10 0.4 25-Feb-1979 19-Mar-1979 25 1 10 0.4 03-May-1972 08-Mar-1976 1406 4 5 0.0 26-Nov-1969 03-Dec-1969 8 1 10 0.1 26-Nov-1969 03-Dec-1969 8 1 0 0.0 a) 15-Jan-1973 12-Sep-1978 1 5 0.0 15-Jan-1976 12-Sep-1978 241 10 0.0 06-Sep-1948 08-Sep-1948 1 2 20 2.0 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 05-Oct-1992 22-Feb-1962 1 0 0.0 28-Feb-1982 28-Feb-1962 1 2 3 3.0	SOUTH ARABIAN REVOLT (in Aden Protector	ora: 25-Dec-1956	29-Apr-1958	491	2	30	0.1		
26-Sep-1972 18-Oct-1972 23 1 10 0.4 23-Feb-1979 19-Mar-1979 25 1 10 0.4 03-May-1872 08-Mar-1976 1406 4 5 0.0 26-Nov-1869 03-Dec-1969 8 1 10 1.3 26-May-1973 20-Mar-1973 1 5 0 0.0 a) 15-Jan-1973 20-Mar-1979 24 1 0 0.0 24-Feb-1971 18-Oct-1979 24 1 0.0 08-Sep-1948 08-Sep-1948 1 2 20 20.0 06-Sep-1948 08-Sep-1948 1 2 20 20.0 06-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0	YEMENI CIVIL WAR (in Aden Protectorate)	22-Oct-1962	29-Jul-1966	1377	3	0	0.0		
29. Febr. 1979 19-Mar. 1979 255 1 10 0.04 03. May-1972 08-Mar-1976 1406 4 5 0.0 26-Nov-1969 03-Dec-1969 8 1 10 1.3 20-Mar-1973 20-Mar-1973 1 3 0 0.0 15. Jan-1978 12-Sep-1972 241 1 5 0.0 24-Feb-1979 18-Mar-1978 24 1 10 0.0 06-Sep-1948 08-Sep-1978 12 20 20.0 06-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 2 3 3.0	YEMENI CONFLICT	26-Sep-1972	18-Oct-1972	23	-	10	0.4		
a) 26-Nov-1969 03-Dec-1969 8 1 10 10 1.3 26-Nov-1969 03-Dec-1969 8 1 10 10 1.3 20-Mar-1973 20-Mar-1973 1 3 0 0.0 15-Oct-1971 18-Oct-1972 370 2 10 08-Sep-1948 08-Sep-1948 1 2 20 20.0 08-Sep-1948 08-Sep-1948 1 2 20 20.0 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 28-Feb-1962 28-Feb-1962 1 2 3 3.0	NDF INVASION	23-Fah-1979	19-Mar-1979	25		10	0.4		
a) 26-Nov-1969 03-Dec-1969 8 1 10 1.3 20-Mar-1973 20-Mar-1973 1 3 0 0.0 15-Oct-1971 18-Oct-1972 370 2 10 0.0 24-Feb-1979 19-Mar-1972 24 1 10 0.0 08-Sep-1948 08-Sep-1948 1 2 20 20.0 08-Sep-1949 08-Sep-1948 1 0 0.0 0.0 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 05-Oct-1992 28-Feb-1982 28-Feb-1982 3 3 3	DHOFAR RERFITION	03-May-1972	08-Mar-1976	1406	4	5	0.0		
a) 20-Mar-1973 20-Mar-1973 1 3 0 0.0 20-Mar-1973 1 3 0 0.0 15-Oct-1971 18-Oct-1972 370 2 10 0.0 24-Feb:1979 19-Mar-1979 24 1 10 0.4 08-Sep-1948 08-Sep-1948 1 2 20 20.0 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 26-Feb:1972 27-Feb-1976 228 2 200 0.9 26-Feb:1982 28-Feb:1962 1 2 3 3.0	AI :WADIAH BATTI E	26-Nov-1060	03-Der-1969	ο α		10	1.8		
a) L5-War-1973 2-War-1979 1 5 0.00 15-Oct-1971 18-Oct-1972 370 2 10 0.0 24-Eab-1979 19-Mar-1979 24 1 10 0.4 08-Sep-1948 08-Sep-1948 1 2 20 2.0 15-Jul-1975 27-Feb-1976 228 2 200 0.9 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 28-Feb-1982 28-Feb-1982 1 2 3 3.0	OF WOOD IN DAIL	CO. 14-100	0001300	•		2)		
a) 15-dar-1 976 14-Sep-1 976 24-1 5 0.04 15-Oct-1 973 18-Oct-1 972 24 1 10 0.04 08-Sep-1 948 08-Sep-1 978 1 2 20 20.0 05-Oct-1 990 17-Oct-1 990 13 1 0 0.0 05-Oct-1 990 17-Oct-1 990 13 1 0 0.0	AL-WADIAT AIR RAID	ZU-Mar-1973	ZU-Mar-1973		o ,	0 1	0.0		
15-Oct-1971 18-Oct-1972 370 2 10 0.0 24-Febi-1979 19-Mar-1979 24 1 10 0.4 08-Sep-1948 08-Sep-1948 1 2 20 2.0 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 26-Febi-1982 28-Febi-1982 1 2 3 3.0	GGADEN WAR (IN EMIODIA)	10-Van-19/0	12-58p-1978	241		o	0.0		
24-Febr 1979 19-Mar-1979 24 1 10 0.4 08-Sep-1948 08-Sep-1948 1 2 20 20.0 15-Jul-1975 27-Feb-1976 228 2 200 0.9 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0	YEMENI CONFLICT	15-Oct-1971	18-Oct-1972	370	2	10	0.0		***************************************
08-Sep-1948 08-Sep-1948 1 2 20 20.0 15-Jul-1975 <u>27-Feb-1976 228 2 200 0.9</u> 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 28-Feb-1982 28-Feb-1982 1 2 3.0	NDF INVASION	24-Feb-1979	19-Mar-1979	. 24	-	10	0.4		
15-Jul-1975 <u>27-Feb-1976 228 2 200 0.9</u> 05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 28-Feb-1982 28-Feb-1982 1 2 3 3.0	GREEK CIVIL WAR	08-Sep-1948	08-Sep-1948	-	7	20	20.0		
05-Oct-1990 17-Oct-1990 13 1 0 0.0 28-Feb-1982 28-Feb-1982 1 2 3 3.0	ANGOLAN CIVIL WAR	15-Jul-1975	27-Feb-1976	228	5	580	6.0	6.0	
28-Feb-1982 28-Feb-1982 1 2 3	TUTSI INVASION	05-Oct-1990	17-Oct-1990	13	-	0	0.0	9.0	2
	7AIRE-7AMBIA BOBDER	28-Feb-1982	28-Fah-19R2		2	3	3.0	0.5	
						State Contract And State Contract.			

	e 18						
CUDIF	0	Ξ.	0	0	0.0	0	0
	. 4						12.
LDIF	6	9.	0.8	.3	61-	4	6.0
Τ.	•			Ü		•	
TCULT	143	151	143	143	143	143	143
	1						
TCSO	6	က	3	က	c	ო	က
TCOUP							
10	0	က	0	0	ဇာ	-	0
JTSO							
L	2	-	7	-	2	-	ł
III	4.7	4.3	4.5	0.0	8	2.8	47.5
1	2	Ó	4	ന	7	7	4
in the same of			1000			<u>و</u>	
a caracteria						Renau	
	0				dne	que (F	
RARGET	babw	ola	Botswana	swans	Mozambique	zambi	nbla
TA	Zin	Anc	В	BG	%	Mo	Zambia
ULT	က	က	က	က္	143	က္	6
2	14	14	1.	7	1,	7	1
cso		-		~		~	
P 1		(,)		U)		.,	
<u>00</u>	0	0	0	က	0	က	0
80			0				0
	_	~	N	-	7	0	7
TII TI	S	۲.	7	۲.	7	۲.	7
	47	24	24.7	37.7	24.7	24	24.7
dia di Sona							
and the second							
N						۲.	
VE	1.3	bwe	DWe	3bwe	abwe	abwe	bwe
兵	bia	Z	9	~	1, 240	~~	2
INTER	Zambia	Zimba	453 Zimbabwe	Zimba	455 Zimbabwe	Zimbat	457 Zimba

E77	i con				E2177		M.T.
ğ							
೮							
		Г		-	7	-	
NORMAL RATIO							
3	6	œί	ω.	<u></u>	-	ιvi	-
	0	-	0	0		_	
A							
E							
ᅙ	Ö	0.0	0.0	0.	Ξ	2	7
70	Ň	_		_		Ÿ	
7						_	
2	o	0	9	_	8	ş	2
	22						
S							
ō							
3	4	ო	N	2	ત	-	က
100							
LENGTH MILOPS FATA							
2	မွ		B		8	4	
"	16	-	8	43	1433	8	ଞ୍ଚ
			20				
	_	g	O	ღ	O)	Ξ	O
Щ	30-Oct-1977	197	197	198	197	5	197
M	늉	ģ	ģ	ပ္ပံ	ģ	8	9
2	ၛ	ű,	3-A	Ö	č	ď	ð
ш	ਲ	ঝ	5	ผ	ŏ	==	Ö
200							
	11	29	9/	83	92	Ω	2
	3	-19	5	5	-19	58	<u> </u>
Ш	18-May-1977	-e	ğ	ş	Jan	늘	31-Aug-1977
A	18	26-1	4	8	7	řζ	3
				_			
82.7		=					
100	2	_	₽.		وليت		=
· 055		ş	3		3		5
1		(ZAN	SA	စ္ည	Ś		\$
	АВ	AR (ZANI	AR (ZAN	ERS	AR (ZANU	Շ	AR (ZAN
A STATE OF THE STA	WAR	. WAR (ZAN	WAR (ZANU	RDERS	WAR (ZAN	ENCY	WAR (ZA)
	VIL WAR	≩	3	띥	VIL WAR (ZAN	3GEN	VIL WAR (ZAN
	I CIVIL WAR	≩	3	띥	I CIVIL WAR (ZAN	3GEN	I CIVIL WAR (ZAN
	IAN CIVIL WAR	≩	3	띥	M TIND ₹	3GEN	IAN CIVIL WAR (ZAN
	ESIAN CIVIL WAR	≩	3	띥	M TIND ₹	O INSURGEN	ESIAN CIVIL WAR (ZAN
ME	ODESIAN CIVIL WAR	≩	3	띥	M TIND ₹	O INSURGEN	ODESIAN CIVIL WAR (ZAN
NAME	RHODESIAN CIVIL WAR	≩	PHODESIAN CIVIL W	MAITENGWE DISORD	RHODESIAN CIVIL W	ENAMO INSURGEN	RHODESIAN CIVIL WAR (ZAN
M NAME	1 RHODESIAN CIVIL WAR	RHODESIAN CIVIL WA	453 RHODESIAN CIVIL WAR (ZAN	MAITENGWE DISORD	M TIND ₹	ENAMO INSURGEN	457 RHODESIAN CIVIL WAR (ZAN

In Chapter 3 we referred to the distributions of culture scores for both intervenors and targets. These are listed below as Figure 1 and Figure 2.




Figure 1. Intervenor Culture z-Score




Figure 2. Target Culture z-Score

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188

Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

V/	A 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Pape	rwork Heduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, L	JC 20503	3.
1.	AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)	2. REPORT DATE	3. F	REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
		October 1999	F	Final
4.	TITLE AND SUBTITLE			5. FUNDING NUMBERS
	Why Nations Differ in Military Skill (and Defense Planning)	How that Should Affect U.S.		Independent Research Project
6.	AUTHOR(S) Wade P. Hinkle, Michael P. Fischerkell Rafael Bonoan	er, Mathew N. Diascro,		
7.	PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S)	AND ADDRESS(ES)		8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER
	Institute for Defense Analyses 1801 N. Beauregard Street Alexandria, VA 22311			IDA Document D-2372
9.	SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY N Institute for Defense Analyses	AME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)		10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER
	1801 N. Beauregard Street Alexandria, VA 22311			
1	1. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES			
1:	2a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEM Approved for public release; distribution		•	12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE

13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)

A consistent recent theme sounded by defense policymakers and commentators is the difficulty of planning under conditions of strategic uncertainty. Many worry about the challenge of economic development in potential adversaries coupled with proliferation of advanced conventional weapons. They argue that those trends could place U.S. security at risk by fostering the emergence of regional hegemons or even near-peer competitors. We argue this is not necessarily the case. This is because two often overlooked factors, civil-military relations and culturally-based organizational norms, may act to systematically constrain a recipient country's ability to attain and maintain the skill needed to take advantage of these assets. We test this hypothesis in a large-*n* study and present the implications of our findings for defense policy and analysis.

14. SUBJECT TERMS			15. NUMBER OF PAGES
intelligence collection, inte near-peer competitor, reg power, national power, hi culture lag, organization	illigence analysis, regional balan iional hegemons, human capita uman development, civil-military nal behavior, organizational c	ons systems, skill, training, readine ce assessment, combat assessment, economic levelopment, economic relations, coups, regional instabiliculture, cultural norms, technolosimilation, arms control, plann	ent, nic 106 lity, ogy
	Defense Review, defense prograf		16. PRICE CODE
17. SECURITY	18. SECURITY	19. SECURITY	20. LIMITATION OF
CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT	CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE	CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT	ABSTRACT
UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UNCLASSIFIED	UL